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Foreword by Olivier Roy
Is it possible to speak of an “Islamist” foreign policy? The question really only 
makes sense since Islamist parties have had the chance to try their hands on 
the levers of power. While they were opposed to the notion, the response to 
the question can only come from their ideological corpus. There are certainly 
some specific ideas to be found in the texts and programs of the parties: 
develop a “third way” from the time when the Western and the Communist 
blocs between them dominated the geostrategic landscape; unite the Muslim 
countries with the long-term goal of reconstituting a Califate; and ultimately 
revive concepts elaborated by jurists of the classical age (dār al islam (house 
of Islam), dār al harb (house of war), and dār al ahd (house of truce)) that 
allowed for the Islamization of concepts of diplomacy and international trea-
ties. This applies to the Sunni Islamists, as we will see, as Iran would develop 
its own model of diplomacy.
Apart from this ideological reference, the Islamist movement has never 
taken up a jihadist stance toward the West and always sought to maintain 
open channels of communication with Western governments. In general, it 
was the West that refused to regard them as legitimate oppositional move-
ments, even though London had liberally granted them political asylum, 
particularly to individuals belonging to Tunisia’s Ennahda and the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS).
However, by now a large share of Sunni Islamist movements (and all 
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those studied in this book) have had experience in managing foreign rela-
tions, even if ephemeral (Egypt), exercised in a power-sharing arrangement 
(Tunisia, Morocco), or, in Hezbollah’s case, outside any state framework. It 
is therefore possible today to study actual practice instead of doing an often 
sterile exegesis of ideological discourse.
Interestingly, despite the great diversity of cases studied, we find a number 
of constants: This is what gives the book an overall unity. As may be expected, 
all the Islamist movements have adopted a foreign policy that is more prag-
matic and moderate than their discourse lets on. Even though largely toned 
down, the ideological corpus has not disappeared; rather, it has slipped from 
a referential focused on the first Muslim community of the Prophet’s era 
into one articulated around paradigms of identity and the clash/dialogue of 
civilizations formulated in terms of defending national values and traditions 
against a corrupting and alienating Westernization. In short, we pass from a 
religious cleavage (Islam/people of the book/heathens) to a civilizational split 
(peoples of the East against the West). We move from revelation to identity, 
from religion to culture. Thus, Istanbul’s Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) mayoralty in the 1990s could launch a series of meetings whose theme 
was the dialogue of civilizations, an initiative subsequently taken up by the 
AKP Government in tandem with Spain.
Turning to the practice of diplomacy, it can be summed up as a dual 
approach. The first is a realistic one, in the sense of the realist theory of 
international relations. The Islamist parties do not question the national 
framework nor the grand regional balances. They are invested in the state 
framework. Even Hezbollah does not challenge the principle of the Lebanese 
state. Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD) adopts the monar-
chy’s position on the Western Sahara in whole cloth. Turkey’s AKP does not 
question the Kemalist state, Turkey’s European leanings or its North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. Nahda the entire time refers to 
the Tunisian nation and subscribes to the postcolonial perspective.
Nowhere do we find complete reversals of the alliances that had marked 
the Islamic revolution’s victory in Iran (replacement of Israel’s embassy 
by the Palestinian embassy, support for Ireland’s Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), and support for liberation movements in Latin America against the 
United States). Egypt and Turkey have maintained diplomatic relations with 
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Israel, while Morocco has maintained links with it even without exchanging 
ambassadors.
At most, a change in the new elite’s tropism can be noted: Many Nahda 
cadres speak better English than French, because they took refuge in Great 
Britain or studied in the United States. The same applies to Egypt and 
Turkey (and to Iran as well): The old Francophone and secular elites have 
been overtaken by a new generation of Anglophone technocrats. French 
seems to be loaded with “values,” while English appears to be purely the 
language of technology. Once again, France pays in terms of influence for its 
willingness to identify Francophony with civilizational values, among which, 
of course, figures militant secularism.
But this distancing from the former metropole and fostering identity has 
nothing to do with an “Islamic” diplomacy that has never made the least start 
at concretization or even definition.
The problem for the Islamists in power, therefore, is managing the 
Islamic referential that is their hallmark. To renounce it, as much in foreign 
as in domestic policy, means losing their specificity.
As it is often the case, the false problem of double-talk poses itself: It is said 
that the Islamists would like nothing better than reestablishing sharia, or the 
Caliphate, but, since they cannot, they wait for more propitious times while 
getting their bearings. But whatever motivates this compromise, it is indeed 
what passes for the actual policy, corresponding as it does to Islamist practice, 
and this practice has a performative effect (as does diplomacy in general): 
Saying is doing. Communiqués, treaties, visits, protocols—all of it creates a 
reality precisely by identifying the Islamists with this new  pragmatism—and 
harping on regrets, nostalgias, or ulterior motives brings nothing.
On the contrary, by adopting a policy of realism, the Islamists contribute 
to discrediting the Islamic utopia, or worse yet, to letting it be manipulated 
by others (the Salafis, for instance). They are rightfully identified with their 
new discourse. On the other hand, their “institutionalization” goes far and 
makes them full members of the political establishment, provided, of course, 
that an eradicating military coup does not remake them into the opposition. 
The Moroccan monarchy understood this better than did the Egyptian army.
As the authors show in this book, what Islamists in power do is refor-
mulate the strategic balances by infusing them with a “supplement of soul”: 
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Muslim solidarity for all, references to the Ottoman empire by the AKP, a 
rejection of a neo-colonialism that today takes more cultural than economic 
forms. But this incantatory quest for a possible alternative to an alliance with 
the West comes to a sudden end.
Instead, the Islamic references make a comeback in the discourse for 
domestic use, particularly toward the militants. They therefore function as 
pedagogical metaphors for explaining to the militants or the people what in 
fact arises from realism: Hamas speaks of the Prophet’s use of the truce in 
order to justify the ceasefire with Israel; Ghannouchi points to the Medina 
constitution to underline that the Prophet also concluded purely pragmatic 
alliances; and the AKP wraps its new interventionism in the Middle East in 
the Ottoman tradition. Conversely, Hezbollah will mobilize the reference to 
a Sunni-oppressed Shiism to justify its intervention in Syria on the side of 
Iran. There is nothing new here: The French Revolution, like the USSR (and 
Iran), pursued the geostrategic tropisms of the old regimes by dressing them 
up in new slogans. The Islamic reference makes it possible to account for 
alliances that are devoid of religion. The reference to the sunna of the Prophet 
and the Medina constitution are rather more rhetorical instruments that 
allow wrapping a realist policy in a religious tradition and, indeed, justifying 
and legitimizing something that would have been done in any case.
On the other hand, the reference to defense of identity seems to go 
beyond rhetoric because it aims to ratify the break with the colonial period. 
It therefore seems to define an “us” (Muslims) and an “other” (the West).
But to what does the break pertain? International relations not at all, in 
fact, but to internal societal questions: family, decency, and education. In 
this sense, the apparent anti-Western sentiment of the Islamists is a kind of 
conservatism that is often shared, at least with part of American society. It 
therefore implies no new alliances or new international hostilities. As seen in 
the relationship between the Saudis and the Americans, having two societies 
that are, in fact, totally different in no way puts in question a close and 
durable strategic alliance.
The real break was made by Iran. The Iranian Islamists in power (thanks 
to a revolution and not elections, it must be stressed) engaged in a true diplo-
macy that broke with that of the Shah, even though, in fact, the grand geo-
strategic constants hardly changed: The drive to be the great Middle Eastern 
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regional power is a constant that presupposes outflanking the conservative 
Arab regimes and delegitimizing Nasser-type Arab nationalism. The reverse 
alliance against the Arab regimes was provided by Israel under the Shah and 
today it is done by the Shiite Arabs. As for the violently anti-Western posture 
(at least to date), other than that of the Sunni Islamists, it stems from the 
very powerful anti-imperialist leftist component of the Iranian revolution 
but that does not exist among the Sunnis or no longer does. It needs to be 
kept in mind that the distinctiveness of the Islamic revolution is linked to 
three phenomena: Shiism (and therefore an organized clergy able to lead the 
movement), Iranian nationalism (strongly anti-Arab), and the third-world 
revolutionary dimension that rallied many militants to the regime. None 
of its elements are found among the Sunni Islamists: They do not have a 
monopoly on Islam and therefore see their religiosity challenged on all sides 
(ulemas, Salafis); they cannot rely on pan-Arabism in a crisis and so they fall 
back on national patriotism that precisely prevents putting in place a Sunni 
front against Iran; and, lastly, they are socially and politically conservative. 
American society (the Tea Party, the Mormons) holds more attraction for 
them than the Iranian or even the Saudi model.
So, is there an “Islamist” foreign policy? In this volume, the authors 
accurately show that no ideological model defines an Islamist foreign policy, 
but that there decidedly is a diplomatic practice that Islamists in a position to 
influence their country’s foreign policy all share. In short, it is not an Islamist 
diplomacy, but a diplomacy of the Islamists.
This fits with the post-islamist model that me and others established years 
ago.
Post-Islamism is not secularization in the sense that the actors may still 
be religious and motivated by religion. It means that the political logic 
prevails on religion: regional geostrategy, national interests, necessity to find 
some domestic consensus contributing to secularize foreign policy.
Religion may be called to justify a shift in foreign policy or to provide 
more legitimacy to a decision: For instance, after the start of the war in Syria 
in 2011, Hezbollah decided to side with Iran and Bashar al-Assad against the 
mainly Sunni uprising. Its propaganda shifted from stressing pan-Arabism, 
pan-Islamism, and the need to fight Israel to a “defense of threatened Shias” 
battle cry. It used the same religious decorum but for another agenda. 
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Erdogan’s Turkey evokes the Ottoman past to justify its more pro-active 
foreign policy in the Middle East, but its priority, to thwart the Kudistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK) endeavors to create some sort of Kurdistan, either in 
Syria or inside Turkey itself, has nothing to do with an “Islamic” policy and 
is simply the pursuit of the Kemalist anti-Kurdish strategy by other means.
Seemingly, the authoritarian shift of Erdogan in 2016 is not a way 
to establish an Islamic state. It is more along the Orban/Putin paradigm: 
authoritarian and conservative regimes, using religion as an identity and 
a template of conservative norms that they would have promoted anyway 
because their constituency is conservative. Once again it does not mean that 
religion does not play a role: It is a factor taken into account by the regional 
actors, not an ideology or a blueprint of a new world order.
Post-Islamism is also a consequence of the diversification of the religious 
field. The Muslim Brothers have been unable to claim the monopoly of 
religion in politics, since the Salafis have entered the political arena during 
the Egyptian spring. The Muslim Brothers do not share a common agenda 
due to the specificity of each national case. They are more integrated into the 
Maghreb than in the Mashrek.
Maghreb and Mashrek are going their own ways. The first is closely 
associated with the West and is framing its foreign policy in some sort 
of north–south relationship: Morocco is thus actively reactivating the Sufi 
networks (tijannya, bousheshyia) that have linked Senegal with Morocco for 
centuries and are now expanding north through the diasporas. Ennahda has 
a good foothold among Franco-Tunisians (with respect to the two members 
of the Tunisian Parliament elected by the diaspora living in France, one is a 
Nahda member).
By contrast, Mashrek is now split by a intricate series of civil wars 
(Yemen, Syria) that turned as wars through proxies manipulated by the two 
competing regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia, both claiming a religious 
legitimacy. The Shia–Sunni divide is neither an ideological nor a religious 
one: Such a sectarian and relatively recent polarization expresses the conflict 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia for the regional leadership. It is a purely 
geostrategic competition for power, not a war of religion.
In this volume, the authors accurately show that no ideological model 
defines an Islamist foreign policy, but that there decidedly is a diplomatic 
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practice that Islamists in a position to influence their country’s foreign policy 
all share. In short, it is not an Islamist diplomacy, but a diplomacy of the 
Islamists. Herein resides this book’s great originality and great contribution.
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The Islamists and International Relations: 
A Dialectical Relationship?
Mohamed-Ali Adraoui
Do Islamists execute foreign policy “normally”? At first, this seemingly caustic question is nonetheless pertinent for anyone interested in how an 
ideological system that claims to make its mark on the fate of Muslim socie-
ties throughout the world gives effect to it. At a time when the Arab world, 
the historical heart of political Islam, is experiencing major upheavals with 
consequences not the least of which is significantly drawing closer Islamists 
to spheres of power, it is essential to take an interest in their worldview and 
the international system1 that they espouse as well as their foreign policy 
ethic. How do they view the global space, translate their attempts to subject a 
society’s structures and history to the religious norm and, when in command 
of a country’s destiny, translate their ideology in the diplomatic domain? 
Also, what do the political principles relating to international relations that 
are inherent in the Islamist offer lead to for other actors of the interna-
tional system? If this ideology raises numerous questions about its potential 
radicalism, one of the principal worries concerns the “revisionist”2 potential 
of militant and political Islam for the international system. Starting from 
a rhetoric and programmatic aims targeting specific non-Muslim countries 
(most prominently those that comprise the West due to the colonial legacy 
and some countries’ primacy event, although they are not exclusively tar-
geted) against which the majority of Muslim societies are supposed to defend 
their identity, their values, and their interests, the international  problem, 
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 nourished by numerous hotbeds of unresolved tensions, in large part explains 
the image projected by Islamism for Western opinion and elites. It is prob-
lematic that certain representatives of political Islam have sharpened after 
earning, for the most part democratically, the right to put their ideals into 
practice.
An examination of the links between the theorists (those who offer to 
determine concepts), cadres (those who are in charge of the organization 
and its structures), and militants (those who subscribe to the idea of using 
all sorts of activity, sometimes violent, to achieve a political objective) that 
emerged internationally over several decades from this current, is of even 
greater interest than the domain of relations that an actor maintains with the 
rest of the world and it is important on at least two counts. Starting from a 
phenomenological perspective, it is a question of perceiving the self as the 
subject of a world to which the Islamist dialectic is meant to apply.3 Born of 
a desire to restore Muslims to a dignified place in the world, the latter has 
from the beginning made the wish to give independence, power, and unity 
to the matrix of believers (al-Umma) the core of its ambition. Preaching on 
the local and national levels are the first stages of a grander projection aiming 
for global scale. Here it is a matter of accessing the image that the actor has of 
himself and hopes to convey to the alterity. On the other hand, the spirit and 
content of a relationship to the world, and, more particularly, to a foreign 
policy, provide an appropriate framework for gauging the applicability of an 
ideology when the moment of its fitting into reality arrives. While Islam from 
birth has been distinguished by a transnational aim of wanting to overcome 
the “pathologies” of history that affected the political social structures that 
divided Islam and Muslims into nations, states, clans, tribes, or parties, 
study of the theory and practice of international relations by its followers 
furnishes choice material for taking the measure of the Islamist project and 
the potential deviations or even possible amendments when the agenda had 
to be put into practice.4
Islamism: An Attempt at a Sociohistorical Definition. The Global Scale 
as the Last Stage of Islamic Renewal
In the Islamist view, international relations are both a resource and a con-
straint. The stage represented by the supranational is part of a larger project 
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that is supposed to join the individual Muslim to the ensemble of his core-
ligionists throughout the world. By mobilizing the religious for the purpose 
of a political grouping together of the “Muslim nation,” the Islamists seek 
to respond, both in international thinking and ethic, to the most powerful 
symbol of the decline of their religion—their domination by foreign powers. 
In that respect, nourishing an Islamist conception of the international order 
(in fact, thought of more like a disorder) means necessarily thinking of the 
world as an action space with the goal of escaping the contemporary develop-
ments that have turned “Islam” from a politically preponderant religion into 
a subjected identity. In this regard, Islam is thus a political body rather than 
only a mere spirituality. One of the most blatant expressions of this decay, 
without doubt, is this religion’s division into various entities (states, coun-
tries, ethnicities, and so forth) that essentially weaken the political and statist 
oneness that, according to the representatives of political Islam, is supposed 
to be its true calling.
Alone the conception of the world promulgated by the founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood almost suffices to grasp the split induced by the emer-
gence of this current nearly a century ago in the history of Muslim societies. 
In his Epistles to Young Muslims, Hassan al-Banna, the Guide, indeed is 
explicit about the principles that ought to govern the “Muslim nation”:5
The entire world is disoriented and in turmoil, and all the powers that make 
up the world are powerless to resolve the problems, for there is no remedy 
other than Islam. Be forward in pronouncing God’s name, so that this 
world may be delivered, for all mankind is waiting for a savior, and it shall 
be nothing else but the message of Islam, whose torch you carry and with 
which you will herald to people.
 O young people!
 Assuredly, the Muslim Brotherhood’s program consists of several stages 
whose sequence is clear. We know exactly what we want, and we know how 
to achieve our objectives.
1.  We want an individual who is Muslim in thought and belief, in moral-
ity and feelings, in acts and in demeanor.
2.  Next, we want a family that is Muslim in thought and belief, in moral-
ity and feelings, and in its work and behavior …
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3.  Next, we want a Muslim people with traits similar to those we men-
tioned above …
4.  Next, we want a Muslim government by the people that will lead 
people onto the way of Islam, as Abou Bakr and Omar, the compan-
ions of the Prophet, peace be with him, did before. This is why we 
do not recognize any governmental organization not based on the 
foundation of Islam and that does not draw inspiration from these 
foundations. This is also why we do not recognize the political parties, 
nor all those traditional figures by whom the detractors and enemies of 
Islam forced us to be governed and contribute to their development. 
We therefore will work for the rebirth of Islamic government, in all its 
forms, and by putting in place an Islamic government based on this 
organization.
Next, we want to assemble all the parties of this Islamic home-
land that Western policy has striven to fracture, and which European 
wishes have misled and locked inside borders. We therefore reject all 
the international accords that transform this Islamic homeland into 
an ensemble of small, weak, and tattered powers that can easily be 
absorbed by those who want to usurp their rights. And we will not be 
silent before the barriers to the freedoms of these people, whom third 
parties have unjustly taken over. Thus, Egypt, Syria, the Hejaz, Yemen, 
Tripolitania, Tunisia, Algeria, Marrakesh, and every inch of land on 
which there is a Muslim …, all of it constitutes our great homeland 
that we will force ourselves to liberate, to extract from this influence, 
to deliver from this tyranny, and whose parts we will reassemble. If the 
German Reich imposes itself as protector of all those in whose veins 
flows German blood, by the same token the Muslim faith calls on every 
capable Muslim to consider himself as protector of any person that has 
been permeated by the Koranic apprenticeship. Islam therefore forbids 
replacing the community of faith with ethnic belonging. And all faith 
is in Islam. Does it not distill itself, in fact, into love and hate?
5.  Finally, we want that the flag of Islam once again flies high in the wind 
in all the countries that have had the chance to welcome Islam for some 
time, and where the voice of the muezzin resounds … Then misfortune 
has wanted that the lights of Islam should retreat from these countries 
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which then fell back into unbelief. Thus, Andalusia, Sicily, the Balkans, 
the Italian coasts and as well as those of the Mediterranean are all 
Mediterranean Muslim colonies and they must return to Islam. Also, 
the Mediterranean and the Red Sea must revert to being Muslim seas, 
as they were before, even as Mussolini arrogated to himself the right 
to reconstruct the Roman Empire. That so-called ancient empire was 
only built on foundations of greed and passionate desires. We therefore 
have the right to reconstruct the Islamic Empire, which was established 
in justice and equality and which spread the light of the way among 
the people.
6.  Beyond that and with that, we want to expose our Islamic message to 
the entire world, reach all the people, spread across all earthly horizons 
and subject all tyrants to it “until there is no longer any disorder and 
religion will be totally devoted to God.” …
Each of these stages has its own appearance, its ramifications, and the 
specific means for achieving it. We contented ourselves here with setting 
out these stages without dwelling on them nor going into the details. And 
it is God who will bring His help, He will be all we need, and what a Great 
Guarantor He is!
 Let the incompetent and the cowards characterize as fiction what 
would for a very long time have been anchored in our consciousness, or as a 
“utopia that invades people’s minds.” This point of view is a weakness that 
is foreign to us and that is foreign to Islam. This is nothing more than moral 
exhaustion that has been planted in the heart of this community, allowing 
the enemies of Islam to gain a foothold in its midst. It is also the destruction 
of faith found in the heart, and it is the cause of the Muslims’ fall. As for 
us, we affirm clearly and frankly that any Muslim that does not believe in 
this project and does not work for its realization will not find happiness in 
Islam. Let him therefore find another philosophy to adopt as a religion and 
on whose behalf he will work.
In the course of the many centuries over which this religious phenomenon 
has put its mark on the evolution of numerous societies, Islam, as much in 
its credo as its cultural and social practice, has been mobilized in various 
political configurations. Among these, the religious has also been able to be 
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kept well apart from the philosophy undergirding the organizational mode of 
public life—unless at times when it was the object of ideologically motivated 
repression6—than called on to serve both as an exclusive identity referent and 
legal matrix as well as a process of legitimizing certain regimes.
However, mobilization of the religious reference on “Islamic soil” is not 
sufficient for defining the “Islamist” ethic, for it relates to a precise socio-
historical experience dating back to nearly a century, and echoes principles 
inscribed first and foremost in a perspective of redressing the Muslim condi-
tion. Islamism is therefore to be resituated in a specific temporality, that is, 
one composed of metanarratives and social figurations that attribute to the 
religious grammar not only a central place in the definition of values and col-
lective identity, but especially a transformative social and political function by 
virtue of a clear finality: the subordination of all the fields organizing society 
to the religious norm understood in a fundamentalist sense. This teleological 
design is characterized by a dual method: puritan reform on the one hand, 
and mass militancy on the other. From here on, we will now call “Islamism” 
the social and political identity offer that saw the light of day nearly a century 
ago in the context of societies thrown into contact with Western modernity, 
to their disadvantage; an offer that has as one of its characteristics the quest 
for intellectual matrices capable of projecting them positively into the future. 
It relates to a current of thought structured around the Muslim religion 
whose ambition is to adapt in a programmatic manner a religious norm 
presented as orthodox. Seeking to exercise social control by introducing the 
sacred prescription in all spheres that make up society (family, school, the 
public square, the state, the media, and so on) by means of an activist ethic 
that mobilizes the various tools of militancy (such as participation in electoral 
contests and street demonstrations, setting up unions, starting newspapers, 
and editorial activity), Islamism aims for moral and political magistery within 
a framework of what is at first a national configuration but that does not 
lose sight of its transitional character. What follows is this attempt at a more 
profound definition.7
Islamism is religiously Salafist in the sense that it is under the sign of the 
“pious forefathers” (Salaf Salih) and as such relates to a fundamentalist con-
ception of the Muslim religion as intimately linked to the project of reviving a 
model of belief and of public life that is presented as paradigmatic. Although 
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the Salafi reference may be the subject of numerous debates—one of the 
most important today without question being the relationship with political 
militancy—everyone recognizes the prophylactic and curative dimensions of 
a return to the sources presented as indispensable. The “original” ethic thus 
is supposed to command, from the political perspective, a total unification of 
believers under the banner of Islam without regard for extra-religious distin-
guishing factors. The centrality of this “imagined solidarity,”8 as supposedly 
tying all Muslims throughout the globe and making them “religiously” keen 
to unify in order to defeat not only their military and political adversaries, 
but above all metaphysical enemies, stands for the core motivation to the 
Islamist design.
Islamism is an explicitly gradualist ideology in how each level of iden-
tification is supposed to entail a specific mode of action. The believer, by 
reforming himself in the direction of a greater adherence to religious injunc-
tions, is only the first stage of the Islamist project. It is followed by ever higher 
levels of projection and accomplishment legitimizing a ceaselessly growing 
mobilization.
Islamism is activist and militant and herein resides the primary reason for 
existing in a perspective of transforming the society and exercising a moral 
magistery as a prelude to taking power.
The conversion of values and religious norms into a political program 
effectively represents a fundamental break in the contemporary history of 
Muslim societies. To accomplish it, this ideological system distinguishes itself 
clearly from a unique fundamentalist ethic by introducing as the key element 
of its approach the resort to a mass political party, that is, an invention of—
most notably Western—political modernity. With the Muslim Brotherhood, 
which saw the light of day in Egypt in the late 1920s, the Muslim world 
experienced for the first time the coming of an actor constructed around the 
Muslim reference aiming to control society by means of a modern activist 
ethic. Echoing the Communist experience starting in the late nineteenth 
century by which Europe saw its ideological and political landscape mutate, 
Islamism was born from a dynamic of Westernization of the politics then 
seen in the Islamic lands. The Muslim Brotherhood, father movement of 
this identity offer, then spreaded out in pursuit of achieving its aims in every 
Muslim country.
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The confrontation to an international system that is largely a stranger 
to the original Islamist vision of the world order also provides substantial 
material for those wishing to address the issue of Post-Islamism. Whether 
this concept is subject to different interpretations and debates, it must be 
evoked in this study. Indeed, analyzing how Islamists have been conceiving 
and practicing diplomacy and foreign action with, at least initially, the aim 
to blow up a global arena that was condemned for being built upon an anti-
Islam agenda as interpreted over the colonial era, raises two major concerns.
First, what is the role of interntional considerations in the evolution 
from an intransigent platform seeking both unification of all the Muslims 
throughout the world and destruction of any nation-state supposedly chal-
lenging the core belief that the Islamic identity can do nothing but generate 
the political independence of the Umma under the Caliphate-flag? Wishing 
to build in a first stage a ‘national Islamist foreign policy’ in an attempt to 
reinforce the key narratives of Hasan al-Banna and finally unify the whole 
of the Muslim-majority countries has led to consider a state of structural 
weakness that the Islamist ideology has been very misfit. Insisting on the need 
for power while trying to consolidate first the nation-state through which 
the initial step toward global unification was envisaged has put Islamists in a 
problematic situation, leading to a certain degree of revision. In this regard, 
playing according to the rules of real power struggles within the international 
system has forces to disengage to some extent from the original revolutionary 
mindset. Post-Islamism in this case is principally due to the objective dif-
ficulty of deeply impacting on a world order that is more likely to socialize 
revisionist forces than be reframed by them. Being aware of the huge cost to 
redefine the international system, namely a global military engagement to 
defeat all the opponents to the unification of Muslims worldwide, has thus 
led Islamists to nationalize their narrative and political commitment.
Second, when it comes to the connection between integration into the 
domestic political arena and the desire for a new foreign policy that is said 
to modify over time the global power struggle at the benefit of the Umma, a 
second problem needs to be raised. Effectively, as we consider that, since the 
1980s, certain movements referring to political Islam have embraced some 
democratic ideals and frameworks,9 this ideological shift certainly had sig-
nificant impacts on the way that Islamists have been theorizing international 
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relations. Thus, in addition to a realistic reaction to the difficulty to impose 
a new logic within the international system, internal evolutions have also 
produced the conditions from which certain Islamist thinkers and activists 
have envisaged to revise, at least partly, their original core beliefs. In other 
words, when identity does change on a domestic level, this has consequences 
on the global scale. In other words, by moving toward a post-islamist stage 
internally, formerly revolutionary and intransigent Islamists have been driven 
the same way to consider conceptual and factual shifts in their understanding 
of contemporary international relations. The conversion-process to demo-
cratic norms has usually created over the last two centuries greater likeliness 
to move away from revisionist standards.10
International Relations: A Preferred Field of Study for Sizing Up the 
Logics and Results of a Real Ideological Confrontation
From a historical perspective, a distinct trait of the Islamist movements is 
that they favor action at the national level. If, paradoxically, projecting on 
a global scale is part of the founding design of political Islam, theorists, 
cadres, and militants from the start conceived of the nation-state stage as key 
to their perspective of religious reaffirmation and acquisition of the tools of 
power. By virtue of a genuine strategy of “gradualism,” “rise,” or of militant 
“ascent,” Islamist entrepreneurs have shown understandings that political 
and civilizational unification, obstructed in their eyes (largely by the fact 
that the Western powers would not tolerate a first-rate strategic competitor) 
as an objective, however compelling, ought to be delayed for now in favor 
of making a success of national Islamic renewal experiments first. Such a 
consideration is nevertheless at the heart of a structural tension in the evolu-
tion experienced by Islamist actors for several decades. This then poses a 
fundamental question: are the logics and finalities of the initial Islamist 
engagement not likely to change by accepting a transitional stage of “first 
constructing the Islamic society and state in a country”?
Would the need to deal with defending the national interest, however 
conceived, not compel a second look at the initial motivations, however 
important, that are essential to the Islamist movements’ capacity for mobi-
lization? Indeed, to subscribe to the Islamist theses like the ones just seen 
in various forms in the epistles of Hassan al-Banna, in theory means taking 
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into account the interest and willingness of the “Muslim nation” wherever 
its members are found and regardless in what sort of political configura-
tion. Still, any Islamist movement that accepts integration in a national 
political arena is pushed nolens volens into a different contour. The problem 
of budgetary choices, electoral alliances, cooperation with other states (often 
non-Muslim) or even the decision to go to war become as much political 
practices that must be carried out as a function of gauging the interests of 
the state concerned and not of the religion as a whole, exclusive representation 
of which is meant to fall to the Islamists and whose defense, prima facie, is 
their raison d’être. Depending on the country under consideration, from this 
then follows the phenomena of accommodation with other sources of iden-
tification. Certain followers of political Islam are moved by this to preach a 
“synthesis” between Islam and nationalism, wanting to raise up a “democratic 
Muslim” ethic or to seek the means yet again for a union of the majority 
of states throughout the world modeled on other supranational construct 
forms, such as the European Union (EU), based not on force but on the rule 
of law and adherence to shared values. These attempts at moving beyond the 
original ideological matrix revert to the main question for these movements: 
What action is called for when the level of identification changes and the field 
of political action is altered?
On the other hand, the nature of the international system also deci-
sively affects the positioning of the Islamists. Since the former pre-exists in 
the emergence of this current, the representatives of this identity offer find 
themselves compelled to accommodate a system of strong constraints (such as 
legal, military, economical, and diplomatic) that hems in their field of action 
even more and, eventually, the ambition of remaking the global space in 
their image. Besides having to think along lines of a statist, not just religious 
logic, the Islamist forces must also deploy their anti-system and—at least 
discursively—revisionist ethic within a system that represents a social reality 
in Emile Durkheim’s meaning, one whose constraining effect11 frequently is 
so powerful that they are influenced more by it than the other way around. 
In fact, the insertion both into an international grammar strongly marked, 
despite real contemporary inflections,12 by the predominant role of states, as 
well as the transformation on the domestic scene into a government party, 
induce, in a perspective of identity redefinition and search for the most effi-
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cient means of serving an ideology called to exercise power, its reformulation 
under the impact of diverse factors that force it to evolve.
The coming chapters all aim to address the issue of how Islamists, within 
one national context, have framed international relations, both as an ideo-
logical movement denying originally the legitimacy of the states they wanted 
to exert power upon, and a political force contemplating nevertheless to 
integrate into the national realm so it can be used as a transitory stage before 
the unification of the entire Islamic people. The main argument of these con-
tributions deals with the extreme difficulty of identifying one specific form of 
Islamist foreign policy. This concept has to be first of all seen as a leitmotiv but 
is finally no practical reality. States promote foreign actions, not ideologies. 
Those doctrinal frameworks generate representations and ideals but when it 
comes to political practices, Islamists have, according to the cases tackled in 
this volume (except maybe with Egypt), either put the national interest at 
the top of their agenda while their discourses were still characterized by the 
duty to protect Islam and Muslims worldwide, or unrarely, admitted that 
they could not achieve the original ideology (at least under the circumstances 
that thay had to handle with). In other words, this collective work high-
lights the fact that, wherever this was possible, the state-logic has overridden 
the coercive part of the original ideology, allowing a significant amount of 
interpretation, and sometimes amendments. Ideological radicalism, to some 
extent, has been tamed, although numerous questions remain when it comes 
to the future of political Islam within societies that are increasingly boiling.
Theoretical Framework: Constructivism. Ideas Come First
The quest to interpret the history and sociology of international relations has 
produced analytical currents that most often compete with one another but 
also strive to propose the most relevant framework for making sense of inter-
actions between the parties occupying the global space. While no grammar 
of international relations could suffice to exhaust the field of structures and 
actors of global politics, it is still possible to find a larger heuristic potential 
for the subject we are dealing with among the constructivist approaches.13 
Our objective being to bring the conception of the world held by the repre-
sentatives of political Islam into focus as well as to examine their international 
and diplomatic ethic, with the main consequence being that of interesting 
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us in the weight of ideology and the manner in which the national interest 
was formulated and defended (depending on the country studied), we opt 
to let ourselves be inspired by an epistemology centered on the dynamics of 
constructing a social reality.14
Islamism makes it its charge to serve a sacred vision of the world. This lets 
us call it an ideocracy whose ambition is to irrigate the total social space with 
the religious norm previously “purified” by an “orthodox” understanding of 
the dogmatic and legal corpus.
Distancing themselves from any materialist conception of the world, 
it is really the perceptions as well as the ideational constructions that are at 
the heart of their politicization. To promote its reign, the representation’s 
proponents thus first seek to advocate a new foreign policy agenda for the 
countries of which they are part, but also to bring forth a new international 
system no longer based on the primacy of the state (for the benefit of a politi-
cal grouping of Muslim societies) and that would no longer be dominated by 
powers perceived as non-Muslim.
Because the social reality (here a global one) is subject to a different view 
and definition, the Islamists come to it having to deal with two obstacles. 
The first is the political action framework. International relations, emerging 
partly as an intellectual and academic discipline starting in the nineteenth 
century, is tied to affirmations of the state and its prerogatives in the global 
space. However, because of the ambition of wanting to symbolically and, 
especially, politically unify the matrix of believers (al-Umma), Islamism slots 
itself ontologically into a transnational perspective, with states being viewed 
as a historical contingency dividing a religious community in the name of 
parochial interests or even ones contradicting those of “Islam.” The dialectic 
initiated in this way is one of moving beyond the national framework after 
a political resocialization under Islamist impetus in majority Muslim coun-
tries, with the aim of awakening consciousness imprisoned by schemas that 
are foreign to “Islam” to the imperative of unifying the body of believers 
planet-wide.
From the perspective of numerous Islamist movements, the act of presid-
ing over the destiny of a state therefore also has a utilitarian aspect, since it is a 
question of taking advantage of a “national moment” to convince of the need 
to globalize the Umma in a larger sovereignty space—a cyclical dimension, 
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in that the experience of power is inscribed in a finite temporality at the end 
of which the states, already in decline today, will decay and leave the field 
to a civilizational authority capable of representing all believers. The second 
obstacle relates to a contradiction inherent in the Islamist project. How, 
indeed, to reconcile the time of the state and the transnational horizon? If 
the Islamic identity is posited as profoundly resistant to being reduced in 
any way to a political space that would not encompass all the faithful, how 
then to justify a militant action organized with the aim of addressing itself to 
only a part of this spectrum? In other words, how to combine the religious 
reference and the national framework when the Islamist forces are the bearers 
of an ambition for cultural and political “denationalization” of Muslims for 
the benefit of a single legitimate framework of identification? If the “time of 
the state” is supposed to be circumstantiated in time, how to exit from it and, 
especially, how to meet the expectations of a society defined on a country 
scale when the ideologically projected scale is that of the Muslim world?
Moreover, the constructivist theses (even though they may not all be 
unambiguous) lead us to ask ourselves about the conditions for building a 
social identity (a religious one in this case). No structure could be given in a 
manner that is ahistorical.15 Demographics, interactions with other entities, 
the personal trajectories of deciders, and the interpretation of the country’s 
history are so many elements that play a role in constructing the bundle 
of representations around which a collective identity and its foreign policy 
interest will coalesce. In this way, the act of trying to reintroduce the religious 
norm on the domestic level finds powerful echoes in the same project pursued 
on the scale of Muslim communities around the globe. Here, the interests 
of the states they lay claim to managing are diametrically opposed to the 
interests of the majority of their competitors on the domestic political scene. 
In addition, the constructivist approaches also permit analyzing the discourses 
and actions undertaken in the international relations domain in a potentially 
dynamic manner, since from the possible transformations of the Islamist 
agenda inside a specific state may develop major modifications when it comes 
to relations with the alterity on the global level. The conversion to certain 
democratic theses that some hence believe they detect in some movements of 
political Islam thus would explain the relativization if not abandonment—but 
most often the reformulation—of principles that are nevertheless fundamental 
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in their ideology, starting with the inevitable coming of an entity that will 
gather together the planet’s Muslims symbolically and politically.
Methodology and Principal Findings
Three principal queries structured the approach of this work. Naturally, 
if the subject represented by the relationship of Islamists to the world and 
their practice with regard to international relations is too vast to hope for 
producing an exhaustive work, three problems have structured this putting 
of the Islamist grammar into perspective when it decides to apply itself to the 
international object.
What is the Islamist conception of the world and of relations between the 
different actors making up the international system? We have seen succinctly 
the centrality of ambitions aimed at restoring Islam and its faithful that has 
been “trampled” by the conditioned exercise of politics in contemporary 
times, but what concrete results has it produced? More precisely, depending 
on which Islamist movement is studied, what vision of the world prevails in 
the environment in which it intends to evolve?
Next arises the necessity of taking a look at what the theorists, cadres, 
and militants have produced by way of thinking about the foreign policy to 
be carried out. If political Islam should not be considered as an unequivocal 
movement despite similarities in aspirations, this justifies moving into the 
discursive registers and structural ideas that proceed from the mouth and 
from under the pen of its apologists. While the volume of materials required 
to answer these questions is far from complete, the researcher can nevertheless 
rely on public pronouncements, publications, or even elements gathered 
during ethnographic observations.
The final problem concerns the implementation of the foreign policy 
agendas that we can shed light on in this way. To what extent does the revi-
sionist potential pertain to Islamism or does it not deploy as a force opposed to 
the established order as well as to the rules of the game thought to be stacked 
against Muslims? Put differently, what is the place of the ideational factor in 
the construction and promotion of the national interest that the upholders of 
political Islam purport to represent, define, and uphold? Under this heading, 
what does the study of diplomacies and interpretation of decisions taken teach 
us when the latter have worked at the summits of a state apparatus?
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The chapters that follow cover six countries in which representatives of 
Islamism have historically organized to assert their views and govern national 
affairs in greater conformity with their conception of the religion. Thus, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Lebanon, and Turkey provide venues 
for testing the hypotheses evoked above. The writings by cadres of the dif-
ferent movements studied as well as the views of militants make it possible 
in each case to portray the landscape of a powerful mobilizing ideology, but 
one whose implementation (with the notable exception of Egypt’s Muslim 
Brotherhood), according to the individual authors, elicits considerable “revi-
sions of the revision.” To put it another way, it appears that the change 
of status from anti-system movement to governing party in the interna-
tional affairs domain entails a redefinition, be it only a discursive one, of the 
original theses of political Islam. The sociological, generational, and political 
changes seem to have significant impact on the contours and structures 
of the Islamist ideology, but without its defenders having made a clean 
break in their approach to power, thus revamping the militant engagement 
motifs by reformulating their objectives and not by deliberately transforming 
them. This step-wise evolution as the powerful revisionist potential, domes-
ticated in light of “reality,” unquestionably occurs but this does not imply its 
 disappearance—at least not in the symbolic sense. Depending on the tenor 
of the crises and tensions in which the Islamist actors come to play an active 
role, the allusions and references to a religious and civilizational partitioning 
of the global space can resurface, such as in the case of centers of conflict that 
they have historically focused on in their discourse on global politics—with 
the Palestinian cause usually ranking first among these.
Taking several case studies into account leads us to recognize that Islamism 
is not monolithic. As a one-century-old ideology that has impacted almost all 
the Islamic cultural sphere, and even beyond, this appears extremely difficult 
to avoid generalizations, and doing so leads the researcher to some necessary 
humility. All the countries concerned thus offer relevant material to address 
the issue of how the Islamists have framed international relations from a 
pluralistic point of view. Ideological similarities are still obvious, but today 
more to justify the persistence of some doctrinal tradition than the constancy 
of a precise and unalterable Islamic theory of world power.
It finally turns out that Islamism as historical experience needs to be 
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 studied more than ever from a nationalistic view. Although this does mean 
that the global design is abandoned, ideology and practice seem to have 
become two separate things, at least when it comes to the intial doctri-
nal framework. In most of the countries where there exists the gradualist 
approach in which political Islam attempts to impose itself, local and national 
realities have most frequently been insurmountable challenges. The fact that 
a national identity such as the Tunisian one does exist in parallel to the pre-
dominant faith among the Tunisian people, that is undoubtedly Islam, had 
made the Islamist motto questionable.The same argument could be naturally 
made about other nationalized Islamist experiences. In other words, it must 
be underlined that mobilizing in the name of a protesting form of Islam was 
not the same thing as ruling in the name of it. Thus, once the researcher is no 
longer focused on the original ideology, the plurality of the political experi-
ences generated by Islamists seizing or sharing power at the head of one state 
becomes not only obvious but most probably unavoidable. In this regard, 
offering to go in-depth into the issue of Islamism and foreign policy compels 
one to admit that there has principally been so far in the foreign policies 
undertaken by Islamists more than one single type of foreign action led by 
them. In this respect, it has to be said that the initial gradualist design does 
represent a failure, except if one were to argue that the original squeleton has 
undergone constant rewording and will continue to do so.
Integration in a political system that they initially did not legitimize 
consequently does not signify the inability of the Islamists to acquire other 
registers of identification, either partisan—starting with the state whose fate 
they seek to safeguard—or philosophical, as in mobilizing international law 
or human rights, but rather the progressive and self-interested character of 
plural positioning as a function of the opportunities and constraints present-
ing themselves. If, in most of the cases, they did not seek to overturn the stra-
tegic order they inherited, they do not yet seem prepared to abandon what is 
often still a mobilizing discourse when it comes to certain opinions sensitive 
to the state of global power relationships, especially those involving “Muslim 
peoples.” Nevertheless, this makes them run the risk of being criticized for 
inaction, or even “hypocrisy,” when the gap between the promise of dignity 
regained and the reality of diplomatic practices consisting of temporizing 
or even concessions is judged to be too large. Also added to the accusation 
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of “double speak” that they face from observers that doubt their desire for 
respecting the rules of democracy are others emanating from forces within 
their base that accuse them of weakness or even duplicity. In grappling with 
the exercise of power, this ideological offer seems bound to follow the path 
of all the others that preceded it with claims of remaking the world in their 
image: making allowances for realities over which it has very little control.
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2
The Islamists of Morocco’s Party of Justice 
and Development and the Foreign Policy 
Problem: Between Structural Constraints 
and Economic Imperatives
Haoues Seniguer
In this chapter on the international relations of the Moroccan legalist Islamic current, in this case the Party of Justice and Development (PJD), we formu-
late the following hypothesis: The more institutionalized this party’s actors 
become, particularly in an authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime like 
the Sherifian monarchy, the more they normalize their presence on the legal 
political field and the more their discourse becomes rationalized, sanitized of 
the residual programmatic, protesting, even revolutionary stances that they 
would have adopted or favored during the party’s extra-parliamentary phase, 
or, more recently, in the Parliamentary opposition. Just as that of any other 
social actors, the posture of legitimist political Islam’s representatives, par-
ticularly in the area of foreign affairs, is tightly interwoven with the position 
that they occupy on the national political stage. By this measure, and espe-
cially in an authoritarian context, relativizing “the autonomy of the national 
decision makers”1 by rigorously paying heed to, on the one hand, the domes-
tic systemic constraints on the actors, and, on the other, their country’s actual 
geopolitical weight on the international scene, is indispensable. Thus, accord-
ing to the periods and positions occupied in the internal political space, the 
Islamists oscillate between ideology and pragmatism or further differentiate 
“the morally desirable” from the “politically possible,” be it in their internal 
(national) or external (extra-national) practice.
Still, the recency of PJD’s accession to power ought to preclude making 
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definitive statements, just as any sort of prospective statements would be 
hasty. In fact, this Islamist party entered the government as part of a het-
erogeneous coalition barely four years ago, after achieving a majority in the 
general election of November 25, 2011.2 So, at most, one may venture to 
formulate some explanatory, by definition tentative, hypotheses that certainly 
take into consideration some very contemporaneous elements but still more 
those from the recent or more distant past. It is impossible to understand the 
true nature of the perception of Morocco’s Islamists and sometimes of its 
transformations through the years, most notably in international relations, 
without doing a dual retrospective study. For one, it is important to adhere 
in globo to a historical vision on this subject like that formulated by one of 
the founding fathers of contemporary Islam, Hassan al-Banna, because it 
rightfully has spread through all of the Muslim world, including Morocco. 
Second, care must be taken to recall the different stages of these trans-
formations as well as the circumstance under which they occurred among 
the Moroccan Islamists, generally following a dual dialectic that combines 
internal and external pressures of the political environment.
An Islamized Royal Diplomacy?
It would be difficult to challenge that activism in the foreign affairs compo-
nent is a function of the relationship between internal forces in the political 
arena where social actors evolve, in this case the Islamists, and of the royal 
diplomacy’s own positions that retain substantial discretionary resources on 
this subject by reason of the monarch’s quality and his symbolic and material 
attributes. As Irene Molina Fernandez reminds us,
foreign relations historically have belonged, and continue to belong today, 
at the hard nexus of state power where no step has been taken toward a 
separation of powers. Consequently, they are still considered, from their 
establishment at the start of the reign of Hassan II to be part of the sover-
eign’s exclusive domain, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—one of the sover-
eign’s ministries whose head the King chooses directly without paying heed 
to the parliamentary majority … Imagining it as a pyramid, its summit 
would be occupied by the “central decisional unity” (the King, the Royal 
Cabinet and the army) which relies on a “subordinate decisional unity” (the 
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government and the parliament), with the political parties, the employers’ 
and civic organizations relegated to being part of the “marginalized deci-
sional unity.”3
From this perspective, one of the remarkable acts of the royal foreign policy 
that truly consecrated or lastingly crystallized the palace’s grip on this matter 
is the Green March of November 6, 1975, organized by the country’s highest 
authorities to rally a crushing majority of the political class to the side of 
Hassan II in sustaining an active defense of Moroccan sovereignty over the 
Western Sahara. In this regard, the neo-Salafist leader Allal al-Fassi even 
spoke of a “sacred duty,” and, in doing so, Islamizing what is essentially a 
national cause, at least a priori.4
The Moroccan Islamist movement, since its creation in the late 1960s, 
therefore has had to face two great difficulties apart from the palace lock-
ing up the social space since achieving independence in 1956. On the one 
hand, there are the considerable religious resources at the disposal of the 
Moroccan sovereign in his capacity of Commander of Believers and by virtue 
of his “Sherifness,”5 which confers on him an atypical form of supplemental 
holiness that takes into account the postulated filiation with Muhammad 
the Prophet of Islam as well as his descent. Add to this the fact that Hassan 
II, upon inheriting the throne from his father in 1961, would exercise a 
“Muslim leadership” on the world Islamic stage—in other words, simultane-
ously intra and extra muros. Also, from the beginning, the Islamists started off 
symbolically handicapped in a major way that they tried, for better or worse, 
to compensate for, get around, and transcend. Any organization, however, 
that wants to endure needs to stand out on the market for symbolic and 
material goods. This the PJD tried to do numerous times only to fail.
Since the start of his reign, Hassan II has taken several pan-Arab and pan-
Islamic initiatives right in line with actions taken by his father Mohammed 
V, who, for example, supported the fight for Algerian independence that his 
son would continue in the name of freeing colonial subjects and “Brothers.”
Usually, a peculiarity attaches to Islamist foreign policy because of the 
primacy the language of Islam has in their political ethos, and, especially, 
because of the particular sensitivity with which they view the Palestinian 
problem, regarded essentially as rooted in religion.
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However, in the Moroccan case, the interaction or “the connections” 
between “local Islam” and “global Islam,” just like an early interest in the 
Arab-Israeli or Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, in particular, manifested them-
selves during the reign of Hassan II (1961–99). This is precisely what the 
sociologist Abdessamad Belhaj recalls:
In its foreign policy, the regime of Hassan II made use of the Islamic factor 
along three axes. First, it developed an extensive cooperation with the Sunni 
Arab conservative front (with Saudi Arabia leading the pack). Second, it 
assumed the leadership of the Community of Muslim Nations in the OIC 
(Organization of the Islamic Conference) and of the Al-Qods committee; 
it also played the role of leading interlocutor in the Palestinian conflict. 
Lastly, it sponsored Islamism by backing establishment of the University 
of the Islamic Renaissance (to which international Islamist actors were 
invited), by hosting Hassanian religious talks (headlined by top-ranked 
ulemas and at which a traditional, tolerant Moroccan model of Islam was 
presented), and by working on the creation of the prestigious Hassan II 
mosque.6
To fight revolutionary socialism, an ideology spreading both to the south 
and north of the Mediterranean, the Moroccan monarchy, abetted in this 
impulse by other members of the conservative Arab club such as Saudi 
Arabia, instigated and in September 1969 held a “meeting of Muslim heads 
of state” in Rabat, “which would give birth to the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference as proposed by King Feisal of Saudi Arabia with energetic 
support from Hassan II.”7 Allal al-Fassi, a leading figure of nationalist neo-
Salafism, a key player in Moroccan national liberation and unconditional 
defender of the throne, was one of “the founding members of the Muslim 
World League set up by King Feisal of Saudi Arabia to counter Nasserism.”8 
In fact, this meeting of the Islamic Conference, which would eventually result 
in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation’s (OIC’s) creation, happened 
after the criminal arson on August 21, 1969 of the Al-Aqsa mosque (one of 
Islam’s three holy places after Mecca and Medina) that was blamed on Israeli 
extremists. It was on this occasion that the OIC and, more particularly, 
the Morocco of Hassan II “took up the Palestinian question, affirming the 
Islamity of Jerusalem, while supporting the idea of a peaceful settlement of 
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the conflict. The decision to put the Palestinian problem on the agenda of all 
of the organization’s summits would definitively seal the ‘Islamic’ dimension 
of the problem.”9
It was also Hassan II who would assume the presidency of the Al-Qods 
Committee at its first session held at Fez in 1979. On the official website of 
the Moroccan foreign ministry can be found two highlighted declarations, 
those by Hassan II and by his son and successor Mohammed VI:
Al-Qods As-Charif occupies a special place in the concerns of Muslims 
worldwide, to such an extent is this city connected with their religious faith 
and lays claim to a preeminent place in their civilization’s political history. 
Cradle of divine revelations and meeting point of religions, this city in the 
Al-Aqsa mosque has a monument chosen by God for the first Qibla and the 
third Haram for believers. (Hassan II)
In Our capacity as President of the Al-Qods Committee, We expend every 
effort on behalf of the international community to preserve the legal status 
of this wounded city. It is about nothing less than defending its civiliza-
tional identity and sacred religious symbols against the acts of aggression 
that menace it and especially the searches, the excavations and all the other 
prejudicial violations of the Al-Aqsa Mosque’s sacredness to which Muslims 
are extremely sensitive. In parallel with Our diplomatic steps, We have 
opted for a pragmatic approach by virtue of which the Beït Mal Al-Qods 
Office takes on the responsibility under Our supervision of implementing 
specific projects relating to lodging, health, education and other social 
services on behalf of our Brothers who inhabit Al-Qods.10 (Mohammed VI)
In practicing Islamism in many respects in place of the Islamists, by preempt-
ing some of their themes, and even by sometimes enlisting them in his 
mobilizations, at least until the mid-1970s, for fighting the left and extreme 
left at the time dominating the high schools and campuses, Hassan II thus 
sought to demine to a maximum the terrain for protests and conflicts in his 
land, that is, in the places where these mobilizations were most susceptible of 
taking hold: Islam and Palestine.
This Al-Qods Committee, created on June 6, 1975 and primarily over-
seen by the Sherifian kingdom has four principal aims: “follow the evolution 
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of the situation in Al-Quods, watch over the implementation of resolutions 
adopted by the Islamic Conference on this subject, make contact with other 
international organisms to aid in the protection of Al-Qods, and make pro-
posals to the member states and all organizations interested in prospective 
steps to assure the carrying out of these resolutions and to confront new 
situations.”11
In conformity with Muslim tradition, the Arab name rather than the 
Western name “Jerusalem” is constantly favored, as if to underline the eter-
nally Islamic character of the thrice-sanctified city. On the official website of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, searches of “Palestine” and 
“Palestinian” return several notable hits.12 In contrast, the key words “Israel,” 
“Zionist,” or “Zionism” come up empty. Only the expression “Israeli aggres-
sions,” stigmatizing the process of colonization of Palestinian territory prac-
ticed by that country, display a few hits for these key words.13
However, this committee14 relates more to inter-Arab and/or inter-Islam 
solidarity on questions of housing, school construction, health coverage, or 
social assistance directed to the Palestinian populations. In other words, it 
relates much more to humanitarian aid than classic diplomatic activism. As 
such, it is not a political organ with a negotiating mandate, exerting direct or 
indirect pressures with a view to a negotiated settlement of the conflict. It is 
instead the protection of Al-Qods, both its Arab-Islamic and multi-religious 
character as a holy place, that the committee focuses on, thus bypassing 
political conflict.
In contrast, Moroccan diplomacy since the reign of Hassan II has, at 
different times, tried to play the role of intermediary with the aim of peace-
fully resolving the Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular 
insisting on the creation of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 
borders with Al-Qods as its capital.15
In that case, how to explain, on the one hand, the emergence of an 
anti-establishment Islamist current in the kingdom and, on the other, the 
existence of a vision competing with that of the palace when it comes to 
foreign affairs, on a properly Islamic basis? Islam, it seems, would not be the 
only and unique distinguishing variable of the Islamist mobilization.
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The Monarchy vs. the Islamists: Competing Foreign Policy Visions?
While the first structured Moroccan Islamist organization, Islamic Youth 
(al-shabība al-islāmiyya), was created in 1969, and then legalized in the ranks 
of the apostolic association Appeal to God in 1972, all the while maintaining 
a more discrete political profile, Hassan II, from 1958 to 1959, before he 
became king, totally opposed any kind of political Islam movement and of 
the pan-Arab leader Nasser, by declaring notably:
At a dinner with Lebanese intellectuals, I unfortunately said: “But after all, 
the Arabs will never be able to solve this problem. If I were them, I would 
recognize Israel and integrate it into the Arab League … It makes sense, 
because in any event it is a state that is not going to disappear.”16
Instead of adopting a warlike and messianic position on the eminently 
conflicted Palestinian problem, in a radical break with the demands by politi-
cal Islam or the traditional positions maintained by Gamal Abdel Nasser, the 
leader of Arab nationalism, he opted for the way of dialogue with the Jewish 
state. Also, well before Anwar al-Sadat who, for his part, officially recognized 
Israel with the Camp David accords of September 17, 1978 and that Hassan 
II moreover supported, the Moroccan sovereign quickly leaned toward a 
normalization of Arab relations with the Jewish state, rejecting the rhetoric of 
its destruction. His position, even though he sent troops in 1967 and 1973 
to fight beside the Egyptian armed forces, basically ended up setting aside 
the ideological posture in favor of quite rapidly turning toward a pragmatic 
solution that the Islamists in all countries for a long time clearly rejected 
before more or less falling into line with it: “I really very much want to work 
with you, but you will never destroy Israel, so stop living an illusion because 
you will solve nothing and you will make the heads of the Arab states waste 
their time.”17
Nor was the Sherifian sovereign against the idea of Jerusalem as Israel’s 
capital. Hassan II’s declarations regarding Palestine broke in at least three 
ways with Islamism’s theses, as represented principally by the historic Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt, and their Maghrebian and Moroccan avatars in 
particular: rejection of the long-held perspective of a return to a pre-1967 
Palestine, renunciation of the destruction of the Jewish state and armed 
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struggle, and recognition of that state. Mohammed VI did not really cause 
this diplomatic line to change, with the situation in the Palestinian territories 
and Israeli occupation clearly not figuring among the priorities on the pal-
ace’s foreign agenda.
Worse yet, Morocco would be a “discreet partner of Israel,”18 as revealed 
by the Moroccan journalist Ali Amar of the online journal Slate Afrique. 
According to the WikiLeaks revelations, which confirmed the Sherifian ori-
entations in this regard that spanned several decades, if “Rabat and Tel Aviv 
were in accord on diplomatic subjects, it was in business that their cooperation 
was more obscure.” Such a partnership is not surprising if the long history of 
relations between the Moroccan authorities and the Jewish state is taken into 
account. The discreet nature or recent lack of Israeli diplomatic representation, 
particularly with the closure after October 2000 during the second Intifada, 
“of Israel’s liaison office in Rabat and the departure of its diplomat, Gadi 
Golan, who held the rank of ambassador,” is linked to the hyper-sensibility in 
the Arab street to the situation of the Palestinians and the repressive measures 
that the Israeli army employed against the Palestinian populations. The mon-
archy did not wish to have this relationship excessively publicized or discussed 
in society and “given visibility” throughout the legal political space at the risk 
of discrediting its discourse of solidarity with regard to Palestine and, in so 
doing, play into the hands of political Islam opposition actors in a quasi-legal 
or extra-legal situation, like the Justice and Charity movement of the late 
Sheikh Yassine.19 Nevertheless, Ali Amar revealed that this type of relationship 
between the Moroccan and Israeli chanceries, as well as regular and multifac-
eted meetings between leading players of both countries, had been going on 
for years with the blessing of the United States. The exchanges would touch 
on several subject areas (tourism, technology, and military armaments) outside 
the sole diplomatic channel that was deemphasized due to its sensitivity:
Despite the popular opposition to normalization with the Jewish state, 
conveyed by numerous anti-Israel marches in the kingdom protesting the 
events in Gaza, Rabat continues to maintain trade relations with Tel Aviv 
in a volume that is far from negligible. Many Moroccan groups regularly 
denounce the ties between the Jewish state and the Sherifian kingdom. The 
national initiative to boycott Israel estimates that they amount to some US$ 
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50 million (Euro 35.3 million) annually, especially in the agro-industrial 
sector. Seeds and technology are transshipped through Europe to mask 
their Israeli origin. Some Moroccan companies import products from 
Spain, the Low Countries, or Denmark whose technology or inputs in real-
ity come from Israel. In 2005, the press reported the existence of containers 
unloaded in Casablanca marked with the star of David or components made 
in Israel built into telecommunications equipment imported by Morocco 
Telecom … Following a merger with Morocco Tours, Yambateva Travel 
recently opened a representative office in Marrakesh. The Israeli operation 
plans to take 45%  of Israeli tourism in Morocco … Rabat has opted to 
make military purchases from the Israeli armaments industry. The subject is 
so sensitive that both countries made it a state secret.20
In contrast, Islamists in general and the PJD in particular, which moreo-
ver previously went down a path of militants of political Islam in other, 
much more radical, organizations, such as Islamic Youth (1969–81), on 
an ideological level never have accepted the normalization of relations with 
the state of Israel. They are systematically careful, moreover, to avoid as 
much as possible using the word “Israel” as a way of acting out symbolically 
their absolute non-recognition of this state, therefore preferring pejorative 
expressions instead: “Zionist entity,” “occupying power,” and so forth. It is 
nevertheless necessary, as Walid M. Abdelnasser stresses, to “differentiate the 
foreign policy of a state from positions adopted by a political movement with 
respect to external problems.”21
Indeed, to fully understand the type of disputes that can bring the actors 
of political Islam and the monarchy into conflict on the question of interna-
tional relations, on the Palestinian dossier above all, it is indispensable, at least 
in broad outline, to interweave two perspectives: first, on the “foreign policy” 
and the Palestinian question, such as they have been coopted by the original 
matrix of contemporary Islam, in this case by the Muslim Brotherhood of the 
era of Hassan al-Banna (1906–49) and its immediate successors that spread 
throughout the Muslim world, including Morocco; second, still in relation 
to the subject of “international relations,” on the principal stages by which 
the Moroccan Islamist movement was constituted, of which there are four: 
underground, legality, opposition, and government.
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From the beginnings of the Muslim Brotherhood and of Islamism, which 
the former greatly inspired by also establishing activist branches22 starting in 
the 1930s in Morocco, Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Bahrain, as well 
as Europe (more during the 1970s) where they also progressively spread, the 
international or foreign relations of the Muslim world, in the name of Islam 
and its expansion through the world, were a major subject, all the more so 
because the colonial period was at its apogee and because the Islamists wished 
to reverse this historical tendency of domination by a near-hegemonic Europe 
on the global scene. They wanted to reverse the international balance of power 
to their advantage. Also, it is by first confronting the sources of contempo-
rary political Islam that it is possible to appreciate the difference between 
the Moroccan Islamists, inheritors of H. al-Banna’s thinking, despite their 
progressive theologico-political autonomization, and the Sherifian Islamic 
diplomacy in relation to Israel or the West more generally.
Internationalism, with the establishment of the Califate as leitmotiv for 
eventual unification of all Muslim nations under a central theologico- political 
authority, is at the heart of the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood’s founder. 
In addition, he dedicated a specific section of the Collected Letters not only 
to “foreign policy” (al-siyāsiyya al-kharijiyya) but also, in other sections, to 
Palestine. He posits, on a subject that touches on the international, that 
“Islam has held to the sovereignty of the Islamic Umma to serve as the guide 
to all communities, and this (as it appears) in numerous verses of the Koran. 
The Umma has to preserve this sovereignty, including by force.”23 According 
to him, it is indispensable to guard “the independence of the Umma, its 
liberty, its visibility, its dignity and power, to lead it toward glorious ends 
from which it occupies its place among nations and its noble abode among 
the peoples and the states …” There is a strong messianic dose in these 
texts by H. al-Banna that he integrates with foreign policy by hammering 
home that it is “at the heart of Islam as understood by the Companions and 
the pious predecessors.”24 For al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Islamists, under formulations that vary with the contexts, the places, and the 
groups, it is a matter of “countering the Jewish domination of Palestine,” 
in the name of the sacredness of Palestine territory because Al-Qods or 
Jerusalem was the “first Qibla” (direction of prayer) and for a long time 
(before Medina replaced it) “the second holy place” after Mecca. Palestine is 
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considered as “the center of unity” of the Arabo-Islamic world and “the spirit 
of nations.” Al-Banna faults the West for its “moral laxness and atheism”; 
it would head up a conspiracy to make the Muslim world turn its back on 
the sacred principles at the economic, political, and cultural levels. For only 
the Califate, whose abolition in 1924 would precisely be one of the causes 
of Palestine being colonized, and the complete temporal restoration of the 
sacred norms on the soil of Islam, could be the means of saving the Muslims 
from their “humiliating dependence with respect to the West.”25 For the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the loss of Palestine is closely linked to the spread of 
anti-Islamic, materialist ideologies in the Muslim world to the detriment of 
the application of the precepts of faith by these populations.
The Islamists and the International: The Three Ages of Brotherhood-
style Foreign Policy
This is the ideological perspective that the members of the PJD subscribed 
to originally before going through some remarkable inflections. Still, it is 
important, in order to better understand the quality of the party’s evolu-
tion when it comes to foreign affairs, to sequence the positions taken by its 
cadres (or its theorists) into four key periods: that of the Islamic Youth, from 
1969 to 1981/2, during which the current leaders of the PJD (Abdelillah 
Benkirane, Abdellah Baha, Saadeddine al-Othmani, Mohamed Yatim, and 
Mustafa Ramid) agitated for the overthrow of the monarchy, the total appli-
cation of the shariā‘a and the restoration of the Califate; the period from 
1981/2 to 1996, during which they strove for legality by abandoning their 
original revolutionary perspective of fighting the monarchy and in deferring 
sine die the possibility of installing the Califate; the period of inclusion in the 
Parliamentary opposition, from 1997/8 to 2011; and, lastly, the “governmen-
talization” period starting in December/January 2012. During at least the 
first three decades of the Islamist movement, it retained a distinctly simple if 
not simplistic conception of international relations as a universal apostolate 
meant to furnish the world with an alternative model of society governed by 
Islamic precepts. This utopian vision did not truly integrate geopolitical con-
straints and the immediate pressures of the institutional environment. A kind 
of mechanical relationship was postulated between returning to the pure faith 
by the world’s Muslims, reconciliation with the teachings of Muhammad, of 
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the pious predecessors, and the reconstitution of the Califate, with Islam and 
the Muslim world ultimately at center stage internationally and hegemoni-
cally at that. This was the idealist period: a manifest and acritical confusion 
over “the politically possible” and the “morally desirable.”
From 1981/2 to 2011/12, the Moroccan Islamists would reason about 
international relations in three registers of discourse, most notably regard-
ing relations with the West, the United States, and Israel, sometimes with 
variations and differences of tone, depending on the places, expressions of 
public support as well as the degree of pressure exerted by the throne: (1) 
confessionalization/communitarization or messianism in discourse; (2) a 
progressive rationalization of discourse, and, finally, (3) the externalization of 
anti-establishment discourse, that is to say, the act, for the men of the PJD in 
the government, of respecting the red lines drawn by the palace by subcon-
tracting to other organs close to its base the protesting or polemical dimen-
sion and by not taking on directly the governmental responsibility of actors 
of political Islam. In this connection, ideological accents, be they messianic 
or tribunitial, alternated with pragmatic tones or succeeded one another. For 
a long time, and there are still some hints of it, foreign affairs in Islamist eyes 
in general and Moroccan ones in particular were summed up as an irreduc-
ible dualism or an Islam versus the West face-off. This antagonism has not 
completely disappeared and has been covered over with pure pragmatism.
Abdellillah Benkirane, in his book The Islamist Movement and the 
Problem of Method in a chapter titled “Western Civilization and the New 
International Order,” returns to the crippling ontological dispute that would 
pit “Islam” against “the West.” He writes that “the world down here has 
become an end in itself,” “the beliefs of Muslims have been spoiled, while 
foreign philosophies have intruded.”26 The golden age of Islam that is to be 
resurrected is that of a globalized Islam, trans-border, universal, with cultural, 
religious content in a socio-political and economic fulfillment yet to come. 
The West, in a book written as recently as 1999, is relegated to a kind of 
essence that is irreconcilable with Islam for it would produce a “philosophical 
thought built upon the negation of the hereafter” and would attach itself 
to deliberately extending its empire. This opposition originates in Western 
“materialist or secular traditions” that Islam would intrinsically reject, since 
it denounces “publicly committing morally reprehensible acts in the public 
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space:  homosexuality, the presence of groups defending homosexuals.”27 
Again according to A. Benkiran, Islam would replace for the West its former 
“Communist” enemy. This would be the work of “proactive lobbies, execut-
ing, colored by Zionism, naturally hostile to Islam and to Muslims”28 that 
would use all informational tools to bring to a successful conclusion their 
projects for dominating the latter. The current prime minister, A. Benkirane, 
envisions that, off-stage, it would be “the Zionists,” the very ones who would 
despoil Palestinian lands and their helpers across the world, foremost the 
United States, to achieve their projects of domination against Islam, Muslims, 
and the Arabo-Islamic world. In his view, a neo-Califate would be a means 
of resistance and of rebirth for the latter as matter of collective duty.29 The 
idea of putting an Empire back together again is therefore never entirely 
excluded, even if no explicit time horizon is set. The confessionalization of 
the international relations concept was particularly palpable before the PJD 
made its debut in Parliament in 1997–8. However, we will dwell on four arti-
cles representative of this period, dating successively from 1992, 1993, 1994, 
and 1996. During this epoch, the future actors of the PJD still focused their 
propaganda on Morocco’s internal situation in essentially religious terms, 
but also on the situation in other Muslim countries, involving particularly 
the activities of “Brother” Islamist movements in Algeria, Tunisia, Sudan, 
Afghanistan, and so forth.
In an article in the Islamist magazine Al-Rā’ya (The Standard), dated 
February 9, 1992 and titled “Zionist Defeat and Great Palestinian Gain,” 
the author glorifies “the intensification of the blessed intifada in occupied 
Palestine, in the shadow of Zionist trials” and deplores “the Arab division and 
international conspiracy” sharpened by the West and “Zionism.” The author 
also praises Hamas, its historical head, Ahmad Yassine, and its military arm, 
“the ‘Azal-dīn al-Qasām phalanxes,” for their offensives against the “robber 
authorities of the Zionist entity.” He assigns five challenges to the Palestinians, 
including:“Privilege a decision to return to its land, as a nation and people no 
matter the cost (author’s note: when the Palestinians were still in the refugee 
camps) … no place other than occupied Palestine … support the intifada, its 
intensification, its importance as an irreversible popular choice, rely on armed 
struggle as a strategic choice for confronting the usurper’s occupation, and 
invite all the Palestinian forces to a complete national dialogue.” This shows 
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that for Morocco’s political Islam actors, Palestine is on the order of a profane 
and sacred preoccupation at the same time.
On June 7, 1994, still in Al-Rāʾya, A. Benkirane, leader of the Moroccan 
legalist Islamist current, delivers an exposé on the “situation of the Islamic 
world.” After the basmallah, the sacred ritual formula used by Muslims, he 
proposes a definition of this geographical space relating to essentialism, to the 
monolithic, in which this ensemble, while extremely diverse and fragmented, 
is totally identified with Islam. It would oppose the materialist, atheistic, and 
hegemonic West. For the leader of political Islam, the sole power capable of 
restoring the Islamic world to its rank is hands down the Islamist movement:
“We can affirm that its only hope resides in the Islamist movement which 
must continually renew itself to stay up to the historic task it is duty-bound 
to carry out, especially on the level of the unification of its ranks and factions, 
the precision of its ideas, the clarity of its project and discourse, the develop-
ment of its programs, the realism of its approaches, and the effort of total 
renewal that it must bring to bear.”
In an article in the same magazine dated February 23, 1993, titled 
“L’Islam and the West: Conditions for the Dialogue,” A. Benkirane, with 
Koranic motives as his starting point, encourages dialogue with a West still 
viewed as completely homogeneous, while recognizing “the positive things 
the West has given” Muslims and “to all of humanity, despite its negative 
points … colonization …, and its attempts to inculcate in the colonized 
Muslim population ‘ideas that break with the true religious science.’” With 
the future ex-Yugloslavia in advanced disintegration, he denounces “the 
genocide” in Bosnia and the aggression in Iraq instigated by the West. He 
denounces the latter’s complicity in the Israeli colonization of Palestine by 
not sufficiently applying the Security Council resolutions, or still more, its 
suspected responsibility for annulling the Islamic Salvation Front’s (FIS’s) 
victory in Algeria in the early 1990s. Tasking a culturalist approach, he calls 
on the West to acknowledge the special “civilizational and historical identity 
of the Umma.” He even exhorts it to “open itself to Islam without prejudice 
to find in it a remedy for certain civilizational sicknesses.” Here we see the 
full apostolic expression.
Finally, in 1996, when the Islamists under their leadership stand at 
the gates of Parliament for the first time in their history, they grant the 
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philosopher-historian Roger Giraud, visiting Morocco at their invitation, 
a prominent platform. He arrived to hold a conference on a work in which 
the theologico-messianic-political tone dominates: The Founding Myths of 
Israeli Policy.30 During this forum, which is a recap in extenso of the text of 
his paper, R. Garaudy, a convert to Islam and found guilty of revisionism 
in France, variously explains, here also interlinking the secular, geopoliti-
cal (anti-globalism, anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism, third-worldism and so 
forth) and prophetic dimensions, that:
the state of “Israel” no longer is just the proxy for a collective Western 
colonialism under American hegemony, it has become a major piece of an 
important planet-wide defense for the United States … Because we have 
shown that the principal enemy is the United States and that their Israeli 
mercenary is the nerve center in the confrontation, converging efforts must 
be made, not just by Muslims, but by all third-world people and also by a 
formerly colonizing Europe but that is today in the process of “taking its 
turn as the colonized.” Let us not forget that in the “Maastricht Treaty” 
it is repeated three times: “Europe can only be the European pillar of the 
Atlantic Alliance,” and it is the start of a colonization, the Maastricht 
Treaty, the pressures by NATO, the World Trade Organization … which 
is the civilian power of monotheistic market religion, that is to say, the 
idolatry of money, shows us very well how the process rolls on … It is 
therefore necessary to refuse to pay to the International Monetary Fund 
these spurious debts and usurious interest … I believe that on the political 
level this implies a collective retreat from all the institutions with preten-
sions to universality that have been turned into instruments of domination 
by a single one and which serve as a cover for its military aggressions … 
My sisters and Brothers, the project of the future is not a utopia if everyone 
feels personally responsible for attaining it … It is not a utopia, I repeat; 
at a moment when the British Empire was the most powerful on earth 
and it possessed the strongest army in the world, a very small gentleman 
named Gandhi jeopardized all the industries in Manchester by calling on 
the Indian people to provide an example … I want to remind you what 
(Babeuf) wrote the day before his death by execution, when he said “When 
the storms have died down, when the people of the Good breathing freely 
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enough come to throw some flowers on my grave, then you will see realized 
in good time what the corrupt of today call dreams.”
It is only on entering the Assembly of Representatives after the general elec-
tions of 1997–8 that the PJD’s actors increasingly relativized their messianic 
accents in international questions by adopting a more political and rational 
discursive register. They thus professionalized their discourse, because now 
they were under a certain number of constraints, be they political in nature 
in terms of their actual mobilizing capability in Parliament that for a long 
time was limited (they had nine representatives from 1997 to 2002, 42 from 
2002 to 2007, 46 from 2007 to 2011, out of a total of 325) or institutional, 
given the palace’s centrality. The impacts of environment, circumstance, 
and structure progressively combined and influenced not only the party’s 
agenda, but also, going forward, the manner of presenting their approach 
to international relations less and less in specifics relative to the monarchy’s 
own demarches with which it tended to align itself. In this regard, one of 
the immediate conditions imposed on the Islamists when they applied for 
legalization was that of having to defend the “territorial integrity,” that is, 
accept the Moroccanness of the Western Sahara provinces and, between the 
lines, the criminalization of the Polisario secessionists. Or by totally backing 
the royal account spun and broadcast on the occasion of the 1975 Green 
March, behind which nearly all forces of Moroccan politics and society 
had lined up with only a few individual exceptions. It was, moreover, a 
remarkable act relative to foreign policy conducted by the monarchy, which 
accordingly enduringly solidified its grip and its legitimacy on two levels: 
on the level of domestic action, and this ever since independence, and on 
the level of external action. This was one specific battlefield less for the 
Islamists.
Two reference texts produced by the PJD help to document the relativi-
zation of the Israelo-Arab/Palestinian question’s centrality and the rationaliz-
ing of the discourse on this subject: The doctrinal charter, which is the party’s 
ideological skeleton and a document distributed in the form of a booklet 
available in four languages (Arab, French, English, and Spanish) under the 
title La politique étrangère du PJD: principes et orientations [The Foreign Policy 
of the PJD: Principles and Orientations]. The charter, sixty-five pages long, 
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does not contain a separate chapter dealing with Palestine. It is essentially an 
Islamo-nationalist,31 even identitarist, reorientation that one is witness to:
As for our party, it guards the historical identity of our people, of our state, 
its civilizational and historical brilliance and its struggle, just as it guards … 
its traditions, its development during four decades since independence, the 
goals, the challenges, the internal and external constraints and the regional 
and global context in which our country evolves … with a view to partici-
pating in building a modern, progressive Morocco, proud of its historical 
authenticity.32
Where this text deals with the “orientations and choices” of the party which 
it envisages for international relations, always in second place, the favored 
angle is that of “sovereignty” or of sovereignism. The document proposes “a 
popular diplomacy that defends Morocco’s unity, its sovereignty, and the 
justness of its questions in international organizations.” In addition, Islamic 
solidarity is stripped of its messianic aspect and conflictual sides, moving it 
more into humanitarian terrain, but, for all that, still rejecting “normaliza-
tion with the Zionist entity”:
As it requires concentrating on furthering the defense of Morocco’s strategic 
interests by economic diplomacy … Press for reaffirming the effectiveness 
of the OIC … for attaining political, economic, and cultural mutual assis-
tance among the Islamic states with a view to achieving complementarity in 
these fields. Contribute to mutual assistance between the popular political 
and humanitarian institutions in the Arabo-Islamic world and rest of the 
world. (The) importance of the Palestinian problem or the Arabo-Islamic 
problems, by activating the role of peoples in supporting the Palestinian 
people until they obtain their freedom and have their rights fully restored; 
discontinue any form of normalization, overt or hidden … with the Zionist 
entity … by constraining the Zionist entity to respect the execution of 
international legal decisions.33
The novelty is the legalist Islamists rallying to the side of international solu-
tions to the Israeli-Palestinian problem, when for three decades of closely fol-
lowing the teachings of H. al-Banna their sole perspective was armed struggle 
to destroy Israel. However, this recognition of international law, particularly 
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in the case of this problem, remains variable, ambivalent, if not conflicted. In 
this short text of barely ten pages, the authors are careful to avoid using the 
noun Israel, because it would amount in their view to recognizing its exist-
ence, even if symbolically, given how much they always challenge it on the 
level of discourse. This is less a programmatic text than a text naming a series 
of external enemies like the “United States of America” hostility (sic) toward 
Morocco and to the Arab and/or homogeneous Muslim world. Without 
question, the PJD avoids the messianic cues characteristic of the Islamist 
movement in contemporary times, but after all it is content to secularize an 
old conspirational rhetoric. On the one side, with respect to implementing 
international law it appeals to the United Nations (UN), which presupposes 
giving at least some credit to this organization, while, on the other, it consid-
ers it to be manipulated by American power:
Worn out by these plots, the Arab and Islamic states have turned in on 
themselves, being content with managing their internal affairs and, for some 
among them, our country included, abandoning the role they once played 
in consolidating and fostering Arab and Islamic solidarity. Worse, many 
Arab countries have reached a point where they no longer seek anything but 
their security under the American-Zionist aegis, which explains why many 
of them hasten to normalize their relations with the Zionist entity. It was 
under these conditions, no longer content to sit still for their supremacy on 
the international scene by one party, namely the United States of America, 
that the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated. In response, and on the pretext of 
the war on terror, the United States exploited these attacks to wage more 
wars and impose their political vision on the whole world. Worse still, the 
Zionist lobby in the United States, allying itself with the all-powerful con-
servative right wing, benefited from the 9/11 attacks by associating Islam 
and Muslims with terrorism and declaring a merciless war against religious 
teaching in the Islamic world as well as against charitable activity. This hap-
pened at the same time that this lobby mobilized all kinds of political and 
material support for the Zionist aggression against the Palestinian people … 
and missed no chance to justify the criminal Israeli policy.34
However, simultaneously, the Charter enumerates six “basic principles” of 
foreign policy: justice on the level of “all treaties, accords, and international 
38 | the foreign policy of islamist political parties
conventions” without “prejudice … or injustice toward any community, 
ethnicity, or minority whatsoever … equal rights … opposition to any accord 
that would constitute an attack on the principle of equality or which is liable 
to establish racial discrimination or favor the application by a state, a group, 
or a community of a policy of ethnic cleansing or sectarian or religious 
persecution … the freedom of travel, of sojourn, of movement, of work and 
property … respect for bilateral and international treaties, the recognition of 
the civilizational plurarity and cultural specificities” as well as “communal 
cooperation.”35 It is in the framework of international legality that the party’s 
discourse, eminently rational as a consequence, inscribes itself.
While in Parliament from 1997 to 2011, the PJD globally used discursive 
repertoires borrowing from populism, at times concurring with an accepted 
or latent clash of civilization. In addition, it seemed to fulfill the classic func-
tion of protest movements that, from one moment to the next during their 
journey, go through a tribunitial phase, especially in the parliamentary or 
extra-parliamentary opposition. The Islamists also did not completely aban-
don a moralizing tone. Still, the movement renounced an anti-imperialist 
logic by admitting the cultural, ethnic, and religious specificities of nations. 
It was a language that no longer really squared with the califal views of earlier 
days, which remained an active utopia with an absolutely indeterminate due 
date.
If the “logics” or “field effects”36 play out on an internal level of poli-
tics, they also play out fully on the level of internal pressures that a party 
may be subject to, especially under an authoritarian regime, as soon as the 
international interests of the persons at the top of the state apparatus (the 
monarchy) are taken into account. This was the case with the announcement 
after the attacks of September 11, 2001 of a “global war against terrorism” 
by the American president George W. Bush, which the Islamists virulently 
opposed. That is, before they rallied to some extent to the cause consequent 
to the royal willingness to take new steps for the fight against terrorism in 
Morocco following the Casablanca suicide attacks of May 16, 2003. This 
they did inspite of the infringements on the level of individual and collective 
freedoms entailed by the language of the law finally passed with the approval 
of the PJD, which, sometime earlier, had still denounced the “anti-Islamist” 
and “pro-American” plot,37 “hiding behind the war against terrorism.” Some 
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observers branded this law as a retreat from respect of human rights and 
privacy.38 In the Islamist party’s final pronouncement on the vote in favor of 
the anti-terrorist law, it stated, for example: “Moroccans are like one hand, a 
solid front, monolithic in the fight against terrorism, under the noble leader-
ship of the Commander of the faithful, His Majesty Mohammed VII, may 
God protect him.”39
It must be recalled that the alignment of the legalist Islamists with the 
anti-terrorism law project was obligatory. This, despite its reflecting in part 
elements of the USA Patriot Act voted for by the United States Congress 
and signed by George W. Bush on October 26, 2001 after the attacks on 
New York’s World Trade Center that were roundly condemned by political 
Islam’s actors. This text provided one of the legal foundations for future 
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
It was under fire fed by criticism of the left-wing groups, by the NGOs 
and part of Moroccan civil society and with the king’s indulgence that the 
PJD, held “morally responsible” for the Casablanca attacks, finally aligned 
itself with those who favored the law at the outset. It is a new, blatant exam-
ple of the interaction between external and internal constraints, which even 
the Islamists could not escape and that they, indeed, had to bend to in their 
political strategies.
Despite its routine anti-American and anti-Western rhetoric, on the 
fringes of a debate on the US–Morocco Free Trade Agreementof 2004 almost 
exclusively led by the palace, the PJD, from a perspective of future electoral 
alliances, moved closer to the liberal Popular Forces party. The Islamist party 
presented itself as a liberal party on the economic plane, even “ultra-liberal,” 
deploring the “hold of the state on certain companies” termed “prejudicial to 
their competitiveness” and, to this end, praising the merits of the “economic 
opening” and “progressive integration with the global economy.”40 The legal-
ist Islamists thus did not vote against the US–Morocco FTA, despite its 
political implications and its potentially negative economic impacts on the 
country for the greater objective profit of the United States:
In this way the “Greater Middle East” appears to be the instrument by 
which the American administration intends to reconfigure all of that part 
of the world stretching from Pakistan to Morocco in the service of its world 
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view and interests. In this grouping, they have to start with some “good 
students” to provide an example and start a trend. Morocco—pro-Western, 
even pro-American, a constitutional monarchy carefully tending to its dem-
ocratic façade, a fan of economic liberalism and “happy globalization”—is 
rapidly appearing as one of a few countries (such as Jordan and Bahrain) 
handpicked by the United States and which it will favor as it pursues the 
realization of its design.41
It should be understood that this anti-American rhetoric tended to be down-
played at least since the mid-1990s, even if it continues to be expressed 
occasionally and at the margin. Indeed, the Moroccan Islamists, in the quest 
for institutional integration and aware of the great sensitivity in Washington 
and Europe on questions of security linked to terrorist groups laying claim to 
Islam, sought to be anointed by the authorities and think tanks close to the 
American administration. In recent years, even before taking on governmen-
tal responsibilities, the members of the PJD regularly took part in the work 
of the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (CSID).42 This institute 
organizes debates43 on the compatibility of Islam and democracy, of democ-
racy with forms of Islamism, and so forth. Mustafa al-Khalfi, the minister of 
communications, who also came from PJD ranks, was even a Visiting Scholar 
in 2005–6 at the American Congress as part of study of “American policy in 
the Middle East,” with a “focus on efforts to promote democracy.”44
To sum up, in order to prove their adherence to democratic principles, 
as consecrated in the great international texts, and simultaneously witness to 
its legalism both in its relations with the internal as well as external politi-
cal environment, the PJD thus sought the approval of the world’s greatest 
power, the very same United States whose whole weight rests on the Arab 
and Muslim world’s conflicts. In doing so, the Islamists are looking for a 
respectability capable of inducing a “boomerang effect”45 on national and 
international levels. They reckon at the same time that transnational mobili-
zation, the accruing participation on global platforms, will create conditions 
of confidence with the world’s great powers as well as financial institutions 
(the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and so forth) with a view 
toward lifting the suspicions on both sides by the time of an eventual taking 
power by the Islamists in the present or in the course of the next few years.
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The determinants—particularly, economic and political—due to the 
negative repercussion of the European financial crisis of 2008–9 on the 
Sherifien kingdom, as well as the geopolitical balance of power in which 
the  Sherifien kingdom carries less weight than other voices of the north 
or south, in part had gotten the better of the PJD’s traditional ideological 
postures. Indeed, since the Islamist party came into power and supplied the 
head of the government, economic relations with Europe and the United 
States, which remain favored partners (Turkey, the foremost Muslim client/
supplier, only ranks in eleventh place),46 for one have not diminished and, 
for another, trade flows with Israel have not ceased; they actually have grown 
since early 2012. “Moroccan imports from Israel during 2012 registered a 
spectacular leap of 216% while exports grew by 150% ,”47 through Israeli 
companies operating in the ports, in agriculture, and in security, with 
Abdelkader Amara, the Islamist minister holding the portfolio, not denying 
the reality of these activities and companies embedded in the kingdom.
That is not to say that the PJD actors would have totally abandoned 
the language of Islam or its critical positions vis-à-vis the West, the United 
States, or the “Zionist entity” as they frequently call Israel. However, the 
exercise of governmental power forced them all the more to euphemize 
their religion- and populism-accented discourse, particularly with regard 
to international questions. This attitude is the corollary to the distinction 
between political structures (PJD) and apostolic ones (Unicity and Reform 
Movement) conceded by the legitimist Islamists. When they had to broach 
the Israeli-Palestinian problem, they opted increasingly for the more specific 
angle of international legality than that of religion sense stricto.
They also did not want to enter into conflict with or be on the wrong 
side of Morocco’s real chief diplomat, as always Mohammed VI. That is 
why the somewhat more radical or messianic discourse against Israel was 
left, among others, to the printed press, like the Al-Tajdīd magazine, which 
could be viewed as an ideological sounding board for positions that were 
more radical than the PJD itself could take within its own ranks. This 
Arabophone daily, also available online, reserved space specifically dedicated 
to Palestine in which, unsurprisingly, can be found texts in quantity that 
support the Palestinian people and call on them “to liberate their country 
from the Zionist occupation,” all the while declaring itself systematically 
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hostile to any kind of normalization with the Jewish state.48 Finally, if 
regular exchanges and collaborations exist between the PJD and other 
political Islamist groups in the Arab and/or Muslim world, it is above 
all communitarian, fraternal, and ideological solidarity that is valued. On 
Palestine, the Moroccan representative of political Islam is less in favor 
of the route of military or armed confrontation with the Israeli state than 
“foremost, religious invocation, and then waging the struggle by modern 
electronic means, the symbolic contribution in all its forms, giving gifts to 
the Sherifian Al-Qods Foundation.”49 As for the words and commitments 
issued by Hassan II siding with Anwar al-Sadat for an Arab normaliza-
tion with Israel, to our knowledge they have never officially been criticized 
and called into question by the legitimist Islamists, foremost among them 
A. Benkirane. In fact, the latter is said to have accepted the invitation by an 
Israeli, Ofer Bronchtein, the president of the International Forum for Peace 
and no less than a former advisor to Shimon Peres “during the era of the 
Oslo and Camp David negotiations,” at the PJD’s seventh national congress 
held in Rabat in July 2012.50 All the same, some members of the Islamist 
movement declared, a posteriori, that this man was, in fact, in full agreement 
with the rights of Palestinians.
Nevertheless, the party assumes or exhibits, on this point as well as 
others, a certain ambivalence linked to the complications of excercising 
power, which regularly oblige them to put the rigid ideological positions of 
the past between parentheses. For the PJD is also constantly caught between 
ideology and realism, which imposes on it, if not entering into a community 
of thinking with all the actors on the political scene, at least into dialogue 
with as many as possible, including the Israelis, whom they generally stigma-
tize publicly.
By way of conclusion, we are in a position to sustain the idea according to 
which the legalist Islamists, engaged in a routinized policy of normalization 
and institutionalization, are caught in such a bundle of systemic constraints, 
be they of an internal or external order, that they de facto favor the pragmatic 
over the ideological. For the actors of political Islam do not evolve outside the 
national, regional, and international political realities that require them to 
make doctrinal, ideological, or strategic adjustments. They therefore euphe-
mize the “morally desirable” under the guise of religious or messianic accents 
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to further prioritize “the politically possible,” which they can in addition seek 
to legitimize theologically. The bottom line is that the Islamists as soon as 
they become institutionalized tend to normalize and make themselves more 
banal on the domestic but also on the international stage. Does this mean 
that they will renounce all the fundaments of their original political culture 
for good? Nothing is less certain.
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The Foreign Policy of Tunisia’s Ennahdha: 
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Several questions suggest themselves when it comes to Islamism, a par-ticularly anxiogenic but relatively ambiguous phenomenon, despite the 
abundant literature devoted to it. In point of fact, the anti-establishment 
position taken by some Islamist parties in the Arabo-Islamic area casts doubt 
on their “dual discourse” oscillating between legalistic endeavors and pro-
testing logic. It stems from the tension between the fundamentals of mili-
tant Islam (defense of the Arabo-Muslim identity) and the exigencies of the 
insertion into politics. This is especially the case with Tunisia’s Ennahdha 
movement, which, since its legalistic turn starting in 1981, seeks to affirm its 
adoption of the democratic idiom while still maintaining its Islamist identity. 
After a brief period of calm in its relations to power, as the result of Zine el-
Abidine Ben Ali ascending to head of state in 1987, the movement would go 
through a phase of violent repression that saw the imprisonment and exile of 
a number of its members.
The first free elections in Tunisia’s history were held on October 23, 
2011 to choose the members of the National Constituent Assembly (ANC), 
which was tasked with writing a new Tunisian constitution. The Ennahdha 
party, legalized in March 2011, received 41.1 per cent of the seats in this 
body (89 out of 2,017),1 thus passing from the status of pariah party to that 
of dominant party.2
The movement’s coming to power ratcheted up this tension, for the 
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party no longer limited itself to its relations with “democratic” or “secular” 
opposition groups but extended it to international relations as if it were the 
head of a sovereign state.
Analyzing the foreign policy of the Ennahdha movement is of great 
interest since it is particularly enlightening about the process of  adaptation—
indeed, normalization—to the logic of power and the practice of a party 
until then relegated to the sphere of the opposition. One of the aspects of 
Ennahdha actions that raises the most questions is the equivocal character 
of its positioning, which would be due to the permanent tension between 
democratic pretensions and the project of state and societal Islamization. 
This ambition has registered since its genesis in the anti-globalism in reaction 
to the West and the identification with the Muslim Umma and no longer 
with the Tunisianism proclaimed by Bourguiba. During the elections for 
the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) in October 2011 and with its 
accession to power, the debate on reconciling the movement’s democratic 
reputation reaches its fever pitch. Simultaneously with making an issue out 
of the religious dimension for electoral mobilization, Ennahdha is anxious to 
reassure, both inside the country and on the international level, the compat-
ibility between Islamism and democracy.
The question that this chapter intends to answer is how the stance of 
rejecting acculturation with the colonizing West, which has constituted 
one of the foundations of Islamist ideology in Tunisia and, in addition, is 
addressed by the foreign policy adopted by the movement henceforth in 
power (until the 2014 elections, which saw a switch to Nidaa Tounes and 
his dear Beji Caïd Essebsi). Did the party try to establish a diplomacy that 
puts an end “to dependency, alienation, and loss”3 by turning Tunisia toward 
the East, in this case the Gulf states? It calls for comparing the principles of 
Ennahdha’s external action, particularly where the West is concerned, and 
the application of these principles with the previous positions taken by the 
movement and its members on these questions. Tackling Ennahdha’s foreign 
policy (its principles and its execution) in light of the positions of Islamists 
toward the West seems fundamental to us because, more than a constituent 
principle of it ideology, it represents one of the motivations to adhere to the 
movement and an organizing element of the militant identity. This chapter 
thus tries to analyze the ambiguities of this movement’s external action, 
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precisely as it relates to the West, in light of the evolution of postures relative 
to the latter. That said, confining ourselves to an analysis of the concordance 
or lack thereof between the party’s ideology as it appears in the official docu-
ments and declarations and the foreign policy principles applied today, seems 
insufficient because it amounts to signaling evolutions or contradictions, if 
any, without making their sources explicit. Here, the analysis of the militant 
careers of thirty-three of the party’s cadres effected as part of our thesis work4 
furnishes material for understanding how the movement’s foreign policy 
operationalizes the passage from an oppositional register to a position of 
power that requires taking into account the reality of foreign relations, on the 
one hand, and the movement’s ideational foundations and their transforma-
tion on the other.
We therefore propose to analyze for the first time how the relationship 
with the West structured the militant imagination of Ennahdha members 
and how their positions on the problem evolved over time before the move-
ment’s legalization in 2011 (1), and then to examine the implementation of 
the Islamist agenda when in power as reflected in foreign policy so as to shed 
light on moments of rupture and of continuity with positions previously 
advocated (2). Finally, we question the changes in Ennahda relations with 
the West and its vision of the international system since the presidential and 
legislative elections in 2014 that led to the departure of the movement of 
power, at least as the main governmental force, and recent announcement of 
the movement on the release of political Islam (3).
The Question of Westernization and Relations with the West in 
Militant Careers: Constructing the Islamist Project in the Alterity
Analysis of the militant careers of Ennahdha cadres clearly brings to light an 
evolution on both ideological and referential levels. This is particularly true 
in their relationship to the West, which, as we will see, has gone through 
more or less sharp transformations at four milestones of their career paths 
(initiation, formal entry into militancy, the episode of the “great test,” and 
the access to power phase).
The problems of deculturation and imposed Westernization appear as 
central in militant logic and especially during the first experiments with 
activism. The alterity with regard to the West and the identification with the 
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Umma indeed constitute as much motives for engagement as an integral part 
of the ideology. The analysis of tendencies to join in the Islamist movement 
reveals the importance of the relationship to the West in the crystallization of 
perception schemas that fostered drawing closer to political Islam’s discourse. 
In observing family socializing experiences, we found that the first types of 
anti-Western attitudes are mainly reactions by the militants against the moral 
“decay” of Tunisian society. Underlying these are rules of behavior and 
principles inculcated since infancy through the transmission of a political 
vision that rejects Westernization pursued by Bourguiba for a conception 
of power based on Arabity and Islamity. These elective affinities between 
Islamist ideology and the parentally transmitted system of representations and 
behaviors reside essentially in the diffuse or explicit reference of these values 
to the Islamic ethic. Decent ways of behaving and dressing, clean language, 
respect for the sacred, obedience to the father, and respect for one’s elders 
are all norms opposed to the conduct and attitudes not yet dominant but 
increasingly visible in the Tunisian social sphere.5 It is also surely a matter of 
violation of public morality by the tourists flooding the country subsequent 
to the development of the tourist sector, as well as behaviors “imported from 
the West” and adopted by Tunisians, such as drinking alcoholic beverages, 
gambling, and blasphemy (looked upon as kaba’ir6). The conservatism culti-
vated by the middle class and the peasant strata favors adoption of an ethic of 
rehabilitating the values they were taught (such as modesty, non-mixing, and 
chastity) but that they experience as greatly devalued in modern post-colonial 
Tunisia. The indignation that these behaviors often elicited in fathers is 
frequently echoed and appropriated by the militants. Gradually it transforms 
itself into a sense of duty, that of upholding the moral order and protecting 
oneself against deviance, which facilitates their adhesion to the ideology of 
rupture that the movement extolls.
Ridha Bettayeb,7 aged forty-seven, who joined the movement in 1980 
and is still a member, held the post of political leader of the movement’s 
engineering school section from 1980 to 1981, and then served as a member 
of its politburo from 1981 until June 1984:
We felt that the Bourguiba regime had tied Tunisia to a different context, 
i.e., the West, than it should be, that’s to say, the Islamic one, that he had 
foreign policy of tunisia ’s  ennahdha | 51
despotically imposed a way of life through coercion on the Tunisian people, 
and he rejected the presence of Islam by closing Zitouna University; the 
religious institutions played no role of any kind and were simply closed, 
which brought with it a great moral decline of society. My father’s job 
forcing us to move from town to town, I saw that clearly. I was at the high 
school in Gafsa, and I remember studying a text there in writing class, a 
verse from the Koran that the professor chanted, so that all the students 
laughed, that’s how bizarre it seemed to them. Each of us in his own way 
saw this exile that Islam lived in our country.
Coming from conservative families or from Youseffian8 ones, the religious 
and political socialization of the militants interviewed shows the existence 
of tendencies that are molded or reactivated in the movement, such as: the 
demand for rehabilitation of the religion (the tendency to religiosity) and a 
propensity for protesting the political system and particularly the develop-
mentalist and Westernizing model followed by H. Bourguiba (the tendency 
to protest). During the initial phase corresponding to the training stage of the 
new Islamist (open circle and cell), the demarcation from society’s dominant 
values is heightened. Identification with the group implies a durable and 
organized affiliation to the extent that it is realized through the actors’ inter-
personal relationships, the sharing of norms and values, time spent together, 
and advocating the same cause. Yet, from the moment that the neophyte 
transitions to a religious status, the identification with the group also pro-
ceeds by opposition to the “pre-Islamic” society as a whole or against specific 
groups that it consists of, such as the Communists, the Westernized elite, the 
Sufis, and non-believers.
Ali Laariadh9 was born at Ben Guerdane in 1955; he joined the Islamist 
Movement of Islamic Tendency (MTI) in 1972 and was the prime minister 
in the troika government:
I felt that I was different from the masses; it is a very immediate feeling, 
this sense of being different from others, and it leads to a sort of break, 
influenced by certain texts we had read (S. Qutb), which assert that the 
Muslim must liberate himself from different ignorances, isolate himself 
from his environment. This is an intangible isolation: the customary values, 
attraction to filthy things, admire your close friend’s success even if it is 
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ill-gotten, regionalism and tribalism—you try to cut yourself off from them 
to rebuild yourself. Gradualism is not beneficial. The movement becomes 
the member’s family while his family now represents jahiliyya (ignorance). 
As the movement’s members integrate and strengthen their ties, their rela-
tionship with society becomes very difficult. We restored that very extreme 
orientation consisting of severely judging the society and excommunicating 
it; we are harsh with our Brothers, our parents.
 We felt close (linked), not fearing loss because we were weak and 
formed a small unit that feared its environment would rob it of its identity. 
We shut ourselves off because we needed a strength that let us break with 
the reality that we were living.
The Islamist novice perceives himself as a stranger in his environment. 
Convinced of his Islamity and knowledge, he comes to anathematize 
(Bourguiba’s) regime that had distorted the revealed message by taking the 
colonizing and dominant West as a model. The rupture that results is a 
symbolic one rather than a physical one, based on the idea that “the Muslim 
is a stranger and his exile grows along with his religious knowledge and his 
emancipation from cultural alienation.” The price of this freeing and the 
vindication of the Muslim culture’s supremacy is a break with the Western 
model and its values.
Said Ferjani,10 born in Kairouan in 1955, jointed MTI in the mid-1970s. 
Returning to Tunis after January 14, he held the post of counselor in one 
of the ministries. (This interviewee refused to furnish us with a number of 
details about his social background, referring us to a press account of his 
militant career.)
In other words, they presented us where everything was mixed up, they 
told us we were wretched [Muslims], that we are pitiful and that our ideal, 
our model, ought to be the West. In other words, that when he [the leftist 
professor] taught Marx to me, it was in dogmatic fashion … it made an 
impression on me, being taught Marx this way. As for me, I accuse the elite 
that taught us, it was the elite’s fault. The left was responsible and it abused, 
it wanted to politicize the teaching in order to gain ground. My idol was 
Jean-Paul Sartre. When the talk is of freedom, you find Jean-Paul Sartre; 
when it is about how to aid the weak, the wretched, you encounter Karl 
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Marx—in the end, that is to say, there is a kind of … dogmatic content 
that only wants to show you that but which does not integrate our heritage. 
Me, I did international studies, which is when I saw that even the West has 
a problem, for example, when it comes to democracy. It started in Athens, 
then Rome; after that, it passes directly to France and the United States and 
other Anglo-Saxon countries, thus London also falls into line. When I real-
ize that and I compare it with the extraordinary meritocracy that prevailed 
in the Carthaginian Republic,11 I am sorry for the West, for its subjectivity 
… it is as if the West said to us “I am wisdom and knowledge” as if there 
was nothing before and there would be nothing after. This is a dogmatic 
structuring of research. While what we really need is: these sciences are 
human efforts, in well-defined periods there were other civilizations, with-
out leaving out any no matter what. At present, it is the West that is weak, 
there is no talk any longer of its power but the world does not stop there, it 
transforms itself and all that. This engenders your dealing with everything 
in your head and in your ideas without an inferiority complex. My sense is 
that the educational system is in the process of inculcating in us an inferior-
ity complex in relation to the West, as if the West is knowledge, all there 
is to know, the West is all development, the West is all of history, in other 
words, we are worth nothing either before or now.
The phase of passage to formal militantism that generally coincides with enter-
ing the university seems to reinforce the anti-Western attitudes even more. 
The principal transformation that takes places in this state is incorporation of 
the Marxist, hence Western, referential. In confronting the leftist students, 
the Islamists have been stigmatized as preachers without any militant, politi-
cal, or even intellectual competence, given that their ideational production is 
confined to the religious domain. The positioning of the Islamists was a source 
of discredit in the militant field. The skills acquired during the novitiate phase 
(religious ethic, cultural capital solely grounded in religious  literature) by 
virtue of this find themselves affected by a negative valuation within the 
university by leftist militants in particular, therefore bringing with it a feeling 
of inferiority and exclusion from the terrain that they want to occupy. The 
religious status, claimed to define the Ennahdha militant by differentiating 
him from others and constituting his very identity, is transformed into a 
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handicap to the extent that it fails to procure for him the credibility necessary 
for setting himself up in a competitive relationship with the leftist students, 
at the time very powerful. The nahdhaoui is then very quickly stigmatized as a 
religious reactionary and lacking the qualities necessary for making him a true 
militant. Clashing with the leftist activists, the Islamists therefore were led to 
appropriate the social justice register for themselves and Communist litera-
ture of class warfare. Islamization of the Marxist referential was made possible 
by theorists like Baqir Essadr and Ali Chariʿati who came to replace Hassan 
al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, whose writing turned out to skirt reality and lean 
right, if not to the extreme right.12 Chariʿati’s writing introduced to Islamist 
discourse words close to Communist terminology, enabling it to compete on 
the same ideological terrain. The ideational evolution as a consequence of the 
competition with the left in the university thus did not happen at the price of 
moving away from the Islamist referent.
The attachment to this register remained a distinguishing element in 
the university militant arena, but the mastery of two cultures, Islamic and 
Western, constituted itself as a mark of superiority over the left. Said Ferjani:
Our movement was a Cartesian one. It makes room for a spiritual dimen-
sion. The idea contained in the letter is the following: these are two lines 
that we talked about. Listen to me, you representatives of the left, you 
secularists, we came out of the same schools, we have the same baggage, 
but we went you one better: what distinguishes us is that we also know and 
perfectly master the culture of our region, its philosophy, and its history. 
Therefore, we master both cultures, the two ideological references.
Rejection of the West and of its influence grew, notably with the advent of 
the Iranian revolution in 1979, which the Islamists interviewed regarded as 
the concretization of the ideal of Muslim victory over that entity.
Ajmi Lourimi,13 born at Chott Meriem of the Sahel in 1961, today is a 
leading movement cadre, having joined it in the late 1970s:
The Iranian revolution is an extraordinary event. Khomeini is an Islamic 
symbol that proves that Islam can make a revolution. Religion is allied 
with the ruling classes in the Marxist discourse, while Khomeini proved 
that religion is the weapon of the weak, it is a revolt against injustice. He 
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had given the Muslim the image that he needed to consolidate his position 
before others. The solution henceforth was there, in real life and was not 
limited to theories in books. The vision that the young have of Islam is that 
of an adolescent but highly charged with meaning, for his existence, for 
challenging the world; he has a vision, a model, it liberates all of humanity, 
as imam Khomeini put it, “proletarians of all countries, unite!”
This attitude toward Khomeini’s Iran calls for special attention. Indeed, the 
references to the inauguration of the Islamic Republic crop up frequently in 
the interviews that the militants granted us prior to 2011, thus demonstrat-
ing the exemplary nature of the Iranian model yet left uncompromised by 
the Shiism. This state of things did not keep Ennahdha from showing an 
accentuated tropism toward the Sunni Gulf that it confirmed when it took 
power. The diplomatic positions taken by the troika put it systematically in 
opposition to Iranian interests, including on the Syrian question. It is only 
during the phase known as the “great ordeal,” which designates the repressive 
episode of 1991, that took a great number of militants to exile in Europe 
and North America and others to prison, that a certain softening on the 
question of relations with the West became evident. It is revealed by the use 
of Western and modern concepts (civil society, peaceful transition of power, 
political freedoms, and independent judiciary, human rights, and so forth) 
that signal its distance from the traditional referential corpus.14
The influence of the militants in exile had a great deal to do with this 
shift, in particular with regard to how the movement related to the West. 
Their discovery in Europe or North America of values such as respect for 
the individual, freedom of expression and thought, and democracy that were 
non-existent in their native countries would, according to the interviews, 
reconcile the Islamists with the Western world. Societies and movements 
in defense of human right, including ones on the left, actually aided the 
exiled Islamists in obtaining political refugee status, facilitated their social 
integrations, or also took up the cause of imprisoned militants. In addition, 
the involvement of the exiled activists in defending their imprisoned peers 
resulted in appropriating the human rights register.
For the movement’s members who remained in Tunisia and were liber-
ated after more than a dozen years of imprisonment, cooperation with the 
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different political tendencies in Tunisia imposed itself as a way of reentering 
the political scene, taking into account the movement’s weakened state. A 
change of the referential thus was called for in order to avoid accusations of 
religious extremism by the government and the legal opposition parties.
It is no longer the West, that imaginary and essentialized entity, that is 
condemned, but the Westernization of Muslim societies by despotic regimes 
who exclude them from the political arena. The position of the Islamists 
around this problematic as a result has become ambivalent, closer to one of 
suspicion and eclecticism than of rejection and total denunciation. It is exactly 
this ambivalence that is found in the attempts made by Rached Ghannouchi, 
the movement’s principal theoretician, to include the democratic idiom. His 
book entitled Les libertés publiques dans l’État islamique [Public Freedoms 
in the Islamic State], published in 1993, indeed bears on this question. 
However, it was not so much about demonstrating Islam’s compatibility with 
democracy as a concept imported from the West but about proving Islam’s 
essentially democratic character and thus once more affirming the religious 
referent’s autonomy from Western influence.
The Islamist Agenda in External Action: The Ambiguities of 
“Moderate Islamism”
On taking power following the elections to the National Constituent 
Assembly in October 2011, the Islamist party stood out for its ability for 
electoral mobilization unequaled in Tunisian politics and relatively unex-
pected in view of its weakening during the opposition years. Two factors 
were decisive in its electoral victory. First, Ennahdha’s financial resources 
allowed it to better cover the Tunisian space. In fact, many Tunisian and 
foreign politicians suspected the existence of funding by foreign interests, 
particularly from Qatar. The second factor is its marshaling of the Islamity 
meme during the electoral campaign, which had added value compared to 
competing groups.
Governing as part of a coalition, Ennahdha was set on obtaining the 
foreign affairs portfolio, which was given to Rafik Ben Abdesselem, the son-
in-law of Rached Ghanouchi, the movement’s president and longtime leader. 
Despite numerous challenges raised that questioned the MFA’s competence, 
his family ties to R. Ghannouchi, and the Sheraton-gate affair,15 R. Ben 
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Abdesselem remained in office until the head of the government, Hamadi 
Jebali, stepped down in March 2013.
The Ennahdha party’s hold on foreign policy resulted in the appearance 
of a partisan diplomacy taking the place of state diplomacy, the majority of 
councilors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs being Ennahdha militants rather 
than career diplomats. Moreover, during official visits abroad, the minister 
relied on his network of personal acqaintances and relations of the party in 
the Gulf countries rather than the posted Tunisian diplomatic personnel. 
This foreign policy monopoly by the party gives meaning to the approach 
taken in this chapter of investigating the militant past and the movement’s 
history for interpretive keys to help understand the directions of Tunisian 
diplomacy under the Ennahdha Government.
The first evidence of rebranding of Ennahdha’s anti-Western positions was 
manifest in the movement’s official documents. In the section of Ennahdha’s 
campaign platform of 365 points dedicated to diplomacy, there was no 
mention of the problem of deculturation. The article stipulating the need for 
Tunisia to emphasize its autonomy and sovereignty had nothing original to 
say. If we compare the movement’s constituent platform dated June 6, 1981 
to the revised statute immediately after the ninth Congress held from July 
12–July 15, 2012, we note the omission of the term “Westernization”16 and 
the total lack of reference to this issue:
Contribute to asserting a foreign policy based on the country’s sovereignty, 
unity, and independence vis-à-vis any power, to establishing international 
relations on the basis of mutual respect, cooperation, justice, equality and 
the right of peoples to decide for themselves and work to support weakened 
peoples and just causes and foremost among them the Palestinian cause.17
By comparison, the 1981 text clearly evokes Westernization and calls it into 
question:
To promote the Islamic character of Tunisia so that it regains its role as 
the center of Islamic civilization in Africa and puts an end to the state of 
alienation and aberration. To renew Islamic thought in the light of Islam’s 
origins and the exigencies of progress and its purification of the vestiges of 
decadent times and Westernizing influences.18
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In practice, the Ennahdha foreign policy is, however, marked by a certain 
fickleness, for without being squarely hostile to the West, it also no longer 
subscribes to the Tunisian diplomatic tradition.
The signs of this break with tradition are everywhere. The first strong 
sign is the Anglicization and Arabization of all of the Ministry’s dossiers. This 
break with the traditionally Francophone19 and Francophile diplomacy cor-
responds to an expansion of Ennahdha’s foreign policy with Middle Eastern 
countries. In this, it confirms an Arabo-Muslim grounding for the Tunisian 
state and its relative detachment from France and Francophony. Although 
this decision may be linked with the profile and course of the MFA that no 
longer masters the language of the former protective power, the linguistic 
rapprochement with the Arab countries at the expense of Francophony is 
symptomatic of the rejectionist attitude toward what is perceived as diplo-
matic and cultural interference.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs reproaches France for its intervention 
both in the affairs of his country and also in lesser-developed countries. He 
declares on the subject of the military intervention in Mali, “it is our view 
that the problems in Mali should be solved within Africa. We are opposed 
across the board to any foreign intervention,” before retracting his statement 
the next day and praising this intervention as necessary. Also, following the 
declaration by Manuel Valls, the French Minister of the Interior, concerning 
the assassination of Chokri Belaid,20 the French ambassador in Tunis would 
be called in by the head of the Tunisian Government. The Tunisian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs reacted as follows in explaining this summons: “The dec-
larations of the French interior minister regarding Tunisia are cold-eyed, 
unfriendly, and harmful to the bilateral relations between the two countries.” 
The version broadcast and publicly espousing of a summoning of the French 
amabassador, true or not, seemed to be addressed more to domestic public 
opinion as a way of showing21 by this display of power that Tunisia had exited 
the state of servitude in relation to Western countries.
Ennahdha’s reaction in this case in effect nourished a lively conflict with 
French policies. A pro-Ennahdha group demonstrated in front of the French 
embassy in Tunis, chanting the famous “get out” at the French ambassador. 
Accusing the French of interfering in Tunisia is evident among others in 
the attitudes of nahdhaouist militants and sympathizers. The accusations 
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hurled at members of the Westernized, secular elite as “France’s orphans” or 
“Francophone rejects” are revelatory of the association between “decultura-
tion” and that country.
This makes it seem that Ennahdha’s positions vis-à-vis the West are 
essentially focused on the former colonizer, which is perceived as embodying 
a Western culture imposed after independence. The MFA’s reactions tend to 
confirm that Tunisia’s sovereignty has to pass invariably through affirmations 
of its autonomy with regard to France. But beyond diplomatic discourse, 
the country remains Tunisia’s primary trade partner, which implies a strong 
dependency even if setting aside all cultural aspects. Ennahdha thus finds 
itself in the awkward position between a geopolitical reality and a vision 
acquired by its militants in the course of their socialization and education 
in the movement, according to which the alienation of Tunisia from France 
under H. Bourguiba and Z. Ben Ali is the principal cause of its under-
development and decline.
Not seeing the same attitude on Ennahdha’s part toward the United 
States is explained by the subtle differences in European and American posi-
tions toward the Islamists. From the movement’s accession to power, it was 
regarded as a partner by the Americans on the express condition that it should 
demonstrate the compatibility between Islam and democracy. American 
diplomacy showed itself also less nervous than Europe with regard to the 
Islamists. The latter was anxious to be reassured before implementing coop-
erative projects that remained in suspense until the impending elections and 
final drafting of the constitution.22 None of the partnership promises made at 
Deauville were concretized while the implementation of bilateral cooperation 
continued by habit despite the problem of respect for human rights under 
Z. Ben Ali. The United States, on the other hand, continued to support the 
government even after the torching of their embassy on September 14, 2012.
The second indication of a break was the intensification of bilateral 
relations with the Gulf countries and principally with Qatar compared to 
what they were before the revolution of January 14. The final declaration of 
the first interministerial meeting of the Friends of the Syrian People at Doha 
was even finalized by the MFA. Diplomatic relations with these countries 
were not as developed before the revolution because of the editorial criticism 
leveled by the al-Jazira network against the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia.
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This shift in Tunisia’s diplomacy, Western-oriented by tradition, trans-
lates the hold of the Ennahdha party on foreign relations into a model that is 
more nearly partisan action than state diplomacy. Although routinely denied 
by the movement, several accusations and documents attest to the provision 
of financial aid by Qatar to the movement antedating the revolution and 
during its electoral campaign for the October 2011 elections.23 In addition, 
al-Jazira was the choice platform for the Ennahdha militants in exile, with 
the MFA having moreover overseen the research department in the TV 
network’s research center.
In terms of policy in the neighboring region, the movement evinces a 
desire to revive the Maghreb Arab Union and to revitalize the Arab League 
but, with Qatar as the exception, foreign relations with the “Brothers” or 
“friends” of the region seem to lack coherence with respect to its ideology. 
Bilateral relations with Egypt and Libya, two countries that experienced 
popular revolutions and the fall of dictatorial regimes, have not evolved 
at all compared to what they once were. With Saudi Arabia there is not, 
properly speaking, any rapprochement despite a number of high-level visits 
nor an accord on extraditing Z. Ben Ali to Tunisia. Tensions even surfaced 
with the Algerian neighbor following unadroit declarations respecting this 
country that confirmed that the Arab spring ended up touching it also. 
Ennahdha was even accused by the National Liberation Front of having sup-
ported candidates from the Islamist current in the 2012 Algerian legislative 
elections.24
Concerning Iran, although it had incarnated victory over the West by its 
revolution as well as providing a source of inspiration for the nahdhaouian 
cadres during the 1980s, nothing much changed on the level of diplomatic 
relations. Ennahdha furnished a substitute model for the Iranian one that was 
more reassuring for the Western countries and as seen by Tunisian public 
opinion, which is one of moderate Islam or AKP-style Islamoconservatism. 
Indeed, during its election campaign, the movement ceaselessly cited the 
Turkish example as the successful embodiment of the match between Islam 
and democracy.
In addition, a rapprochement with this country, which is considered a 
solid partner along with Qatar, on the Syrian question is notable, while with 
Iran there is a fundamental point of divergence on this issue. Implicitly, 
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Ennahdha thus positions itself against Iranian interests and certain Shiite 
groups in the region that support the Bachard al-Assad regime.
In this connection, the decision to break diplomatic relations with Syria 
without consulting its neighbors constitutes an innovation in Tunisia’s for-
eign policy, which has always followed a moderate line, particularly in the 
Middle East. Ennahdha’s submission to Qatar seems to be at the bottom of 
this energetic and highly debatable posture with regard to Syria, making it 
the first state to break diplomatic relations with a member of the Arab League 
without prior consultations. The support for the “Syrian revolution” high-
lights the evident will to occupy a pioneering position in the Arabo-Muslim 
area and to promote a cascade of revolutions in the region that would let 
Islamist parties assume power. It is equally an opportunity for Ennahdha to 
mark the transition from a soft diplomacy to a foreign policy intended to be 
radical and based on the principles of “Muslim solidarity.”
A landmark diplomatic action under the Ennahdha Government that 
seems to line up with its ideology and historical principles regarding foreign 
policy was the MFA’s visit to the Gaza Strip at the head of a Tunisian delega-
tion. This mission confirmed a specific attachment to the Arabo-Muslim 
identity and its support for the Palestinian cause. In fact, it was one of 
Ennahdha’s foreign relations priorities. It was part of the movement’s con-
stitutive platform in 1981, of the revised by-laws after the ninth Congress in 
1981 and it was repeated in the latest version of the preamble to the constitu-
tion dating from March 2013.
It was a first in the history of Tunisian diplomacy, which had always 
taken a prudent, moderate position on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, that 
a minister of foreign affairs would go to Palestine during an armed conflict 
and show himself hostile to Israel. It nevertheless remains to specify that the 
delegations arriving in Gaza in a show of support for the Palestinian people 
would not have been able to access it without the prior authorization by the 
Israeli Government.
Despite this audacious marketing ploy, normalization of relations with 
Israel up to that point had not been officially condemned by Ennahdha. 
Attempts to write penalties into the constitution for normalization of rela-
tions with this country were headed for failure and the movement was 
forced to beat a retreat following European and American objections. In 
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an  interview granted to the American think tank Washington Institute for 
Near East Policy (WINEP) in November 2011, the movement’s president 
was quizzed on the plan to include an article in the new Tunisian constitu-
tion criminalizing normalization with the Zionist entity. Rached Ghanouchi 
denied it, saying, “There is no reason to include an evolving political situation 
such as the Israeli–Arab countries crisis. The only country that should be 
named in the constitution is Tunisia.” Additionally, he stated that it had only 
been mentioned in the Republican Accord of the High Instance of Yadh Ben 
Achour, in that way signaling its exteriority with regard to the movement.
The most striking element in examining specific aspects of the Tunisian 
Islamist movement in power is the absence of connecting threads, especially 
with its past. The passage from an oppositional (mobilizing) register to one of 
wielding power (pragmatism) makes its positions difficult to discern clearly.
Exit from Power and Exit from Political Islam: Which Consequences on 
Ennahdha Foreign Policy?
In 2014, Nidaa Tounes (Call for Tunisia) won the presidential and legislative 
elections of which Ennahdha was placed in a subaltern position with sixty-
nine seats in the parliament compared with eighty-six for Nidaa Tounes (out 
of a total of 217 seats).25 A coalition between Ennahdha and Nidaa was set 
up to avoid political instability due to the lack of a comfortable majority for 
Nidaa. Participating to the governmental coalition Ennahdha was granted 
one ministerial position (vocational training and employment) and three 
secretaries of state within the Habib Essid Government.
A second political crisis solved by the so called National Unity Government 
headed by the new chief of government Youssef Chahed increased the number 
of Ennahdha’s ministerial positions within the Government. Ennahdha holds 
today three ministerial positions and three secretaries of State. Ennahda, 
however, remains sidelined from foreign policy. This ministerial post was 
assigned respectively to Taeib Baccouche (from Nidaa Tounes) and Khemais 
Jhinaoui (a career diplomat). The Minister of Foreign Affairs elaborates and 
implements the foreign policy of the Government in accordance with the 
guidelines and options defined by the Head of State.
Two questions come to mind with regard to this new configuration of 
power: the first one is to know whether Ennahda, as part of the governing 
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coalition, continues to have an impact on the Tunisian foreign policy? The 
second concerns the consequences of the separation between political and 
religious activities on the movement’s vision of the world and especially its 
relations to the West.
Regarding the first question, it should be noted that the Tunisian foreign 
policy has had some inflections in comparison with the Tunisian Diplomacy 
under Ennahdha’s Government. The first difference concerns the Syrian 
issue. Ennahda and former President Moncef Marzouki positioned them-
selves in favor of the rebels, which led to the breaking of diplomatic ties with 
Damascus. This decision was qualified as a diplomatic error by the current 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Khemais Jhinaoui and a consular mission opened 
in Damascus pending full resumption of diplomatic relations with Syria. 
Intended to be neutral, the Tunisian position remains vague on the issue, 
since the resumption of relations with Damascus is conditioned by the estab-
lishment of a political solution to the Syrian crisis according to a statement 
from the Minister.26
Besides, Saudi Arabia, which has seen its influence diminish in favor 
of Qatar during the government of the Troika, is now rehabilitated by the 
Tunisian foreign policy. The rapprochement with the Saudis in particular is 
visible through the proliferation of high-level visits between the two countries 
and a kind of confused alignment with the Saudi position. The positioning 
of Tunisia in favor of Saudi Arabia following the severance of diplomatic 
relations with Iran in January 2016 is indicative of this rapprochement. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had indeed published a press release dated 
January 3, 2016 in which he “calls for the need to ensure the protection of 
diplomatic and consular missions, while preserving their sovereignty against 
these attacks.” More recently, the Minister of Religious Affairs who declared 
that Wahhabism is the source of terrorism was dismissed for “non-respect of 
government’s imperatives and his statements that conflict with the principles 
of the Tunisian diplomacy.”
The other remarkable element in the same vein concerns the classification 
of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization at the meeting of the Council of Arab 
Ministers of the Interior on March 2, 2016 in Tunis. Tunisia, through its 
Interior Minister Hedi Mahjoub, accepted the declaration of the Council—a 
position that was immediately rectified by the Minister of Foreign Affairs who 
64 | the foreign policy of islamist political parties
issued a press release stating that it is not a binding decision. Even if Rached 
Ghanouchi is openly opposed to Hezbollah,27 the displayed and assumed 
contradiction between two sovereign ministries, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Interior, is less a sign of the influence of the latter 
in the foreign policy than a strategy that aims to please Riyadh in order to 
attract Saudi investments in Tunisia, while mitigating the consequences of 
such a decision: alleviate the anger of national public opinion and not offend 
the countries of the region.
Regarding the second question, namely the decision of the movement 
after his tenth Congress28 to separate political action from dacwa, it should be 
noted that it is more a question of specialization than strict separation to the 
extent that the members of the movement have to specialize either in preach-
ing or in political action. Yet, the consequences of such a decision are far from 
being negligible on the movements’ vision of the international system and 
more precisely its relations to the West.
The reading that was made of this decision can be divided into two trends: 
on the one hand, those for whom this is an important advance of Tunisian 
political Islam toward democratization and secularization and, on the other, 
those who see a double discourse intended to deceive public opinion and 
political actors at national and international levels, in other words a kind of 
Taqiyya toward the West. In my view, this shift should be interpreted taking 
into account the specificities of militant trajectories within the movement 
without excluding the strictly pragmatic dimension.
Ennahda, since its very beginning, had for its main feature the existence 
of an initiation phase that is central in the recruitment process—a phase in 
which religiosity is a central motivation of membership and a major dimen-
sion of the identity of the neophyte. It is during this phase that occurs in fact 
the ideologization process of Islam.
Some would argue that this religious dimension initially aiming at the 
establishment of the sharia and of an Islamic State cannot be evacuated over-
night. But the very logic of militant careers within the movement shows that 
religious motivations behind the entry into militancy are gradually giving way 
to secular motivations, following “a desecration process.” This desecration 
occurs under the effect of the initiation process itself, which, at the contrary 
of Sufi initiation, is based on the development of the militant’s Ego and 
foreign policy of tunisia ’s  ennahdha | 65
contributes to the replacement of extra-worldly retribution (the search for 
extra-worldly salvation and the satisfaction derived from fulfilling the func-
tion of khilafa—lieutenance—the Creator) by material and symbolic rewards 
of activism. The different frames of interactions in which the militants evolve 
after the novitiate period—militancy within the university and the confron-
tation with the Left, prison, exile and finally, the exercise of power—are all 
experiences that accelerate, although to different degrees, the secularization 
process and adaptation of the movement to the political environment.
However, this desecration does not concern all the militants in the same 
way, taking into account their differentiated dispositions and social and 
militant trajectories. This is not strictly speaking a confrontation within the 
movement between militants from the outside seen as “more open” and 
those more radical from the inside in which the first would have taken over. 
The opposition is much more complex since it is related to: 1) the militants’ 
dispositions that determine, since the initiation phase, the specialization into 
activism by preaching or activism through political action, and 2) activist’s 
social experiences, including experiences of excellence during their militant 
careers (revolutionary for some, intellectual or religious for others) that 
contribute in the desecration of Islamist militancy. The layout of the move-
ment to compromise and therefore moderation is then less the result of the 
dominance of outside moderates within Ennahda, than the consequence of 
its operating logic.
The so-called separation, unless it is mere political tactic, is not com-
pletely devoid of strategic considerations at different levels: internally and 
internationally.
Internally, this action seeks to protect Ennahdha from the revolt of its 
members who are still committed to preaching activity and to the original 
project, namely the Islamization of society. Besides, while maintaining its 
presence in the social and religious fields, the movement protects itself from 
accusations of instrumentalization of Islam for election purposes, since out-
sourcing these “services” to groups from the party and formed by members 
who are now somehow detached.
At the international level, and this is the question that specifically con-
cerns us here, a general trend among Islamist movements in the Arab and 
Muslim region can be observed, which is the rejection of the term “Islamist” 
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or “political Islam” in favor of a party with an Islamic background. This shift, 
done at the expense of ideological coherence of these movements, seeks to 
make Islam soluble in democracy and seems to be encouraged by Western 
Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations. With this regard, the 
issue of terrorism makes registration as a political party with a religious 
reference beneficial for the movement, rather than an ideological party whose 
objective would ultimately be restoration of the sharia and the Islamic State. 
Tunisian Islamists, anxious not to be excluded from the circles of coopera-
tion, have adopted the themes, and methods of training and debate promoted 
by international bodies.29
The parallel drawn with the AKP (Justice and Development Party), espe-
cially during election campaigns, was to convince the Tunisian electorate 
of the existence of a moderate Islamist model, able to evolve in a demo-
cratic, secular context and to achieve excellent results at the economic level. 
However, the comparison with the Christian Democrats since the release of 
political Islam shows Ennahda’s will to blend into a model recognized and 
accepted by the West.
Under the troika government, Tunisia began to turn toward the East, 
thus affirming its Arabo-Muslim roots. However, this turnabout, although 
justified by these two unifying elements, was not without inconsistency. Qatar 
is at the forefront at the expense of countries that are closer ideologically, like 
Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood in power, and despite the movement’s 
organizational and ideological attachment to this other movement since its 
creation. Ennahdha’s foreign policy also contains elements of its former 
posture toward the West marked by its attempts to assert equal-to-equal 
relations with this part of the world. The simultaneous media and strategic 
imperative of moderate Islam imposed a softening in the positions taken by 
the movement in this regard, even an abdication of its basic principles, such 
as normalization with Israel.
The interplay between domestic and foreign policy is not to be left out 
of explanations for this inconsistency. Are not shows of force toward France, 
however prudent, or the visit to Gaza, ways of proving to Tunisian public 
opinion that Tunisia’s foreign policy under Ennahdha is rooted in unyielding 
values, namely autonomy where the West is concerned and attachment to the 
Arabo-Muslim identity?
foreign policy of tunisia ’s  ennahdha | 67
Notes
 1. Report of the Instance Supérieure Indépendante des Elections—ISIE, http://
www.isie.tn/Ar/image.php?id=724, last accessed May 21, 2015.
 2. Following the elections, the Ennahdha movement allied itself with two parties 
of the left: the Democratic Forum for Labor and Freedoms (DFLF) and the 
Congress for the Republic (CFR) in order to form the government. The ANC’s 
presidency went to Mustapha Ben Jaafar, top leader of the DFLF and the 
presidency of the Republic to Moncef Marzouki, head of the CFR.
 3. Constituent platform of the Movement of Islamic Tendency (Ennahdha’s old 
name) in June 1980.
 4. Maryam Ben Salem, Le militantisme en contexte répressif. Cas du mouvement 
islamiste tunisien [Militantism in a Repressive Context. The Case of the Tunisian 
Islamist Movement], PhD thesis in political science, under the direction of 
Daniel Gaxie, Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, 2013.
 5. As noted by Jean Séguy, it is difficult to demonstrate empirically that a value 
system dominates in a society, but also the absence of unanimity in this domain 
in societies, a fortiori in a period of transition, also makes this enterprise more 
difficult and therefore requires paying attention to a differentiated relationship 
to morality according to social classes or layers on the one hand and, on the 
other, to the changes in these relationships as a function of the groups fre-
quented by the individual. Jean Séguy, “La socialisation aux valeurs utopiques” 
[Socialization in Utopian Values], Archives des Sciences Sociales de la Religion, 
1980, Vol. 50, no. 1, p. 9, p. 16.
 6. Kaba’ir is a major sin under Islam.
 7. Interview conducted in 2009.
 8. Designates followers of Salah Ben Youssef (1907–61), a member of the Destorian 
party, comrade in arms of Bourguiba, and Minister of Justice in the Chenik 
Government who opposed the policy of the Tunisian Republic’s first president 
and was assassinated.
 9. Interview conducted in 2007.
10. Interview conducted in 2012.
11. This reference to the Carthaginian Republic, a non-Arab and non-Muslim 
African power, is quite revealing about the territorial reading of the East–West 
conflict. It likewise denotes after all a basic knowledge of Phoenician history, 
Carthage, like Athens, being an aristocratic Republic.
12. According to a study by A. Hermassi, Baqir Essadr and Ali Chariʿati are high on 
68 | the foreign policy of islamist political parties
the list of Islamist most-read authors. Abdelbaki Hermassi, “La société tunisi-
enne au miroir des islamistes” [Tunisian Society in the Islamist Mirror], Monde 
arabe Maghreb-Machrek, no. 103, 1984, 39–56.
13. Interview conducted in 2008.
14. Sadri Khiari, Tunisie. Le délitement de la cité. Coercition, consentement, résistance 
[Tunisia. Distintegration of the City. Coercion, Consent, Resistance], Paris, 
Karthala, 2003.
15. A Tunisian blogger Olfa Riahi exposed to the media an affair of misappropriated 
funds directly implicating the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
16. In Arabic, the term taghrib refers to the West gharb wholly in its allogene 
character.
17. Constituive rules of the movement after revision (ninth Congress):
18. 
19. The diplomatic correspondence of the Tunis Regency kept in the Tunisian 
National Archives (TNA), historical series, attests unequivocally the use of 
French as the language of diplomacy with foreign powers and Tunisia’s own 
representatives abroad from the early nineteenth century on. Arabic, Ottoman 
Turkish, and Italian were also utilized.
20. Tunisisan politician, president of the Patriotic Democratic Movement WATAD 
(al-WATaniyyun al-Dimkratiyyun al-Muwahid), who was assassinated on 
February 6, 2013.
21. This version is questioned by a source in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 
assures that it was meeting.
22. Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
23. One accusation was leveled by the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs in a 
newspaper interview. Having met Rached Ghannouchi during a visit to the emir 
of Qatar, the Syrian minister asserted that the latter is supposed to have ordered 
disbursement of USD 150 million for supporting the Ennahdha party in its 
campaign for the October 23, 2011 elections.
24. Anouar Chennoufi, “Ennahdha réfute les accusations du porte-parole du 
parti algérien le Front de Libération Nationale (FLN),” Tunivisions, May 12, 




لتأسيسيا نلبياا لتغريب.ا رثاوآ
ءإلسالمي على ضوالفكر ا. تجديد للضالوا
أآ
1981 6- 6-لنھضة الحقا) تونس فياإلسالمي (حركة ا هالتجاا لحركة
 إلسالميةا رةللحضا ىكبر ةإلسالمية لتونس حتى تستعيد مھمتھا كقاعدالشخصية ا 
أ عابالغتروالتبعية اضع حد لحالة وو بأفريقيا
طالنحطاا رعصو سبروا من تنقيتهو رةلمتطوا ةلحياا تمقتضياولثابتة ا مإلسالا لصوأ 
foreign policy of tunisia ’s  ennahdha | 69
25. Today, Ennahdha and Nidaa have equal number of seats within the parliament 
(sixty-nine) given the crisis within Nidaa that led to the resignation of seventeen 
of its deputies.
26. Interview granted by the Minister to the Egyptian newspaper al Ahram on 
September 11, 2016.
27. In an interview with TRT Arabic, R. Ghannouchi condemned “Hezbollah’s 
commitment to the counterrevolutionary forces in Syria and Yemen and its con-
tribution to the destruction of the country” and stated that Ennahdha cannot be 
at his side given the fact that Hezbollah “has blood on his hands.”
28. The congress was held in Hammamet on May 21–22, 2016.
29. Seif Soudani, “Discrète visite de Rached Ghannouchi aux États-Unis: décryptage 
d’une réconciliation,” Le courrier de l’Atlas, December 7, 2011, http://www.
lecourrierdelatlas.com/139607122011Discrete-visite-de-Rached-Ghannouchi-
aux-Etats-Unis-decryptage-d-une-reconciliation.html, last accessed October 12, 
2016.
70 | the foreign policy of islamist political parties
4
The Foreign Policy of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood
Tewfik Aclimandos
Foreword: Looking Back to This Study
This author stopped studying the Brotherhood by the end of 2013, for many reasons, some personal, and others related to the Egyptian situa-
tion and to work ethics—Muslim Brothers are jailed and they cannot defend 
their cause. This author’s dislike for their ideology and their way of doing 
things does not prevent him from being respectful to the men, their commit-
ment to their cause and their sacrifices.
Studying the Brotherhood tests the limits of “neutral axiology.” Studying 
this movement raises hard questions, regarding religion, the nation state, 
ethics, politics, polity, security, lies and truth in politics, democracy, revolu-
tion, the relation between religion and law, the relation between religion 
and ideology, the relation between religion and polity, the relation with the 
“other,” and how you study this “other.” Do we have a universal political 
science’s idiom enabling us to use the same concepts for describing widely 
different worlds? To claim being neutral toward these issues is lying. Defining 
the right distance between the movement and the researcher is impossible; 
managing the actual distance between them is delicate.
Our “sources” are widely different: interviews with top, middle-ranking, 
and modest militants; doctrinal books written by top and middle-ranking 
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Muslim Brothers; testimonies of former members, of dissidents, and/or of 
militants who disapprove of the “official line”; testimonies of their Egyptian 
foes who had to work with them: these foes can be secular actors, security 
officials, or simple people; testimonies of their “public”; and anthropological, 
sociological, and historical studies.
It should be clear that this is a clandestine organization, with a solid 
and deep-rooted “culture of clandestinity.” This does not mean that it has 
never tried “openness”; it means that it is not organized for a “natural” 
relation with the “other.” This culture precedes Egypt’s authoritarian turn: 
al Banna, the great founder, the “imam,” praised secrecy. He had a grand 
design (the caliphate and the conquest of the world), and thought that evil 
forces (Crusaders, international Jewry, free masonry) would do their utmost 
to counter it: so it had to adopt the organizational structure and way of doing 
things of masonry, as he imagined it. The Brotherhood would be a masonry 
“for the good.”
Saying this means that this author considers the ideology to be relevant, 
to be much more relevant than thought by other colleagues and scholars. It 
structures the shared worldview. Of course, not all the Brothers have the same 
understanding of “Islam,” of “takfir” issues. They disagree on democracy, on 
the tools to seize power, on jihad and violence. In the Brotherhood you have 
many different profiles. Some are more “Salafis” than the Salafis, others are 
simply conservative, others are liberals. Many prominent leaders consider 
the martyr Qutb (the main ideologue) to have developed a very dangerous 
worldview and to be very weak on theological issues. But even those who do 
not like him feel compelled to pay tribute to him, and this is significant: they 
will tell you that Qutb has not been properly understood; they will tell you 
that he does not say what he seems to be saying; they will say the last writings 
should not lead us to forget the previous ones; they will say his interpretation 
of Quran is not the work of a ulema, but remains important; and so forth. All 
this is true. But it underestimates the widely shared common assumptions. 
All the known Muslim Brothers agree to say that a Muslim society that toler-
ates alcohol, that does not execute the hudud (penal corporal sanctions), and 
that accepts the “mingling” between women and men is not really Muslim. 
All of them want the restoration of an imperial caliphate and the conquest 
(not necessarily violent) of the world. Observers who forget the powerful 
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appeal of this goal miss the crucial point. This means that I am convinced 
that the “post-Islamism” paradigm, which assumes that the great narratives 
are dead, is most inappropriate for analyzing the Muslim Brotherhood. I do 
not say that post-Islamism does not exist and is an illusion. I am saying the 
leadership and the great majority of the membership is not post-Islamist. To 
claim the contrary or to think that this is a normal evolution of the move-
ment is a huge mistake.
This leads us to specify what pragmatism is. Pragmatism means that 
the leadership understands that this goal cannot be reached for now. It also 
means many Brothers understand that societies may not be ready for now 
for their kind of medicine and a gradual approach is needed. It may mean a 
flexible approach regarding the means and the allies: for instance, the leaders 
understand (albeit for the wrong reasons, their fantasies about International 
Jewry ruling the word) that they need to placate the USA and Israel friends in 
Washington. Recognizing the peace treaty is not too high a price for seizing 
control of Egypt and other countries.
I evoked “known Muslim Brothers.” We should never forget that this is a 
clandestine organization. Nobody has relevant and reliable data regarding the 
membership. Even former insiders disagree: Khalil al Anna told me, many 
years ago, the Brotherhood did not accept Salafists. The late Husam Tammam, 
Farid Abdul Khaliq and Ahmad Raif, strongly disagreed. Tammam claimed 
the Brotherhood, once an urban movement, became—during the Mubarak 
years—a rural one, with an increased hostility to Egypt’s culture, produced 
by cities and urban people. Sure, the last years proved Cairo was irremediably 
hostile to the Brotherhood. But what about other cities, and most notably 
Alexandria?
Other experts try to draw distinctions between different generations: 
some would say the fracture opposes two generations, others evoke three dif-
ferent generations and others four. All those experts concur to demonize the 
oldest to which I do not agree, but few seem to consider the very real fact that 
none of the generations is homogeneous, or willing to admit that we simply 
do not have reliable data.
Some would say the Brotherhood imposes a strict discipline. Others 
tell us this is an illusion: the leadership never had the means to impose this. 
Others tell us everybody has the right to express his views, but also has to shut 
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up when a decision is adopted. Some insiders tell us “discipline is necessary 
when people has different views. The great majority of the militants trust 
the leadership and is more homogeneous than we think.” A journalist who 
knows the movement says we should not underestimate the fact that most 
of the members, including some of the top guys, are not really interested in 
politics. They are religious people and tend to trust those (Khayrat al Shatir) 
who decide.
A lot of analysts, including some pro-Islamists like Khalil al Anani, say 
the collapse, the failure of the Morsi presidency is to be explained by the lack 
of a serious agenda, the bad shape of the organization, aging and slowing and 
sheer incompetence. This diagnosis needs some comment: first, the Muslim 
Brothers had an agenda and a plan. It was simple: to seize power, exploiting 
the divisions and the incompetence of their foes, and the army’s dependency 
(so they thought) on Washington’s help. They simply misread the Egyptian 
electoral map, misunderstood the nature of clientelism (a relation grounded 
on mutual interest, not on ideological affinities) and did not see how deeply 
the Egyptian youth rebelled against all kinds of authorities, including reli-
gious authorities, and how much other Egyptians were keen on protecting 
their private liberties, and were committed nationalists, not interested in the 
kind of transnational allegiance they advocated for.
The bad shape of the organization is a polysemic claim: it can mean 
this organization is not working. The strongest argument for this is “despite 
the warning of the young militants, the leadership did not see the coming 
storm,” but it is clear that this is not related to the existing internal channels. 
Instead, it was a clash of analyses. It meant that the movement no longer had 
the means of imposing discipline: militants were disaffected, disobedient, 
did not believe their leaders, had multiple allegiances (for instance, a Muslim 
Brother judge was first a judge and second a Muslim Brother, not the other 
way round). It is clear we can find evidence for such claims and evidence that 
disproves these claims. While admitting that I do not have scientific means to 
prove my claim, I do not buy this argument. We simply do not know. It may 
mean that the Muslim Brothers were divided on many issues and that differ-
ent cliques competed for influence (Morsi, at some point, tried to emancipate 
himself from al Shater, but failed): this is true but not really relevant. They 
had a shared interest in governing Egypt. Last but not least, it may mean 
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that the strongman al Shatir behaved as if the Brotherhood was a Leninist 
organization, while it was merely “Brezhnevian”: too bureaucratic, too plural, 
paying tribute to ideology without seriously believing in it or, to be more 
accurate, without behaving as committed believers. There is a grain of truth 
in this, of course, but once again we do not have enough data to know.
The argument that “they are stupid and incompetent” is very popular 
in Egypt. For instance, many Leftist militants who fought the Brothers for 
the controls of syndicates and labour unions told this writer: “I (have) never 
met a competent Muslim Brother. We can meet competent Salafists who 
are good engineers and militants, (but) there are no competent Muslim 
Brothers.” They were unable to explain this and tended to say: anyhow, being 
a Brother guarantees you clients and incomes, so there is no need to improve 
and to learn. I do not know. I have problems with this assessment. Suffice to 
say, incompetence, if real, does not explain the demise. Ideological lenses or 
blindness is a safer bet. Incompetence may also mean “lack of competent staff 
on some issues”: for instance, they do not have serious economists. But this 
claim is not convincing: so many conservative people (having a problem with 
the so called “July’s State”) were willing to work for them. The Brotherhood 
simply did not co-op them. Some explained this by the need to reward 
members of the Brotherhood, others by a deep rooted paranoia against all 
those who were not members of the movement. Some, including many 
allies, say the problem was not with the Brotherhood, but with President 
Morsi. Choosing him as the presidential candidate was a huge mistake. This 
tends to forget that the real center of decision was not the presidency, but 
the Guidance bureau, and, more accurately, the strongmanship of Khayrat 
al Shatir. Last but not least, we are told the “deep state’s” hostility paralyzed 
them and ultimately destroyed them. At the time of writing (February 2017), 
some in the Deep State claim that “letting them win the presidency was a 
clever trap aimed at discrediting them.” But this claim is implausible. Of 
course, the Brotherhood had “foes” in the Deep State, but they also had allies. 
They were unable to capitalize on their resources and quickly antagonized 
every significant actor, including the Salafists and their allies.
Before the conclusion of this foreword, I present a quick allusion to the 
“democratic transition” and the “conversion to democracy” paradigms. I 
never believed in this. The smartest argument went like this: “the Muslim 
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Brothers have renounced the violence, but they still want power, so they are 
compelled to seek this though elections; they don’t believe in democracy but 
they will have to adapt to it and progressively they will adopt democratic 
values.” It is clear that this is too deterministic and I have written some long 
pages regarding the naivity of these experts who assumed that the Brothers 
were lying. I should point to Leslie Piquemal’s work as her views are more 
nuanced. Many Brothers vaguely understand democracy as a nice thing, 
providing many resources to their movement, starting with protection and 
freedom to speak.1 However, they either do not accept some basic assump-
tions of democracy (such as equality for all citizens, the right to free speech, 
and sovereignty of the people), or they think they can convince a majority to 
renounce to this, or that they do not really understand how this is working. 
Anyhow, the main consequence of their approach to democracy is a very 
liberal use of the main concepts, which lose any meaning. Equality means 
equality and inequality, civil state means non-military, and does not prevent 
ulemas from having a veto power on legislation. Rightly or wrongly, their 
discourse antagonized everybody else.
Introduction
The “Arab spring” radically transformed the regional scene. It also occurred 
at a time of American withdrawal. Each country was the theater of a struggle 
opposing different actors, most of them benefiting from external support. 
Different projects and alliances competed for the regional hegemony and for 
“the soul of the Arab spring”: a Turkish/Qatari/Muslim Brotherhood pro-
ject, relying on a “strategical alliance” between Erdogan’s Turkey and Egypt’s 
Morsi, funded by Qatar, a conservative project carried by the Emirates, 
Abdullah’s Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Egyptian Army, Mubarak’s supporters 
and many factions in the Deep Egyptian State, and some democratic forces, 
some of them funded by the Emirates. Last but not least, Iran had its clients, 
many of them shiites, and its own projects.
Of course, we should analyse the event with more nuance. For instance, 
King Salman of Saudi Arabia does not share the Emirates’ and his brother’s 
hostility to the Brotherhood. He can use them as long as they accept a second 
seat. The Egyptian army was not a permanent member of the “conservative 
alliance”: it decided in 2011/12 that Egypt’s stabilization needed to let the 
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Brotherhood seize power, and I have many serious reasons to believe this 
would have been an ideal solution for them, if the Brotherhood accepted to 
rein in its transnational approach (preferring the Brotherhood’s interest in 
each country to Egypt’s, as defined by the state and public opinion) and to 
lower the intensity of confrontation on the Egyptian internal scene: in each 
alliance you can find occasional or structural tensions. But this is the broad 
picture, and it is clear Egypt was the main battle ground. Billions of dollars 
were spent to fund political actors and to win the battle.
How to Read the Brotherhood?
For two years and a half, the Brotherhood, the oldest Islamist group on 
Earth, was the main political actor on Egypt’s scene. For a year and a half 
(December 2011—June 2013), it controlled the legislative branch. For a year 
(July 2012—June 2013) it controlled also the executive and wielded power. 
Certainly, the fact of knowing (but did they know?) that the army, the secu-
rity organs, and large parts of the bureaucracy were very suspicious from the 
start and increasingly hostile thereafter perhaps slowed them down in their 
options (or perhaps not), but it did not fundamentally change the situation.2
The constitution that they had promulgated was Islamist-inspired: little 
does it matter to know that it went further than they wanted, in order to 
appease the Salafis, or not as far in paying heed to the middle classes of the 
large Egyptian cities and the Western capitals as they may have wished—the 
text is there, in eloquent response to all those who bet on a conversion of this 
group to democracy.3
Everything becomes “up for grabs” when studying this group. It is secre-
tive, clandestine. Even in power, it has failed to regularize its still illegal 
status. Even inside it, very little information circulates, and there are various 
degrees of4 initiation.5 The most visible representatives of the Brotherhood 
are not those who wield the real power.6 For better or worse, they do not 
partake in the same options as those at the top. The oral discourses that this 
force produces are insanely contradictory. The Brother cadres do not say the 
same thing—each with his own version that changes from one sentence to 
the next, from one contact to the next.7 The promises the Brotherhood makes 
to its contacts are just as irreconcilable and the political actors that have dealt 
with them, from Saudi Arabia to various Communist groups, and on to the 
the egyptian muslim brotherhood | 77
Egyptian presidents, the Salafis, the liberals, the nationalists, the jihadist all 
claim that the Brotherhood consistently lies and, worse yet, never honors its 
commitments. There is room to believe that relating this way to the truth, 
to the lie, and to other protagonists is deliberate, assumed by the top and the 
executive authorities. I am personally firmly convinced of it.
All our sources of knowledge are more or less tenuous.
A) First, available to us are statements, confidential talks, explanations by 
the cadres, leading or not, of the Brotherhood. But it is impossible to do 
anything whatsoever starting from this corpus. Or, rather, it makes pos-
sible all sorts of contradictory explanations, none of which are capable 
of taking into account or putting in order the totality of what has been 
said (and this even if taking into account the context in which they were 
made).
B) Next, we can study the programs it has proposed to the voters at various 
points. But, as Leslie Piquemal suggested in her thesis,8 their proposi-
tions are too vague, ambivalent, and contradictory, which opens them 
to various interpretations: it may be, as he asserts, that the principal 
actors use concepts borrowed from other “enclosures” and from other 
discursive systems whose meaning they fail to truly understand. They 
could just be lying. It could be they target so many different audiences 
that everything clashes, that the message no longer makes any sense, if 
one excepts this very simple one that says: when the society and the state 
become Islamized, all problems will be solved.
C) We can focus on their doctrinal texts, on the material they make their 
militants read, and their cadres during different stages of their initiation. 
Most of my colleagues9 think that the “great narrative” has unraveled and 
that no one on the inside really believes in it any more. They base this 
contention on the great pragmatism that (according to them) the leader-
ship exhibits, based on the fact that the Brotherhood for ages has not put 
out elaborate or constructed ideologies; that the Qutbism,10 which is at 
the core of the Brothers’ teaching is too revolutionary for the conservative 
provincial middle classes that are their recruiting focus in which we find 
those in command of the Brotherhood; or within the great plurality of 
the militants that are very different from one another; or in the fact that 
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the discourse produced by the cadres and the executives are “potpourris,” 
mixtures of little consistency, borrowed from different schools, postures, 
and Islamic paradigms.11 None of these arguments seem decisive to me, 
but I am alone on that point. For me, pragmatism and adaptive capacity 
are not incompatible with dogmatism. The Brotherhood knows how 
to appear gradualist and patient, but it has never made a compromise 
that entailed a definite renunciation of (a significant part of) its “grand 
design.” The blinders and ideological biases that organize its readings 
of what is real are there. One can even wonder if it will show itself 
capable of alternating the cycles of confrontation/détente (Islamism of 
war/New Economic Policy))12. Its first passage in power pleads for a 
negative response. But then, we only destroy what we replace. This 
is not because the Brotherhood understands that the moment is not 
propitious for reestablishing the jizya over the non-Muslims, that it is 
not necessarily led to discover virtues in the idea of citizenship. Another 
argument advanced by supporters is that no one in the Guidance Office 
is well acquainted with the thought of Qutb or produces texts that are 
clearly Qutbian. Admittedly, this is still not proven when it comes to the 
current Supreme Guide.13 But was Brezhnev well informed on Marx? 
Unique to an ideology that structures the identity of an organization, 
that furnishes it the elements of its language, is that it is reducible to 
some simple, even simplistic, maxims, that explain reality, describe the 
totality, determine who are the friends and enemies (or, rather, in this 
case, the enemies and the useful idiots). Beyond their real divergences, all 
the Brothers we know more or less believe that a society or a power that 
does not mete out penalties of corporal punishment, does not prohibit 
alcohol and adultery, and in which women are liberated is not a “truly, 
completely” Islamic society or state.14 They all think that it is enough for 
a power and society to be Islamic for all problems to be solved or to be 
ready to be solved. They all think that the Califate must be reestablished 
and that it is the route toward reestablishing Islam’s political superiority 
and its global magistery. All, in addition, believe that, at minimum, 
all sorts of evil forces will collude to abort this grand design. Finally, 
I do not believe it necessary that everyone believes in all the credos of 
Qutbism, either in its simple or complex versions. It suffices that they 
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recognize themselves “globally” in them and they accept them as a guide 
for action. In the end, I do not believe that the very great diversity to be 
observed among the cadres is reflected at the top. I do not underestimate 
the extent of the divergences, whether they oppose the cadres with iden-
tical or opposed sensitivities.15 But the perspective of achieving the great 
design, the certainty (well-founded, seeing the Brotherhood’s actions 
since Mursī assumed the presidency) of ending up in prison if power is 
lost assure of a certain cohesion.16
D) We can fall back on affirmations, discourse, and testimony by their adver-
saries, dissidents, security services, competing or even hostile political 
forces, whether Islamist or not, businesspeople, and so forth. Not all the 
accusations that they make are justified, but some diagnoses formulated 
before they took power and shared by all their Egyptian competitors, 
adversaries, and enemies seem to have been validated by observation17: a 
Brotherhood that almost never respects its commitments, whose mem-
bers are past masters in the art of talking to lie, of saying nothing. It is a 
Brotherhood that does not count among its numbers many well-qualified 
ulemas and even fewer intellectuals. It practices a sectarian socialization, 
relates to its environment with suspicion and even hostility, enforces a 
highly constraining iron discipline that obscures somewhat the diversity 
of opinions and postures,18 and, finally, it maintains a relationship to 
violence that does not shrink from it; far from it—during the two years 
it was in power it could be established with certainty that the Brothers 
had formed militias and did not hesitate to use them.19 Their coming 
to power and the policy they tried to implement confirmed the worst 
suspicions. In order to discredit them, the Brotherhood exploited the 
similarity of accusations launched against it by these diverse sources and 
the excesses of some, claiming that they were all the work of the same 
hidden and hostile power (the security services, international Zionism, 
seculars, and who knows what else) or stemmed from a thinly disguised 
racist passion: Islamophobia.
E) Observing it in action—but clearly, all sorts of questions pose themselves 
about how representative the level considered is and about the respec-
tive importance of this or that aspect, and so forth. It especially poses 
the question about the “structural” part and that of contingency or of 
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“agency”: there is indeed something troubling in the following, dual 
observation: i) many huge errors seem due to chance and the observer 
cannot keep from thinking that they could have been avoided; and ii) 
on the other hand, the Brotherhood always makes decisions that are 
conducive to the most hostile interpretations of its behavior, as if it is 
organizationally structured for the worst.20
In view of the importance of ideological bias on the part of some or the 
other, and that all the facts are challenged by one actor or another, and given 
the extreme rarity of information about certain dossiers, or its profusion in 
excess about others, researchers have to fall back on formulating hypothetical-
deductive theories and on accepting tested prediction and experience. But the 
problems are numerous: When, for example, I maintain that those who bet 
on the Brotherhood blowing up have, until now, been consistently wrong, I 
have to qualify it by saying that it should not be assumed that I will always 
be right. When I assert that the Brotherhood has never truly converted to 
democracy, and that many obstacles seem insurmountable, I cannot be sure 
that the exercise of power or wandering in the desert will not motivate it to 
nuance its views in the near term—even if I do not really believe it. The facts 
have sometimes gone against me—for example, when the Brotherhood gave 
the necessary guarantees to Israel.21 The impact of “context,” of “the past,” or 
yet ideology on how the great orientations are determined can be debated ad 
infinitum. I nevertheless think that, for now, my own hypothetical-deductive 
model is rather confirmed by recent developments: Here we have a dual 
organization, at once mass movement and apparatus patterned on Leninism, 
conveying an ideology that must be classified as extreme right and not center, 
that is still effective even if it is somewhat diminished, that functions on 
a sectarian socialization model, maintains a hostile relationship with the 
environment and arouses equally intense hostile reactions, and that selects 
and appoints leaders based on criteria that favor the most extreme.
Bets Made by the American Government and Some Researchers
From Cairo it is quite difficult to know what is going on in Washington. 
Nevertheless, it can be told that the Obama administration had—very 
quickly—opened channels with the Muslim Brothers. A lot of “noises” were 
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heard in 2009 and 2010. Muslim Brothers and members of Hamas started 
behaving as if they had American insurances. Sure, this should not be con-
sidered as a plot. The American administration’s message, conveyed through 
emissaries, was: “we have nothing against you, we are not your enemy, and we 
do not have objections against your seizure of power if you give us the proper 
insurances.” An American official told an Egyptian diplomat “the Muslim 
Brothers will surely govern Egypt at some point and we engaged them; they 
guaranteed us they would abide by the Peace Treaty Agreement.” Almost all 
Egyptian actors interpreted this as a “green light” and maybe more. In light 
of actual evidence, this seems to be be a strong exaggeration.
After Mubarak’s fall, and after some hesitations, it seems the Obama 
administration decided the Muslim Brothers were the most powerful and 
the most reliable Egyptian partner. They won elections, they gave the proper 
guarantees. Moreover, Ambassador Patterson did not hide her dislike of 
secular actors; she considered them to be lightweight and not serious. The 
American administration, while divided on the soundness of this assessment, 
decided that it should give the Brothers a chance and support them.
This strategic decision (fitting into a broader perspective of disengage-
ment from the region) relies on analyses that, at best, are based on some risky 
bets. Some do not directly concern me here while others do.
The first bets were on the Brotherhood’s converting to democracy and 
that it represents the strongest moderate Islamic force. Both assertions are 
wrong—moderate, democratic, quietiest or non-violent Islamisms do exist, 
but the Brotherhood is not one of them, as all of its actions since July 2012 
show. At most, it recognizes (or pretends to recognize) that the holder of 
executive power should be elected by universal suffrage. This recognition 
cannot obscure the fact that the Brothers, together with Mubarak’s former 
party, are the side that commits the most election fraud. Legislative and 
judiciary power must be rigorously limited, surveilled, and intimidated. The 
acts of the former must be subject to control by a body of ulemas. Civil liber-
ties also are tightly restricted, the medias harassed in all kinds of ways, and 
extra-governmental violence frequently resorted to. The government of laws 
was destroyed by a cascade of decisions made by President Morsi, culminat-
ing in the constitutional decree of November 21, 2012 and by some deeply 
disturbing articles in the new constitution. But all this is of no concern here.
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When optimists are forced to admit that such subscribtion to the rules 
of democracy is not genuine, they wager on historical necessity, on cunning 
reason. As far as they are concerned, whether the Brotherhood wants to or 
not, it will end up admitting that it cannot succeed in its passage in power 
unless it draws its inspiration from the Turkish AKP. Cooperation between 
the two forces was closer and closer. Various militant Brothers go through 
stages of training in Turkey and familiarize themselves with techniques of 
political communications, management, elections monitoring, exchanging 
views with their Turkish counterparts, and so forth. A strategic partnership 
between the two countries has been contemplated and at a point seemed 
promising. But claims of cooperation or even alliance do not equate neces-
sarily to similarity of paths. No need to recall here that the AKP’s recent 
evolution is troubling in several respects. Today nobody thinks President 
Erdogan is a committed democrat. Let us rather underline that the Turkish 
and Egyptian contexts are far from being the same—recall the importance 
and historic depth of Atatürk’s legacy, the relationships maintained by the 
AKP with Sufism (which contrast with those entirely more strained ones 
of the Brothers with Egyptian Sufisms), the religious makeup, or yet again 
the relationship to the respective nationalisms of the two countries. This 
last point is crucial—but before elaborating on it, let us remember that the 
Brothers, when they study a nearby experience for cues, favor that of the 
Sudanese Islamists.
A particularly dangerous commonplace holds the Muslim Brotherhood 
to be “nationalists” like the others, distinguished from them by a stronger 
attachment to cultural authenticity, to the defense of “identity.” It is true that 
this platitude describes a number of elected Brothers and several militants. 
It is equally true that in certain, religiously more homogeneous countries 
the Brothers’ ideology could be in the service of constructing a nation state. 
Finally, it is true that the definitions of nationalism vary greatly and that some 
would probably allow, provided they are relaxed, considering the Brothers as 
nationalists. But it behooves us to remind the irenics of an unpleasant reality: 
The Brotherhood’s ideology carries within it a religious conflict as threatening 
as a storm cloud. Let an occupier not of the same religion dominate a homo-
geneous population and it is, or can be, a powerful vector of nationalism or 
of mobilization in a fight for national liberation, but in multi-confessional 
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countries or even nations it instead endangers civil peace or nation building 
even if it takes part in the struggle for liberation. Of course, determining if 
the propagation of this ideology is a symptom or a cause can be debated, but 
this does not qualify the diagnosis. Precisely in Egypt’s case, the Brothers 
have always maintained a very hostile relationship to the whole enterprise, 
all the processes of building/modernizing the state begun under Mehemet 
Ali, which they often describe as de-Islamizing the country, imposed by evil 
forces and their allies.
Anyhow, al Banna had harsh words for nationalism, which amounted 
to the worship of dust. More recently, Supreme Guide Mahdi Akif caused 
an uproar in an interview in which he said that he did not mind seeing 
Egypt governed by a Malaysian Muslim. During the Morsi presidency, many 
militants said they did not see why Egyptians considered the frontiers to be so 
sacred: Ceding some territories to other Muslims was no big deal. President 
Morsi may or may not have had such designs, as claimed by their opponents; 
the militants’ discourse gave credential to this accusation.
In the same vein, invoking an eternal and prescriptive “identity” mainly 
functions to delegitimize Egypt’s “great culture,” a product of the 1920s and 
1930s; it is perfunctorily dismissed as imported and corrupting. The quasi-
automatic habit of the Brothers in describing their competitors or adversaries 
as enemies of Islam and their attitude toward the Copt community are also 
factors weakening the national cohesion (even if the Mūrsi Government 
during the first months managed some thorny issues rather well,[CH3N23]22 
before a string of missteps or worse in 2013). In other words, betting on 
the Brothers to “stabilize” the countries in the region is to ask something 
of them that they cannot deliver—at the very least, their discourse inflames 
polarization.
Along these lines, several colleagues think that the Brotherhood has 
given up on utopia or on the great plan of reestablishing the Caliphate. 
This assertion seems to be a fantasy—as is the one, perhaps more nuanced, 
which says that, in fact, its conception of the Caliphate is closer to a league 
of Arab states or a European Union than the caliphate model that prevailed 
historically. The Supreme Guide’s declarations prove the opposite—he has 
frequently asserted that the hour of reestablishing the Caliphate was nigh.23 
During Mūrsi’s presidential campaign, a preacher close to the Brotherhood 
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proclaimed the imminent reestablishment of the Califate with Jerusalem 
as its capital.24 To dismiss these comments (and a multitude of others) by 
declaring that they were “designed for internal consumption” seems to me to 
be a bad move.
For one thing, demagoguery is not without consequences; for another, 
Cairo press circles had it that the worried Gulf capitals demanded clarifica-
tions and were not pleased with the response (“We are all one tribe”)—with 
said Gulf capitals ending up asserting, proof in hand (in the case of the 
Emirates), that the Brotherhood decided to stir up trouble in Kuwait and 
the Emirates, either because it was trying to run a blackmail of “peace in 
return for aid” or because it wanted to take over an oil state so as to finance 
the grand design of a Caliphate. To put it another way, it was a remake, fifty 
years later, of the Arab cold war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, revived 
under the Mūrsi presidency. The unprecedented scale of aid furnished by the 
Gulf countries in support of the uprising and the coalition that overthrew 
Mūrsi (in excess of 25 million dollars in seven months) illustrates the hate 
and loathing that the Brotherhood aroused in the oil states whose state- and/
or nation-building is still fragile. Finally, while it is impossible to have a look 
at the whole of the Brotherhood’s book production, never have I laid eyes on 
a text that would permit thinking that the restoration of a Caliphate on the 
historic model has stopped being an ultimate goal (however remote). That 
said, this grand design probably would not have been met with so much 
rejection by a highly Islamized opinion had it not been accompanied by 
what looked very much like an absolute contempt for borders as drawn. I do 
not know if the version by Egyptian intelligence asserting that the Brothers 
intended to sell off a part of the Sinai to benefit the Gaza emirate and render 
it viable can be believed. Let us say that Egyptian opinion believed it, that 
the reactions of many militant Brothers (“What’s the problem?”) were wor-
risome, and especially that it is likely that the Brotherhood Government 
proposes to return to Sudan the disputed Halayeb and Shalātīn … which 
brought a swift reaction from the army.25
But the Brotherhood’s regional agenda did not only have drawbacks 
for the Western capitals. The “Brothers” regime had an objective interest in 
keeping the peace with Israel. It was not immaterial to have seen an Islamist 
regime forced to reaffirm the Camp David accords, to deal with Israel, to 
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present guarantees to it (such as during the crisis of November 2012), and 
especially to keep Hamas “on the leash.” The latter, interested in weakening 
the successive Egyptian regimes, saw itself compelled to manage the (Muslim) 
“big Brother” and take into account its hopes and wishes. It did not want 
trouble on its Eastern flank. Of course, this acknowledgment did not mean 
that the Brotherhood’s views on Israel or Palestine were subject to revision or 
updating. In the longer term, the goals always remained the same. The same 
applies to the risk inherent in any pan-Arab or pan-Islamist program: the 
“tawrīt” strategy—incite a conflict in the hope that its own protector would 
be forced to intervene—is a temptation felt by all of the region’s small actors, 
state or non-state, and it is not certain that Hamas would have accepted 
bending to the counsels, hopes, and diktat of the Brothers ad aeternam.
Another very dangerous wager wants the Brotherhood, decreed as mod-
erate, to be the natural, strategic ally of the West, desirous and capable of 
facing off against, neutralize or even be victorious against the decreed, most 
obscurantist version of political Islam, to wit Salafism, and against the “fun-
damentalist” Salafist, jihadist, takfiri, or other terrorism. Plenty of arguments 
are advanced, but the principal one relies on the following description of 
reality: a) here is a fraternal ideology that is radically different from Salafism 
and opposes it. Variation: the first one is draped in nothing but good quali-
ties; the other had nothing but faults; b) the Brothers are capable of forcing 
the various Salafist movements to recenter themselves, for competition will 
force anyone toward the center; and c) when the time comes, the Brothers 
naturally will choose the liberal, nationalist, leftist “seculars” or the Western 
countries over the forces of darkness and the various terror threats. All this is 
inaccurate if not fantastical. To begin with, to avoid any misunderstanding, 
I will assert that the Brothers are radically different from al-Qaeda, and I 
do not confuse the two entities. This is not only a question of the degree of 
moderation or extremism. The Brothers are engaged in building a new order 
(which a destructive phase may precede) while al-Qaeda in my view seems 
to be profoundly nihilist. The following expositions mainly focus on other 
Islamist or Salafist groups.
While it is generally correct that the Brothers are more flexible and 
moderate than the Salafis, there are enough exceptions to resist the tempta-
tion of devising universal rules for this problem.26 But that is not what is of 
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the essence here. What is considerably underestimated is the Salafization of 
the Brothers. There are many Salafis in the Brothers’ ranks, especially in the 
provinces (and it is in the countryside that the Brotherhood scored its best 
election returns). Frequently, the religious education of militant Brothers or 
militant candidates is “outsourced,” that is, entrusted to the Salafis. Qutbism 
and Salafism are very different, but they are not incompatible. The former is 
a teleological view of history; the latter, a theology, is a reading of the Holy 
Text and the hadiths. It is possible to be Qutbist and Salafist at the same 
time (even if Qutb’s commentary on the Koran contains numerous assertions 
that all amount to serious errors as far as the average Salafi is concerned). In 
other words, the Brotherhood is deeply shot through internally by Salafism 
and happens not to separate itself from it as sharply as researchers who advise 
the Obama administration like to think. In addition, to think that electoral 
competition necessarily and invariably propels everyone toward the center is 
contradicted by the facts. Among the Brothers exists a powerful current that 
explains the size of the Salafist result in the legislative election of November/
January 2011 by a too considerable recentering by the Brothers and that 
thinks the Brotherhood must revise its policies, practices, discourse, and 
practices to define them as more to the right. The Brotherhood base is much 
more inclined to accept an alliance with the Salafis than with non-Islamists, 
perpetually described by the hierarchy, the preachers, and the Brotherhood 
press as satanic, impure, and immoral enemies of God. Along the same lines, 
their teaching centers on the obligation to jihad—even if the latter is defined 
in a manner that allows not just reducing it to armed struggle (defensive or 
not). A consequence of this expansion is an abusive use of warlike metaphors. 
Defining politics or elections as war has deeply corrupting, even destruc-
tive, effects. It is at times very difficult to distinguish some Brothers from 
jihadists and many a young Brother has gone to fight in Syria. Lastly, even 
conceding—which I do not—that the description of reality effected by said 
researchers is right (that the Brothers are quite distant from the Salafis and 
are the ideal “antidote” to this very real threat) this reasoning remains highly 
vulnerable to criticism: When the Brothers are in power, they are the ones 
who discredit themselves and not the Salafis. The failure of the Brotherhood 
in power risks attracting even more recruits to the Salafis or to the jihad-
ists—not the reverse. But it gets worse. Would the Brothers really want 
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to attack the Salafis or the jihadists? The question posed itself well before 
President Mūrsi opposed the French intervention in Mali (which surprised 
no one in Egypt). Indeed, one of the president’s advisers had asserted in an 
interview with al-Shorouk that those among the jihadists who happened to 
be in Egypt preparing for jihad in Palestine or Syria were “irreproachable” 
(lā ghubār ‘alayhum).27 Worse, the chief of state freed several jihadist Salafis, 
some of which immediately rejoined the armed groups proliferating in the 
Sinai. It is not known if this was naiveté on the part of the Brotherhood, or if 
this decision was the fruit of Salafist or Jihadist pressures or a Machiavellian 
calculation by the Brothers. But the result speaks for itself.
The answer is complicated. For one thing, the effective plurality of these 
monistic, indeed exclusivist groups, contradicts the claim of one or the other to 
be the true representative of Islam and its unique banner bearer. They are thus 
considerable embarrassments to each other and serious competitors. On the 
other hand, this plurality can provide diverse resources when it comes to the 
division of labor or positioning relative to the non-Islamists. There are cogent 
reasons for thinking that there is coordination and a division of roles between 
the different Islamist actors and that the Brothers, who themselves sent their 
troops and militias against the non-Islamist demonstrators, or against certain 
opponents or the judiciary apparatus, were not upset to see the Salafis of 
M. Abū Ismāʾil do the same “dirty work,” even if it means half-heartedly 
condemning them (all the while supporting them; here, too, the double-talk 
is prodigious). It is nonetheless troubling to realize that not a single attack 
has been carried out against the natural gas pipelines since President Mūrsi 
assumed full command. Moreover, when some jihadists groups kidnapped 
Egyptian soldiers in Sinaï, in May 2013, President Mursi gave instructions to 
“protect the lives of the kidnappers and the kidnapped.”28.
Along the same lines, all observers of the Egyptian scene are in agreement 
in thinking that the presence of Salafis, whether they are organized or simply 
free electrons, lets the Brothers pass as “moderate” in the eyes of non-Islamists 
and Western capitals without having to make much of an effort. In any case, 
the leniency of the Brotherhood regime for those who literally incited to 
murder or who lit small or large fires, is difficult to explain any other way. 
In the same vein, the Brothers seem to have, at least with respect to the 
“battle for promulgating the constitution,” opted for putting together a large 
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Islamist coalition gathering with a maximum number of actors. Although 
since then the al-Nour Salafist party has chosen to stand out by distancing 
itself from the Brotherhood, the Brothers are still very close to other Salafist 
groups, certain of which cannot pretend to be legalist or non-violent. In any 
case, we can say that past experience shows that the way that the Brothers 
managed groups situated to their right has always produced disasters despite 
their best efforts. Or, furthermore, that the Brothers give more attention and 
weight to local and regional Islamist actors than to Egyptian non-Islamist 
political forces.
So it happens that an Egyptian journalist who knows the Brotherhood 
very well told the author that it is not content to merely aid or coordinate 
with jihadist groups: It recruited specific militants in order to strengthen its 
own paramilitary arm.29
For a long time, I have been astonished by the indifference of the 
American administrations of the past dozen years to the collusions and con-
nections between the Brothers and jihadists. But I believe I have hit upon 
an explanation, which, admittedly, is based on a bundle of assumptions. 
Recently, a Sudanese Islamist reminded me that the Sudanese intelligence 
services had offered to turn over Bin Laden to Washington or Riyad during 
the late 1990s. However, the Sudanese services (and the Sudanese deep state) 
are Brothers. This same Sudanese Islamist asserted that 9/11 could have been 
averted had the two capitals accepted the proposed transaction. This led me 
to ask myself if 9/11 had fostered the development of cooperation between 
the USA and the Brothers involving the exchange of information on jihadists 
and al-Qaeda, indeed more—all the experts are convinced by the fact that 
Brothers infiltrated all the political actors with which they dealt or that chal-
lenged their pretense of representing or embodying Islam. Did they transmit 
specific information to the United States? The question appears legitimate 
given American indulgence of the Mūrsi regime and the Islamist group.
It should be noted that the connections between jihadists and Brothers 
and the ongoing intensification of the former’s presence in Egypt are the 
principal reasons for the reproaches formulated by the Egyptian security 
forces against the Brothers. It is not our task here to evaluate the various 
accusations and diverse episodes cited to buttress them. Some facts cited seem 
very plausible (but are not necessarily accurate), some comport with verifiable 
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data, while others are more farfetched (but are not necessarily false). We are 
on ground where it pays to mistrust the plausible and not shut ourselves off 
to what seems beyond belief—in short, in a very different universe. I simply 
wish to add that at present we can ask ourselves in which direction the bal-
ance of power between the Brothers and their more radical allies will evolve: 
While the former have greater financial resources, they have fewer carrots 
than several months ago and more need of their partners.
Postface: With the benefit of hindsight, we can say this: The Muslim 
Brotherhood tried to build an internal coalition including the whole spec-
trum of Islamists, from the moderate ones (al wasat) to the more extremes, 
including the jihadists. This was both a preventive strategy (to neutralize 
jihadists and give them a stake to not cause harm) and an offensive one 
(use the other forces as a scarecrow, entrusting them for the dirty work; fix 
the army in Sinai). Even if President Mursi spoke to Ayman al Zawahiri 
as if the other was a superior, it is clear that the Brotherhood saw itself as 
the unquestionable leader of this coalition. It viewed its Islamists, Salafists, 
and jihadists partners as being a resource and a threat. Their approach was a 
mixture of policies aiming at using them, placating them, neutralizing them, 
and weakening them in the long run. The picture is further complicated by 
their ambivalence toward Egyptian Salafists: They considered them to be a 
tool in the hands of their opponents in the Deep State and in Saudi Arabia:30 
a dangerous one as it targeted the same public, and a useful one as the Salafists 
frightened everybody. Co-opting them to choke them seems to have been the 
motto.
It remains to briefly examine the hope, cherished by some in 2012 and 
2013, of seeing the Egypt of the Brothers become part of the Sunni bloc des-
tined to oppose Iran’s hegemonic aspirations. This hope is nourished by the 
interest the Egyptian Muslim Brothers have in seeing the regime of Bashar 
al-Assad, the principal ally of Iran and Hezbollah, fall. And it is true that on 
this question, the Brotherhood’s views and those of Teheran are irreconcil-
able. But keep in mind the extreme animosity that pits the Muslim Brothers 
against the Wahabite monarchy—the latter and its allies (the Emirates and 
Kuwait) are, at present, their principal enemies. We cannot be certain if the 
various conciliatory maneuvers with Iran that could be observed during the 
first months of the Mūrsi presidency31 were a normalization for the purpose 
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merely of reestablishing contact, a simple exchange of views and know-how, 
a sort of clumsy—and highly counterproductive—blackmail designed for 
the petro-monarchies, including Qatar,32 or if it would translate into a major 
upheaval in Cairo’s foreign policy orientation, given that the Brothers figured 
that there was nothing more to expect from the countries on the peninsula 
(Qatar excepted). The various interpretations all have their supporters. But 
the Salafis, including those in the Brotherhood, are deeply opposed to this 
rapprochement, and it is not certain that they would not have had the means 
of checking it by fulminating against a supposed Shiite threat or by organizing 
pogroms of some Egyptian Shiites. I tend to believe the Brothers tried to have 
it both ways: to collaborate with Iran or to confront it according to the needs 
and priorities. For instance, the Brothers needed Iranian tourists. Regarding 
the Syrian question, in August 2012 President Morsi angered al Riyad by 
inviting Teheran to participate in the discussions for a settlement. This initia-
tive was explained by my colleague Omar Ashour: “can you figure a solution 
without Teheran, a very plausible answer”. But later on the Brotherhood 
concluded that Assad had to be toppled by force, and this famous “Syria 
speech” (june 2013) is one of the factors that convinced many in the “Deep 
State” to topple him.33 This shift, from the search of a “peaceful solution” 
to the military confrontation, was explained by the growing implication of 
Hizbollah and Iran in Syria, and by a gesture to the other Islamist Egyptian 
forces at the eve of a decisive confrontation with the secular forces in Egypt.
I conclude this section by a brief allusion to a “grand design” explained 
by Brother Isam al Aryan to a colleague—even if he denied saying such things 
later. The Brotherhood wanted to slowly disconnect Egypt from the West, 
by building a huge Islamic economic partnership with the most successful 
Islamic countries: Malaysia, Turkey, and Indonesia.
Deciders, Constraints and Options of Egyptian Foreign Policy
During the last decade of Mubarak’s very long reign, the president made the 
big decisions and set the foreign policy directions. The head of the IGS (the 
mukhābarāts ʿama or Islamic Guidance Society) General Omar Soliman was 
his principal adviser and aide, and the “center” managed the principal foreign 
policy dossiers, those of the bordering countries (Sudan, Libya, Palestine, 
and Israel), the Nile riparian states, the United States, and important or 
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problematic countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan). The head of 
the diplomatic service and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of course, gave 
advice and took care of the remainder. Under the Mūrsi presidency, things 
were different. The consensus is that he was nothing but the representative of 
the Brotherhood in the presidency and that the key decisions were prepared 
and made “elsewhere.” If there was any kind of revolution, it is that the 
chief of state’s maneuvering room had shrunk considerably. But it still is 
worth knowing where to situate that “elsewhere.” Researchers who were 
able to interview members of the Office of Guidance (here I am thinking 
especially of Patrick Haenni) learned the following: 80 percent to 90 percent 
of decisions were taken within it. But an insider I had a chance to talk with 
said something else: The “decider” is Khayrat al-Shātir, the Brotherhood’s 
strongman, assisted by his own men and cadres from the Brotherhood’s inter-
national organization working in the presidency. The “real entourage,” the 
“real team” (as distinct from the advisers and aides who were appointed for 
cosmetic purposes in the communications operation) that surrounds (stifles) 
the president is composed of those men. The president’s adviser for external 
affairs, Isām al-Haddād, an Egypto-British doctor, is one of them. He is the 
man for delicate missions, the Father Joseph, the real head of presidential 
diplomacy who reports to Khayrat al-Shātir. A former diplomat, in a fit of 
temper during a colloquium, went so far as to assert that the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs was useless and was no longer informed. This was probably 
an exaggeration—for example, in Teheran, the chief of state was surrounded 
by professional diplomats—but it seems probable that the role of the minister 
today was more secondary than ever.34
This brings us to the question of what role is played by the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s international organization. Husam Tammam (eight years 
ago), maintained that the organization had been considerably weakened 
by the regional crisis that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait precipitated and by the 
divisions pitting various national Muslim Brotherhood offshoots against one 
another at that time in deciding what attitude to adopt. The Kuwaiti Brothers 
had never forgiven the support that certain Brothers furnished to Sadam 
Hussein. The ruling principle since then among Brotherhood branches has 
been the following: The people living in Mecca know their allies best—put 
another way, each branch would decide which route to take. Still, there were 
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frictions. Personally, I’m inclined to go along with reality in saying that the 
Brotherhood Internationale was “much less than the Komintern, but more 
than the Socialist Internationale.” To give an example, the Supreme Guide 
of that era, Mahdi ʿAkif, had affirmed that he would arbitrate between two 
rival factions within the same national branch if the two brought an appeal 
to him.35 Today it looks as if the cadres of the international organization 
may have played a major role in the decision-making process and Egypt’s 
foreign policy, so that it often adopted views that were different from those 
of the head office’s members (with al Shatir as an exception), and that the 
different regional branches shrank a bit. But anyone who talked concerted 
action, interactions, and indeed even coordination on certain dossiers no 
longer does so. An exception must be made for Hamas: It is clear that, for 
the moment, the ties between the Cairo Brothers and those in Gaza are very 
tightly drawn. Recently published articles asserted that Qatar had advanced 
important sums of money to Hamas so that it could send hundreds if not 
thousands of men to provide protection for the presidential palace.36 This 
information has not been denied and observers of the way the security forces 
acted during the big demonstration in November 2012 (refusing to open 
fire to protect the palace) do not consider this farfetched. It may very well 
be completely unfounded but the fact that political actors believe it is not 
inconsequential.
It is equally difficult to determine the role of the IGS, the security 
organs, and the army in the development of the Brotherhood’s foreign 
policy. It seems some, in the Deep State, were very angry against many 
GIS members, believing, rightly or wrongly, they helped the Brotherhood, 
but nobody was really associated with the “Brotherhood” decision-making 
process. A prominent journalist wrote many articles to defend former IGS 
chief Ra’fat Shihata, saying in substance he never compromised himself with 
the Brotherhood—this implied that some people thought otherwise.37 Some 
press articles give to understand that the service carefully filtered, too much 
so, the information that it passed on to the office of the presidency and that 
the Deep State had no confidence in the chief of state.38
As for the army, it seemed to conduct a parallel diplomacy, privileging its 
traditional allies in the Gulf. The most striking example is the chief of staff’s 
visit to the Emirates, involved in a serious conflict with the Brotherhood after 
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dismantling a Brotherhood organization accused of preparing a coup against 
the state.
It is, however, on the linked dossiers of the Sinai and Gaza that the 
differences over foreign policy are most pronounced. It is nearly certain that 
the decision in February 2013 to flood the Gaza tunnels was not made by 
the civilian powers that be, whether those of the presidency or the al-Shātir 
team. It was the Minister of Defense who issued a decree in December 2012 
that prohibited land sales to foreign interests in the eastern part of the pen-
insula. The “sovereign organisms” of army and security services announced 
themselves as very hostile to Qatar’s growing role in the Egyptian economy 
and in projects in the Canal zone and on the peninsula. Rightly or wrongly, 
these organs thought the Muslim Brotherhood was indifferent to their own 
sovereigntist preoccupations and that they were much more tied to Hamas 
and the jihadists. Added to that was that the former’s political options, 
and regional agendas were dangerous to Egypt’s national security as it was 
conceived by the army and security services.
Egyptian foreign policy must take a major economic factor into account: 
Over several years, perhaps a decade, the Egyptian economy must create from 
800,000 to 1 million new jobs annually to absorb those entering the job 
market. However, the Egyptian budget and savings are clearly incapable of 
doing so. The country needs foreign investors, who will not come unless the 
budget is “in order” (and that needs a working tourism sector and a steady 
flow of diaspora’s remittances). So support is also required from foreign 
donors, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Western governments, and 
from the Gulf. During the first half of 2013, tourists and investors fled the 
country—the former because of the insecurity, the latter because of govern-
mental incompetence or for political reasons.
The key problem for the Muslim Brotherhood has been the visceral 
hostility of the majority of the Saudi royal family and the other Gulf emirs 
and kings. Even Qatar’s aid has been problematical: It comes with strings 
and it is not certain that the Egyptian army would not exercise its veto over 
Qatar’s demands. The aid provided by Turkey, the Brotherhood’s other great 
ally,39 proved easier to obtain but is also much more limited (in material 
terms). In other words, the Brothers depend greatly, for the first time, on aid 
by non-state Islamic actors and the good will of international and Western 
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authorities, be it the IMF, Washington, or European capitals. However, 
several among these actors have belatedly taken notice of the very brutal char-
acter of Brotherhood practices and of their authoritarianism, their disdain for 
the law, and anyone who questions them. Add to this that they are reputed to 
be highly incompetent when it comes to governance and managing the state 
apparatus. These “international” actors have (vainly) put certain pressures 
on the Brotherhood to get them to … become more moderate. The latter’s 
response has been to pick up the pace, intensify the repression in order to 
“lock up” and create the maximum of irreversible facts on the ground, thus 
betting that if they win, they will at all events be indispensable and that 
Egypt’s key position, its importance to Israel’s security arrangements and 
the consequences of an eventual breakdown would keep the Brotherhood’s 
detractors from being too exacting. Stressing that this was a very risky strategy 
is moot; we know how it turned out: the Brotherhood managed the feat of 
reconciling young revolutionaries and the military.
Conclusion
In absolute terms, all other things being equal, the Brotherhood’s grand plan 
in foreign policy more or less had these features:
A) Reassure Israel and the United States, in order to gain their support 
or at least their neutrality; all the while, they were slowly “detaching” 
Egypt from the American protector by increments to render them less 
dependent on the latter. As we have seen, the Brothers went quite far in 
the guarantees offered to the Hebrew state and in the pressures they put 
on Hamas.
B) Work at having the largest possible number of countries in the region 
come under the Brotherhood’s thumb—as a necessary prelude to rees-
tablishing the Caliphate.
C) Conclude a strategic partnership with Turkey—and, if possible, a rap-
prochement by both countries with Iran, even if Iran’s strategies and 
actions and their own tend to be irreconcilable, most notably on the 
Syrian question. More precisely, Iran has an interest in destabilizing 
certain of the Gulf countries. The Brotherhood in power tried the 
same thing, despite (or because of?) its great weakness by reason of 
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the Egyptian economy’s sorry state. A move toward Iran was a threat 
enabling Cairo to extract money from the Gulf States. In doing so, it 
forgot that the region’s Egyptian expatriates are a vital source of currency 
earnings for the country and that their living abroad eases the pressure 
on its job market. Any destabilization of the Gulf would have highly 
prejudicial consequences for the Egyptian economy and treasury. We do 
not know how things would have turned out, the arm-wrestling between 
the Brotherhood and Riyad having been settled with a victory for the 
Saudi monarchy, traditionally allied with the Egyptian army;
D) Adjust the system of Cairo’s alliances, if possible while safeguarding the 
relations and networks of the former regime (United States, Europe, 
Libya, Qatar substituting for Saudi Arabia). But the favored partners, 
besides Turkey, would become Qatar, Malaysia, China,40 and Singapore. 
All this seemed to be a good idea (even if some Brothers, and not the 
least among them, asserted that they hoped to see Turkey and Qatar 
substituted for Europe and the United States, a project whose absurd-
ity should not surprise), but we must be careful not to forget about 
Africa. The continent’s capitals, exasperated by Mubarak’s arrogance 
and authoritarianism, had very warmly welcomed Mūrsi’s accession to 
power.
E) In the long term, the three main problems that a Brotherhood regime 
would have had to confront seem to be these: A) how to avoid the traps 
of the tawrit: don’t get pulled into bad adventures by allies (Salafis) or 
protegés (Hamas) at the wrong time; B) how to manage or what attitude 
to adopt toward the Salafi jihadists, the Brotherhood brigades engaged 
in third countries (Syria, for example), and toward the war on terror; and 
C) how to pursue an activist policy in the region, especially in working 
toward the restoration of the Caliphate without jeopardizing the foreign-
aid flows that the economy needs.
F) We do not know how they would have proceeded and if they might 
have succeeded where Nasser had failed, despite being much subtler 
and competent than they, given the permanent gulf between ambitions, 
great projects, and constraints, with a constant manipulation by double 
talk. Instead of marrying up the national security doctrines of the state 
bureaucracy and Egyptian security organs, or trying to find a modus 
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vivendi with them, or getting busy with seriously managing the Egyptian 
economy, they would try to consolidate their grip on the Egyptian state 
in the face of the enormous resistance of two-thirds if not four-fifths of 
the population. They would ignore the preoccupations and conceptions 
of other Egyptian actors, would opt for brutality and resort to force. 
More and more numerous became those inside the state apparatus, the 
security organs, the political, media, and very influential middle classes 
in Cairo and the big delta towns who thought President Mūrsi and his 
crowd posed an immense danger to civil peace and Egyptian national 
security. These forces would seek and find support among the Gulf 
monarchies—which, after July 30, 2013 contributed more than 25 mil-
lion dollars in support of the new regime and to guard against a return 
to power by the Brothers. The petro emirates may be the Holy Alliance, 
but the Brothers were no democrats.
Notes
 1. Leslie Piquemal, “La montée
 révolutionnaire des mouvements
 islamistes par la voie électorale: le
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 2. The Brothers certainly knew that the great majority of the personnel in the 
interior and justice ministries considered them as enemies, in the strongest sense 
of the word. I do not know what they thought of the rest of the civil bureaucracy, 
but I am under the impression that they built their reading of the latter’s actions 
on the theme, legitimate but simplistic and erroneous, of the defense of ill-gotten 
privileges——and with a strong tendency to think that ill-gotten gains, whether 
things or privileges, belong to the conqueror. The Brotherhood’s strongman 
Khayrat al-Shatir told several contacts that the Brothers were going to set up 
parallel institutions, but it is not known with certainty what that meant, even 
if one may suspect the worst. What was most likely is that he had in mind first 
the ministries of the interior and of justice. As for the army, the Brothers’ views 
are more difficult to fathom: It could be argued that they were always wary of it, 
but on the other hand also maintain that they did not see anything coming, with 
evidence to support both scenarios, and with less irreconciability than may be 
thought. I am inclined to think that they believed the military to be so corrupt 
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that reassuring them of their privilege would suffice to buy their neutrality, all 
the while thinking that al-Sissi was too bigoted, tooo religious, and too good a 
Muslim to be their enemy. They failed to see that a sincerely believing Muslim 
often has excellent reason to detest them. The problem of the bureaucracy’s hos-
tility toward the fraternal project is crucial, if only because the Brothers attributed 
to it their failure and some of their mistakes and even going so far as to assert that 
they fell victim to a systematic sabotage. This Brotherly plea to me seems to be out 
of order. It ignores the enthusiasm, the euphoria, and the good will capital that 
initially accompanied the first “democratically elected” president. It forgets that 
the Egyptian bureaucracy has served some very different masters and to make an 
enemy of it takes quite a talent. As far as justice is concerned, it is the Brothers 
who were looking for a fight, from the first week of the Mursī presidency. And if 
a crushing majority of the country is hostile to them beginning in late November 
2012, it is their fault (with the constitutional declaration and the repression that 
followed it). A group that has against it a near-totality of the security organs, 
the army, justice, the media, intellectuals, artists, the high public function, the 
Sufi societies, the population of Cairo, and a large part of the provinces, and the 
Salafis is a group that cannot pretend to represent “a happy medium.” Postface: 
the discussions I had with insiders tend to confirm this analysis. First, many intel-
ligence officials, including prominent ones, were, at first, willing to collaborate with 
the Brothers. Second, al Sissi was the army’s choice for Tantawi’s succession, because 
his profile was deemed to be a clever trap for the Brotherhood: a very devout person, 
but a devout person considering them to be dangerous for religion?
 3. An important text on the constitution is that by Ellis Goldberg, who is more 
measured than me. http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8172/reflections-on-
egypts-draft- constitution. See also the more restrained article by Joe Stork 
at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/29/egypt-new-constitution-mixed-supp 
ort- rights
 4. The Brotherhood in its current configuration cannot be considered a political 
party, since its activities are not purely political and because nothing is known 
of its finances (or its international networks). It does not wish to normalize its 
status neither as an “association” nor as an NGO, because prevailing law calls for 
financial transparency, strict supervision by the Ministry of Social Affairs, and 
so forth. In other words, since it does not want to restructure, it has to change 
the existing legislation. However, it refrains from this, arguing the fact that there 
is no parliament yet. But this is a spurious pretext, since the presidency or the 
Consultative Assembly legislates on all kinds of subjects.
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 5. The Brotherhood recruits, selects, and inducts its members after a long period 
of observing them, surrounded, after having structured their environment. See 
my article Samir Amghar (ed.), Les islamistes au défi du pouvoir: évolutions d’une 
idéologie [The Islamists Challenge Power: Evolutions of an Ideology], Paris, 
Michalon, 2012.
 6. Those most often seen are ‘Isâm al-‘Iryān and Muhammad al-Biltājī. The real 
strongman of the Brotherhood is Khayrat al-Shātir, who is the strategist and 
controls the finances, the membership files, external contacts, and internal disci-
pline. Five or six “strongmen” assist him, and none of them really talk with the 
press.
 7. I put the question to several journalists who “covered the Brotherhood.” If that 
does not seem enough, it suffices to consult the whole of the Cairo press, on any 
given day, particularly after a decision or taking of an important position by the 
Brotherhood. The same Brother cadre will have said two contradictory things to 
two different journalists; the Brother cadres will have contradictory versions of 
explanations; and so forth.
 8. Leslie Piquemal, “Les Frères musulmans égyptiens à la fin de l’ère Moubarak 
(2005–2010). Identité et projet politique” [The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
of the late Mubarak era (2005–2010)], PhD thesis, IEP Paris, 2012.
 9. I take the opportunity to reiterate my being indebted to the late Husām 
Tammām, Patrick Haenni … and the late Ahmad Rā’if, who, in the course of 
long, stimulating conversations always imparted a great deal to me. The first two 
for a long time thought that the great narrative was no longer operative.
10. The thought of Sayyid Qutb, such as he had developed during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, offers many points in common with Leninism. A) History has 
a meaning: the Creator, knowing His creature, He deprived it of the right to 
legislate, for He alone is capable of furnishing the Perfect Law. Men take credit 
for this law, in the guise of numerous ideologies and by doing so assault the 
Sovereignty of the Most High, and perpetuate relationships of oppression and 
domination for the greatest misfortune of all and society’s perdition, returning 
it to states that came before the Revelation, eras of ignorance and error. B) A 
genius intellectual has discovered this meaning. C) A vanguard must prepare 
itself to achieve Utopia, to accelerate the movement. It is interesting to note that 
those who, inside the movement, do not adhere to this schema do not dare to 
say that Qutb has to be renounced. They assert that he did not say this, that he 
instead said other things and that he was misunderstood.
11. The doctrinal inconsistency of Brotherhood texts is deplored by Shaykh 
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Qaradāwī (who contented himself with describing it), for example, in an inter-
view in al-Dustūr dated October 5, 2008.
12. I am thinking, of course, of the great texts by Alain Besançon, who explained 
that the Communist Party
in the Soviet Union alternated alternated “Communism of war/NEP” and that it 
must not be thought that the second cycle brought durable doctrinal revisions 
or irreversible compromises.
13. Muhammad Badī’, before becoming Supreme Guide, was in charge of “educa-
tional” or “pedagogical” programs of the Brotherhood. He had been arrested in 
1965 for being a member of the organization reconstituted by Qutb.
14. This passage owes much to long discussions I held with Mustapha al-Ahnaf. The 
central idea is his, but I reworked it slightly.
15. There are numerous differing susceptibilities/postures among the Brothers, but 
it is important to avoid reductive dichotomies, opposing an “enlightened” youth 
to a villainous old generation of obscurantist theocrats, or that such and such 
generation would have such and such a posture or susceptibility. I see the prob-
lem differently: a Brotherhood that relies on the principle of blind obedience, 
which collects 8 percent of its members’ income, which is mostly not transpar-
ent, and can expect some members to claim the right of asking questions or 
receiving explanations on how funds are spent. Some lawyers are exasperated by 
the Brotherhood’s disrespect for the law and the judicial system. Some provincial 
cadres are aware of the Brotherhood’s loss of popularity and the deterioration 
in people’s quality of life. Many palpable tensions concern nominations in the 
state or the Brotherhood party. One member of the Brotherhood’s police con-
tingent maintains that he left the Brotherhood because he was asked to torture 
some militants. Many observers noticed a battle for influence between President 
Morsi and strongman al Shatir, a battle lost by Morsi. And so on and so forth …
16. It is supremely curious to “jump ship” on board one that has endured many 
trials at the moment when the goal is in sight and the reward for sacrifices made 
is imminent. More generally, it is very difficult to leave the Brothers: it would be 
to completely change worlds, in the radical sense of the term.
17. To mention only the testimonies of Brotherhood veterans: al Khirbāwī, Tharwat: 
qalb al ikhwān, mahākim taftīîsh al jamā’a, Cairo, Dār al Hilāl, 2010, 250 pages. 
Al Khirbāwī, Tharwat: sirr al ma’bad, al asrār al khafiyya li jamā’at al ikhwāân 
al muslimīn, 3rd édition, Cairo, D ār Nahdat Misr, 2012, 359 pages. Durra, 
Usāma: mon dākhil al ikhwān atakallam, Cairo, al ‘asr al jadīd, 2010, 128 pages. 
Durra, Usāma: min al ikhwān ilā maydān al Tahrīr, 1st edition, Cairo, Dār al 
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misrī li-l nashr, 2011, 102 pages. Al Milījī, al Sayyid ‘Abd al Sattār: tajrubati 
ma’ al ikhwān, Cairo, al Zahrāâ’ li-l i’lām al ‘arabī, 2009. Fāyiz, Sāmih: jannat 
al ikhwān,rihlat al khurūj min al jamā’a, Cairo, Dār al tanwîīr, 2013, 199 pages. 
Abūû Khalīl, Haytham: ikhwāân islāhiyyūn, dâār dūn, Cairo, dâār dūn, 2012, 
265 pages.
18. The stifling character of the discipline is refuted by some cadres who assert that 
the Brotherhood is more homogeneous than those who wager on its diversity 
(subtext: discipline is freely consented to, no one feels compelled) and that 
discussions are much more frequent than is believed. Both objections do not 
strike me as decisive. On the other hand, it is true that it has been possible to 
observe on one or two occasions (post-2011) “refusals to obey” or very stormy 
dissents from the official line after its adoption.
19. The list of intimidating moves, beating opponents, and attacks on peaceful dem-
onstrations is imposing. Now must be added abductions of activists followed by 
torture—and assassinations.
20. An example will illustrate the point: the candidacy of a Brother in the 2012 presiden-
tial elections, contrary to solemn commitments given, reiterated, and reconfirmed. 
All of our Brotherhood contacts say that the Brotherhood sincerely believed that it 
would abide by this commitment, but it had to change its mind when the Islamist 
democrat Abū-l-Futūh announced that he was running for the supreme court. As 
for the Brotherhood’s adversaries, they never believed the Brothers’ promise and 
thus saw their worst suspicions confirmed. I believe we can say what came next: 
even if the Brothers’ sincerity was believed, it is clear— and it was clear from the 
first moment—that they lacked the “means” for keeping this promise, it being 
evident that there would be candidates and serious clients who could win without 
their support and who represented a threat to them. We are thus confronted with 
a dilemma: The Brotherhood leadership must be Leninist, Machiavellian, or com-
pletely stupid. The two propositions pose all sorts of problems: The explanation of 
stupidity is too short, for two reasons: For one, the Muslim Brotherhood have held 
power in one country—Sudan—for the last twenty-four yearsand no one explains 
that “balance sheet” by the stupidity or the leadership and the local Brother cadres. 
The Sudanese Brothers have a different status from the Egyptian Brothers and 
still the bottom line is a disaster. Lastly, it would be necessary to explain why the 
Brotherhood leadership is always made up of people making disastrous decisions. 
The explanation by way of “ideological-discursive closedness” to me seems more 
promising but does not resolve all the problems.
21. Of course, this does not necessarily refute my framework. Members of the 
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Muslim Brotherhood believe that “International Jewry” rules the world; it is 
therefore necessary to placate it as long as possible. That said, and this illustrates 
the problems many had with the Brothers, it should be added the Brotherhood 
went at lengths saying it never accepted the peace treaty and did not renege on 
it. Morsi, when he talked to the Israelis, acted as a president and not as a Muslim 
Brother. Of course, nobody believed this.
22. I think especially of the affair of the blasphemous film that a diaspora Copt 
produced. Brothers and Salafis succeeded in avoiding a new round of sectarian 
incidents by seeming to believe that the American administration was the “real” 
guilty party, thus diverting the vindictiveness of their militants and of the mob.
23. For example, late December 2011. See http://www.youm7.com/News.
asp?NewsID=565958
24. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cUztA230IiQ, or also http://new.elfagr.org/
Detail.aspx?nwsId=224064&secid=1&vid=2
25. http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/173754
26. I still like the Salafist formulation: “Let us distinguish ends and means. The 
Brothers are prepared to make concessions on ends but not the means, while we 
do so for the means, not the ends.” It may be invidious, but it is elegant.
27. http://www.shorouknews.com/news/view.aspx?id=b85a41bd-d442-4e59- b01 f 
d -8ee3df8f7f04 http://digital.ahram.org.eg/articles.aspx?Serial= 1096628& ei d= 
1504
28. http://www.almasryalyoum.com/news/details/317252
29. It is a proven fact that the Brothers had militias, since many Egyptian demon-
strators saw them. It is also an established fact that these were armed militias. On 
the other hand, their operational value is unknown and may be overestimated 
by both adversaries and allies. Najwān ‘Abd al Latīf, in a recent communica-
tion, confirmed that the veteran jihadist ‘Abbūd al-Zummur told him that 
the Brothers had the weapons but few men who really knew how to fight. The 
jihadists have both. It remains to be seen if this assertion indirectly corroborated 
the journalist’s version or demolished it.
30. You can explain the Salafist al Nur decision to support the coup against the 
Brothers in three different ways: You say that this was a Saudi decision and they 
had to comply. You say Salafists were terribly afraid, as the Brothers tried to 
seize control of the Salafist Mosques and kept on harassing the Salafist leaders. 
The last one is that you say that the Salafists were smart enough to understand 
that the Brothers endangered by their mistakes the whole Islamist project and 
tried to distance themselves from this experience. I heard in Cairo the three 
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explanations: The Brothers and some Deep State journalists prefer the first one, 
the Salafist the third, and many journalists the second.
31. President Mursi went to Teheran and the chief of Iranian intelligence paid many 
visits to Egypt.
32. http://www.youm7.com/story/2016/4/2/% D8% A3% D8% B3% D8% B1% 
D8% A7% D8% B1-% D8% AC% D8% AF% D9% 8A% D8% AF% D8% A9-% 
D8% B9% D9% 86-% D8% B9% D9% 84% D8% A7% D9% 82% D8% A9-% 
D9% 85% D8% B1% D8% B3% D9% 89-% D9% 85% D8% B9-% D8% B7% 
D9% 87% D8% B1% D8% A7% D9% 86-% D9% 88% D8% B2% D9% 8A% 
D8% B1-% D8% AE% D8% A7% D8% B1% D8% AC% D9% 8A% D8% A9-% 
D8% A5% D9% 8A% D8% B1% D8% A7% D9% 86/2656367
33. http://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2013/6/16/% D9% 85% 
D9% 88% D9% 82% D9% 81-% D9% 85% D8% B1% D8% B3% D9% 8A-% 
D9% 85% D9% 86-% D8% B3% D9% 88% D8% B1% D9% 8A% D8% A7-% 
D8% B1% D8% B3% D8% A7% D8% A6% D9% 84-% D9% 84% D9% 84% 
D8% AF% D8% A7% D8% AE% D9% 84-% D9% 88% D8% A7% D9% 84% 
D8% AE% D8% A7% D8% B1% D8% AC
34. I replaced “certain,” used in the French version, and preferred “probable.” I 
conducted many discussions with Egyptian diplomats: All agreed to say that 
President Mursi sidelined the ministry, but some said that Mubarak did the 
same thing, a claim denied by others.
35. Read his interview in al-Dustūr dated December 20 2006. There is also an 
interesting article on the international organization in al-Sharq al-Aawsat, 
dated August 29, 2008. Or yet gain the article by ‘Abdal Mun’im Mahmūd in 
al-Dustūr of January 28, 2009 that discussed the relations between Hamas, the 
Egyptian Brotherhood, and the international organization.
36. Al-Fagr, February 7, 2013.
37. Ra’fat Shihata was fired soon after Mursi’s fall. I was unable to find this article 
on the web, but I am sure I saw it during the 2013 summer in an issue of the 
weekly Al-Fagr.
38. The services assert that it was impossible for their chiefs to see Mūrsi face to 
face to discuss the confidential defense dossier. He was always “flanked” by two 
people, one being a member of the international organization. After his fall, 
articles inspired by the services confirmed that the office of the president of the 
Republic systematically transmitted all confidential defense dossiers submitted 
by the services to the Hamas leadership in Gaza and that they had to take this 
into account in their policy of (not) sharing information.
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39. I personally did not become aware of the importance of Turkey’s role in the 
Brotherhood’s network of alliances until after Mūrsi’s fall (well after having 
written the first version of this article). The Brotherhood and Egypt were a dos-
sier receiving high-level attention; several economic treaties had been signed that 
were criticized by the opposition as too favorable to Turkey (I am not equipped 
to evaluate this assertion, which has it that these treaties amounted to exempt-
ing Turkish firms from the tolls due to the Suez Canal Company). Many are 
the members of the Brotherhood international organization that left London, 
Brussels, and Berlin to settle in Turkey. It was in Turkey that the Brothers, then 
still in the opposition, met with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representa-
tives in 2010, and so forth. After Mūrsi fell, the Ankara government systemati-
cally exerted daily pressure on its Western interlocutors to impose sanctions on 
the new Egyptian authorities.
40. President Mūrsi made a state visit to China in late August 2012. See: http:// 
online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044423050457761727155030 4082 
.html
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5
“Islam and Resistance”: The Uses of 
Ideology in the Foreign Policy of Hamas
Leila Seurat
To this day, the classic definition of foreign policy as the instrument by which the state tries to shape and interact with its international envi-
ronment remains a widely accepted framework for international relations 
theory. Applied to the Palestinian landscape, this definition does not fail to 
raise important questions. Do the actors of the national liberation movement 
have the means for carrying out real foreign policy in the absence of true state 
institutions? If there is one, what specific practices of external action does 
Hamas put forward?1 Can the transnational component that defines Islamist 
ideology be reconciled with the defense of interests that are more specifically 
national?
This chapter enlists against the realist theories of international relations, 
whose analyses remain focused on states.2 In it, I try to show that, despite 
being a non-state actor operating in a territory over which it does not exercise 
classic sovereignty, Hamas does in fact pursue a foreign policy whenever it 
deals with actors located outside Palestine as well as formulate discourses 
and implement actions that address non-Palestinian actors. This observation 
remains relevant for the period following the take-over of Gaza in June 
2007. Even if Hamas seems to fit all the criteria of a state entity3 as classi-
cally defined, it must continue to be regarded as a “non-state,” particularly 
because its control over the Gaza strip by no means implies any attribution of 
traditional sovereign resources.4
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The transnational ideology advocated by Hamas is not really limited to 
this actor alone, because there are many examples of state actors who stood 
for ideological positions that were transnational in one way or another.5 The 
Soviet Union, for example, comes to mind, for how it sought to advocate 
the Communist model even outside its borders, or yet again Syria and Iraq 
whose nationalisms not only addressed their own citizens but all Arabs. Nor 
does the religious aspect of Hamas transnationalism make it fundamentally 
different from these other actors, since even Russia’s transnational ideological 
positions can be said to have been permeated by a religious dimension in the 
way it considered itself the protector of the Greek Orthodoxes.
Thus, even though Hamas remains a non-state actor tapping into the 
register of political Islam, the sources of its international practice are funda-
mentally the same ones organizing the foreign policies of states: defending its 
interests as perceived by the movement’s leaders and advocating the values 
and constitutive norms of this politico-religious player’s ideology. This dual 
observation remains valid even when its foreign policy defines itself both in 
relation to the occupying power and by interactions with other actors.
The principal element distinguishing Hamas foreign policy from “classi-
cal” foreign policy is the situation of the occupation and encirclement of the 
Gaza Strip both of which significantly impact its decision making.6 Indeed, 
the main foreign policy authority, the Political Section7 (maktab siyassi), is 
split up between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, the Israeli prisons that hold 
some of its members,8 and finally, the exterior, which, until recently, fell 
within the purview of the movement’s Damascus offices. This dispersal leads 
to adoption of different, more or less inclusive decision-making processes 
that most often reflect the unilateral action of members settled outside the 
Occupied Territories. At the same time, these disparities provoke a heightened 
competition between the leaders in Gaza and those in the exterior with regard 
to the conduct of diplomacy. While a foreign policy only rarely responds to 
the exigencies of a supposed national interest and is not always just the result of 
various inputs reflecting the coalition of forces in power, this pluralistic game 
takes a specific form in the case of Hamas and thus obliges us to acknowledge 
its specificity. Moreover, the exterior leadership’s recent departure from Syria 
prompted a fracturing of this authority, whose members henceforth are them-
selves dispersed over several Arab capitals, notably in Qatar.
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A historical analysis will let us show that, since the early 1990s, the use 
of ideology in the foreign policy of Hama evolved to respond to the realiza-
tion of the movement’s interests. In what follows, we will try to present the 
principal ideological redefinitions that ensued after it carried the legislative 
elections in January 2006 and the events following its victory, starting with 
the taking of power in Gaza in June 2007. Finally, the start of the “Arab 
Spring” opens a period of uncertainty during which interests are no longer 
easily identifiable.
These developments are not without their consequences for the resort to 
ideology.
A Foreign Policy in Gestation
Relying on Ideology with Regard to Israel Raises Hamas’ Status Vis-à-vis the 
PLO
Formulated in conformity with what the movement’s leaders regard as the 
“Islamic norm,”9 the Intifada lets Hamas boost its status in Palestine by dif-
ferentiating it from the PLO’s political program.
The Muslim Brotherhood participating in the first Intifada in December 
1987 is concomitant with the birth of Hamas. The movement thus took 
shape through a foreign policy action defined as an instrument of rebellion 
against the occupying power. For an organization that until then had kept its 
distance from various armed conflicts,10 this choice proceeded from an inter-
nal interest: Protect the group’s structures in order to avoid findings itself 
marginalized on the national political scene. In this enterprise, Hamas largely 
defended its action as conforming to a specific “Islamic norm” principally 
by exploiting religiously significant dates or by mobilizing primarily during 
sermons or days of fasting. Recourse to religion hence derived here from a 
desire of differentiating itself from the Unified National Command, the body 
called into being by the PLO for waging the Intifada after 1991. Hamas has 
always oscillated between its attachment to the “historic solution,” which 
envisions the liberation of all of Palestine and its capacity for living with 
the “interim solution” of advocating the creation of a state with the 1967 
boundaries. As Khaled Khroub commented during the post-Oslo period,11 
the movement’s leaders resorted to the first option: The “historic solution” 
ideology in the foreign policy of hamas | 107
is clearly ideological since it is based on the idea that Palestine constitutes a 
waqf.12 During the same period, the leaders also seek to sign on to the recom-
mendations of the second perspective, “the interim solution,” but when it is 
put forward, it still turns out to be coupled with “Islamic conditions” that 
require it to remain faithful to the sharia, the leaders by then largely turning 
to concepts from the Koran such as sabr (patience) to bolster a solution that 
may appear to be deviant.
These different examples illustrate the fact that, when it comes to Israel, 
the use of ideology can serve the movement’s interests including wanting to 
compete with the PLO’s prestige on the national scene. Like any actor in 
contention with other groups in the same political system, Hamas must assert 
its identity and distinguish itself from its competitors if it is to positively 
influence public opinion or important players. Besides the affirmation of 
righteousness and defense of the population’s interests, the resort to ideology 
helps Hamas distinguish itself from other political forces, especially Fatah. As 
a matter of fact, all Islamist movements appropriate this strategy of counter-
legitimacy against opponents.
Relations with the Other States: A Non-ideological Approach lets Hamas Avoid 
Isolation
While the movement falls back on an Islamic discourse in criticizing Oslo, 
its opposition to the accords signed between the occupier and Arab countries 
is seldom formulated in an ideological idiom. Indeed, on the signing of the 
peace treaty between Israel and Jordan in October 1994, Hamas contented 
itself with deploring “a new crack in the Arab wall of solidarity.”13 This is 
mostly explained as an attempt by the movement to garner support in a 
regional environment in favor of normalization with the Jewish state while 
still remaining a fervent proponent of the military option.14 Sidelining the 
constricting ideological discourse in its charter—which denounces the exist-
ence of a dual “imperialist–Zionist” conspiracy and makes the problematic 
failure of Arab policy toward Palestine the center of its rhetoric—in practice 
makes room for pragmatic declarations.15
In this context, the movement’s silence at a time of successive Islamist 
victories in Jordan in November 1989 and Algeria in 1990 is particularly 
revealing.
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The diplomatic road that Hamas embarked on when Iraq invaded Kuwait 
also illustrates this setting aside of ideology. The movement succeeds in find-
ing a position of equilibrium allowing it to maintain good relations with the 
Gulf countries while it avoids alienating a largely pro-Iraq Palestinian public 
opinion. Its various communiques16 thus witness to a subtle interweaving of 
multiple positions, which, despite their seeming contradictions, end up in a 
pragmatic posture that assures it of continued financing by the petro mon-
archies and simultaneously reinforces its regional status relative to the PLO. 
In addition, preserving friendly relations with the petro monarchies has the 
effect of not excluding the movement from the community of Arab states just 
when it is being accused by the PLO of serving Iranian interests in Palestine.17
Adoption of this new parlance will allow the movement’s leadership to 
make numerous visits throughout the region.18 In 1991, the delegation to 
Iran, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia led by Ibrahim Ghosheh19 provides the 
opportunity for the leaders to gain real visibility and to appear for the first 
time as diplomats from then on. Sheikh Yassine, upon his release from prison 
in 1997, toured Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iran from February to June 1998.20 With its 
spiritual and charismatic leader officially received by numerous states despite 
heavy pressure from certain actors, especially the PLO, this was a seminal 
episode in the movement’s foreign policy.
Finally, adopting a pragmatic foreign policy will also free the movement 
to start talks with Western countries including the United States.21 When the 
incident at Marj al-Zouhour22 happened, leading Israel to expel 415 Islamists 
to South Lebanon, Hamas contacted the five members of the UN Security 
Council through their embassies in Amman, lobbying them to take a position 
on Resolution 799 that demanded the immediate return of the expellees. The 
movement’s representatives at the time delivered letters written personally by 
its leaders explaining their position and making the focus of their remarks the 
legitimacy of resistance to the occupation in conformity with international 
norms, in this way trying to deter the United States from putting their group 
on the list of terrorist organizations.23
The uses of ideology depend primarily on the degree of the movement’s 
integration on the national and regional scenes. In contrast to the actions 
against Israel registering in an “Islamic doxa” and in the wish to assert itself 
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against the PLO, action by Hamas toward the other states lacks this dimen-
sion. The reluctance of a number among the latter to develop relations with 
an Islamist movement largely explains Hamas’s ambition to appear as an 
actor capable of understanding diplomatic issues and of respecting the prin-
ciple of non-interference in the internal affairs of these countries.24
A Specific Hamas Aspect Justifies the “Exceptional” Dimension of its Diplomacy
The dispersal of the maktab siyassi, the central authority for foreign policy 
matters, caused a similar fragmentation of decision making as the Hamas 
leaders found themselves geographically dispersed and with limited means of 
communication. Moreover, this scattering caused an imbalance between the 
interior and the exterior because the members of the external leadership had 
an edge in terms of “day-to-day” management of diplomatic affairs.25
It is the cadres living outside the Territories who constitute the decision 
makers rather than the actual Political Section institutionally. This phenom-
enon would be linked to the aptitude of members living abroad in reaping 
financial resources for the movement.26
This preeminence goes back to the arrest of Sheikh Yassine along with 
many other Gaza leaders in 1989. Faced with the urgent reorganization of the 
organization’s structures, the diaspora then and there took control of Hamas 
under the leadership of Musa Abu Marzouq,27 followed by Khaled Mechaal.28 
This foreign policy decision-making monopoly would have been fostered 
by the Muslim Brotherhood’s wish to see power mainly in the hands of a 
diaspora Palestinian.29 Even with the interior regaining part of its influence 
when Yassine is released in 1997, the exterior retains its hegemony thanks 
in large part to foreign donations that entailed control of the movement’s 
financial but also its military apparatus. This phenomenon of competition 
between the two leaderships is reflected in foreign policy strategies: unlike the 
leadership in the Territories, the diaspora had a longstanding hostility toward 
collaborating with the Palestinian Authority.30 In fact, at the time of the Taba 
accords in September 1995, the interior leadership that sought to protect its 
members against arrest by finding common ground with the new Palestinian 
administration decided to suspend its attacks on Israel. It was then that 
several Fatah leaders met members of the interior in the summer of 1995 in 
Cairo and then in Khartoum. Opposition by the decision-making pole in 
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Amman to stopping the violence and to the entente with the Authority partly 
explains the failure of these meetings and the resumption of attacks in 1996. 
Fearing it would be marginalized politically, the exterior cadres then tried to 
undermine the chances of dialogue between the interior and the Authority.31 
The extent of these fractures in part explains the movement’s foreign policy 
during the second Intifada: Sheikh Yassine is alleged to have accepted the 
possibility of a ceasefire proposed by Yasser Arafat while Khaled Mechaal 
opposed it and is said to have issued an order to the al-Qassam brigade to 
organize an armed operation at Rafah.32
Governance and Foreign Policy
Limited Uses of Ideological Discourse against Israel
The Hamas victory in the legislative elections of January 2006 and the move-
ment’s integration with the Palestinian institutions induced a distinct change 
in the deployment of Islamic values against the occupier. An abandonment 
of the religious-type arguments is perceptible in the numerous accords signed 
between Fatah and Hamas, which involve new demarches with Israel and 
encourage the Islamist movement to limit its armed interventions in the 
territories occupied since 1967. While the “Document of National Accord”33 
signed in June 2006 called on all Palestinian political groups to come together 
under the PLO aegis and to clearly express their will of seeing a state consti-
tuted within the 1967 borders, it implied that Hamas acquiesced in transfer-
ring the dossier of negotiations with Israel to the PLO and to let the president 
of the Palestinian Authority conduct direct negotiations with the Jewish state. 
By the same token, the “Mecca Accord” signed in February 2007 that put a 
temporary stop to the armed conflict between the two factions while opening 
a path to a national unity government, implies that the Movement of the 
Islamic Resistance recognizes the validity of the accords concluded previously 
between the PLO and Israel under American patronage. These pragmatic 
steps primarily signaled a will to consolidate its popular base, to strengthen 
its cohesion and to garner new support.34 The reconciliation agreements most 
often are devoid of any reference to the fundamental ideology, even while 
they entail measures directed at the occupying power.
That said, ideological arguments would not be taken leave of entirely. 
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They are, for example, mobilized on the occasion of indirect negotiations 
with the occupying power, such as when signing truces. While signing the 
hudna of June 2008 under Egyptian auspices, Islam and the resistance thus 
appear to be instrumental in justifying what some regarded then as a doctrinal 
drift.
This truce entails the bilateral cessation of all military operations, the par-
tial reopening of checkpoints, as well as the progressive lifting of the blockade 
by Israel. It is explained as easily by external factors as by internal motives, 
since it also offered a means for appearing like a responsible player in the 
eyes of the international community: The truce ought to permit lifting of the 
blockade, an objective linked to internal legitimacy, but also offer the benefit 
of a period of respite for organizing the interior scene. This lull nevertheless 
also entailed the risk of having the compromise be seen as compromising with 
the enemy. Therefore, phrased in conformity with the “Islamic norm,” the 
hudna lets the movement continue to advertise its difference with the PLO 
that, for its part, explicitly recognized Israel. This legalistic invocation more-
over is coupled with a historical legitimization. By referring to the distant past 
and fitting this process into the long term, the Hamas leadership was able to 
give an Islamic justification for the reconciliation: “In the history of Islam, 
during the era of the Prophet and the ensuing centuries—during the time of 
Salahuddin (Saladin), for example—negotiations were held with the enemy, 
but within a clear framework and specific philosophy, within the context of a 
vision, of rules and of regulations governing this negotiation.”35
On the other hand, in order to deflect the charge of compromising with 
the enemy, the truce is characterized as just one more stage in the armed 
conflict and thus could be presented as a kind of “resistance.”36
After Many Attempts at Pragmatic Overtures, a Hamas Isolated Regionally and 
Internationally Again Resorts to Normative Elements
After scoring its victory in the legislative elections of January 2006 and 
forming the tenth Palestinian Government in March, the movement flaunted 
pragmatic positions far removed from the original ideology, especially with 
regard to the Western powers.37 But the continuing refusal by the Quartet38 
to open any kind of dialogue with the movement, combined with the con-
tinuing blockade imposed by Egypt and supported by the “moderate” Arab 
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countries, led the movement to restart a specific religious or normative dis-
course designed to advance certain specific interests.
Thus, the strategic alliance that has Hamas side with Iran is the one most 
often analyzed in terms of values held in common. Kahled Mechaal’s various 
declarations during his Teheran visits indeed move in this direction by accen-
tuating a religious referent advanced as a common denominator: “We wish 
to unite the Arab and Islamic nation on the Palestine question.”39 This same 
formula allows Hamas to legitimize its diplomatic visits to the Arab countries. 
In 2006, a delegation sent by the movement thus made the rounds of many 
states in the region.40 The movement leadership then insisted strongly on the 
ideological unity that, according to them, gathered up the Islamic actors in 
the struggle against Israel. These foreign policy declarations compatible with 
their values thus responded to several imperatives.
As contacts with the different Arab countries dwindled, the assertion of 
a “united Arab front” to fight Israel assumed all the more importance, with 
Iran constituting a main source of material, political, and military support. 
The resort to ideology also made it possible to minimize an alliance that was 
not approved unanimously, given that it included a Shiite actor. Hamas thus 
favored the common denominator among Sunni and Shiites compared with 
the doctrinal specificities that might put them at loggerheads.
When this alliance is not described in Islamic terms, it is formulated 
starting with a mobilization of the concept of “united resistance front,” which 
made aggregating more countries, including non-Muslim ones, around the 
Hamas vision possible. This partly explains the official meeting between 
Khaled Mechaal and Russian president Dimitri Medvedev in May of 2010 
in Damascus.41 The “resistance front” uniting actors such as Russia, Turkey, 
or Qatar around Hamas let the movement assert that attempts to isolate it 
had failed and that, going forward, there were many who would treat it as a 
legitimate and indispensable player. In the same vein, the resort to the ideol-
ogy of “resistance,” in giving the impression that an “axis” existed, can equally 
serve to stigmatize a purported alliance between Israel, Cairo, and Abbas. 
Erasing the lines dividing internal and foreign policy let Hamas delegitimize 
its Palestinian competitors, starting with Fatah.
If some external actions are presented as deriving from a religious matrix 
or are defined in normative terms or suprastate ones, this does not stop the 
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movement from pursuing an agenda resembling “classic” foreign policies. 
The use of ideology depends on the place it occupies inside Palestinian 
institutions, on its capacities for governance, but also its integration with the 
regional field. The effects of the economic and diplomatic isolation of Hamas 
explain in part the doctrinal renewal that reinforces the rapprochement with 
allies such as Iran, Syria, or Hezbollah and permits integrating new actors in 
a common front. However, the hypothesis of “normality” once more encoun-
ters limits due to the geographical dispersion of the movement’s members 
and the scattering of its decision makers.
New Tensions Born of Winning the January 2006 Legislative Elections
The splintering of decision authorities continues to exert a key influence on 
the elaboration of foreign policy. The signing of the “Document of National 
Accord” in June 2006, involving recognition of the 1967 boundaries as well 
as the transfer of the dossier of negotiations with Israel to the PLO, from then 
on constrains Hamas to heeding the weighty voice of the prisoners within its 
leadership authorities. The latter find it difficult to disregard or suppress such 
a stance, which, clearly, represents what the prisoners want.42
The problem of the center of gravity (markaz al-qiwa) between the two 
leaderships is at the core of the antagonisms between the interior and exterior, 
the more so since Gaza dominates the institutions of government as well as 
Gaza’s economic, security, and military activities.43 The tunnel economy, 
moreover, reduces the interior leadership’s dependence by its taxing of 
imports from Israel and Egypt. In spite of the Gaza leadership’s claims, 
the exterior considers that power should remain centered outside Palestine. 
Thus, while the government of Ismaël Haniyeh conducts its official foreign 
relations through the figure of its minister, Mahmoud al-Zahar, it is Khaled 
Mechaal and Oussama Hamdan,44 operating out of the Syrian capital, who 
nevertheless enjoy much greater freedom in organizing the bulk of meetings 
and invitations of foreign heads of state to Damascus. The reconciliation dos-
sier is once more at the heart of these cleavages, since in October 2009, while 
Mahmoud al-Zahar45 approves and signs the Egyptian document, Khaled 
Mechaal opposes it and refuses to ratify the accord.46
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The New Uses of Ideology Confronted with the Arab Spring
When the Efforts at Legitimization Conflict with Defending Interests
The arrival of the “Arab Spring” forced Hamas into adapting its external 
action to the new reality emerging in the region. Its foreign policy therefore 
continued to register a certain pragmatism toward Israel. In November 2011, 
when Fatah and Hamas met in Cairo, Khaled Mechaal recommitted to 
respecting the 1967 borders and endorsed a new form of resistance calling 
itself “popular” or “peaceful.”47 Choosing such an approach was all the easier 
because its implications corresponded with the critical line on armed struggle 
taken by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.48 It thus let the Movement of 
Islamic Resistance stress its ideological kinship with an organization that was 
on the verge of normalizing its relationship with the United States and the 
European Union.
With regard to the Arab states, Hamas adapts its discourse to the demands 
of the new environment by formulating it around the notion of “resistance.” 
Considering that its action and popular uprisings are two aspects of a single 
phenomenon, it takes to the field of the Arab Spring by presenting itself as 
one of the agents of change. It reckons that the “heroic resistance” of Gazans 
has provided the Arab peoples with the example for rising up against des-
potic regimes whose oppression is compared to that of the Israeli occupiers: 
“We pride ourselves on having sparked this awakening; the Palestinian cause 
remains the focus of these peoples who rejected the injustice of the regimes 
in power.”49
However, this new formula, calculated to show a direct link between 
the intransigence of the Gaza Strip toward Israel and the determination 
of the Arab peoples in the face of dictatorial regimes, runs up against the 
risk of seeing some Arab states succeed in stifling the nascent social and 
political contests. This means that we are witnessing the implementation 
of an extremely pragmatic policy by the Islamist movement where this new 
discourse evolves as a function of which Arab or Islamic actors it addresses. 
Once again, resorting to the ideological argument finds itself blunted by 
considerations that are exclusively political.
In the course of his numerous trips from late 2011 to early 2012, Ismaël 
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Haniyeh intended to restore to the Palestinian cause its religious depth in a 
context of regional upheaval that saw a growing number of countries emerge 
more disposed to welcoming a movement ideologically close to the Muslim 
Brotherhood. During his visits to Egypt and Tunisia, he attempts to con-
gratulate these two peoples on the accomplishments of their revolutions all 
the while he is reframing the Palestinian cause in its largest sense as the same 
quest for dignity and justice that characterize these upheavals.50 In Qatar, 
Haniyeh visits the head office of the al-Jazeera network to praise its objectiv-
ity and professionalism as well as its propensity for evidencing its support of 
the Muslim uprisings throughout the region.
Conversely, when he touched down in countries where there was no 
“spring,” this type of normative reference vanished. While visiting Bahrain, 
Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the connection between the 
popular uprisings and the Palestinian question disappeared in favor of other 
topics, such as that of blockade. In Jordan on January 29, Khaled Mechaal 
and his delegation were very careful to drop any references to the revolts 
visible in the region, Abdallah II himself being threatened by the beginnings 
of a Jordanian revolt.51 Discourse that posits an unwavering link between 
Hamas and the “Arab Spring” therefore constitutes a form of ideologization 
of interests that is promoted or not depending on who is being addressed.
With the external leadership of the organization headquartered in 
Damascus until February 2012, the Movement of Islamic Resistance had 
everything to lose by pronouncing such an ideological discourse with regard 
to Syria. Preserving the Syrian support constituted an imperative for the 
movement by enabling it to retain the economic support of the Islamic 
Republic and then being threatened in numerous statements by Iranian 
dignitaries with a cutoff in financial support, military hardware deliveries, 
and provision of military training in Iran to the party’s armed wing.52 At the 
same time, given its pro-revolutionary stance this posture of distancing itself 
from the Syrian uprising puts Hamas in an awkward position. How then 
to reconcile efforts at ideological legitimization with defending its interests 
when the two are at odds?
The movement managed to find a compromise by engineering the depar-
ture of exterior leadership cadres while maintaining a symbolic presence 
ensured by the top leaders. This policy of “presence in absence” (tawājud)53 
116 | the foreign policy of islamist political parties
let it minimize the costs of breaking with the Syrian regime while still appear-
ing to be an actor opposed to Bashar al-Assad. The Syrian crisis once again 
illustrates the dilemma of diplomacy in which Hamas would henceforth find 
itself and testifies to how it managed to define a position that to this day 
allows it to reconcile its different interests and multiple constraints.54
The statements made by Ismaël Haniyeh during his visit to Iran on 
February 17, 2012 can also be read as an attempt to obscure this contradic-
tion between efforts at legitimization and pursuit of specified interests. This 
recalls the cogency of the maximalist strategy of rejecting any normalization 
with Israel (tasswiyya) and reasserts the religious dimension of the Palestinian 
question. Despite the risk of seeing the return to the “rejection front” dis-
please the new regional actors that Hamas hopes nevertheless to appeal to, the 
movement feels itself obliged to maintain this rhetoric of the Islamic resist-
ance pole in order to assure continuity in its longtime sources of support.
The Splintering of the Decision-making Bodies: Ideology in the Service of 
the Group
The start of the Arab Spring, which allowed the Gazans to move around and 
be received abroad,55 amplified the phenomenon of competition between the 
Gaza decision-making group and the one abroad that continued to exercise 
a monopoly on foreign policy decisions.56 Still, since 2011, these unilateral 
decisions are being publicly challenged by different (groups of) actors with 
parochial causes and interests. We also note that unilateralism henceforth is 
criticized in a context of an external leadership weakened since its departure 
from Damascus: From now on, its members also find themselves dispersed 
among several Arab capitals, with Khaled Mechaal having returned to Qatar 
while Musa Abu Marzouq, vice president of the Political Section, settled in 
Cairo.
To cite an example, the topic of reconciliation was a frequent source of 
discord between the leaders. Signed by Khaled Mechaal in February 2012 at 
Doha, the agreement envisioned the formation of a provisional government 
in which Mahmoud Abbas, president of the Palestinian Authority, would 
also assume the post of prime minister, was something violently denounced 
by a part of the leadership in Gaza as well as by Mahmoud al-Zahar57 who 
objected to Mahmoud Abbas becoming prime minister.58
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This opposition then expressed itself in dogmatic terms, the objecting 
members of the movement giving ideological motives for their rejection: 
Why grant such concessions when the victories of the Islamists in Tunisia 
and in Egypt or elsewhere set the stage for a global Islamic project centered on 
Hamas in Gaza that would end in Israel’s defeat? These justifications accord-
ing to the Islamist norm, however, do not imply any correlation between geo-
graphic splintering and ideological opposition59 and must not be construed as 
meaning that the Gaza leadership may be “tougher” than the external one.60 
The refusal to validate a foreign policy decision for not being coherent with 
the movement’s doctrinal principles is a way of serving the positioning of its 
cadres. It is not directly opposed to the objectives pursued, but can serve the 
policies of one particular group.61
The sermon delivered by Youssef al-Qardawi in the al-Doha mosque 
on May 3, 2013 with Khaled Mechaal62 present also provoked very sharp 
dissatisfaction among a part of the Gaza leadership.63 Indeed, as he preached, 
Sheikh Youssef al-Qardawi said some insulting words about Hezbollah when 
he called out the Shiite movement as the “party of Satan,”64 thus in the 
same breath not only insulting the Party of God’s Secretary General Hassan 
Nasrallah but also the Islamic Republic by calling it an ally of Zionism.65 
Imad al-Alami and Mahmoud al-Zahar then had sent an urgent letter to 
Khaled Mechaal to have him clarify his position and distance himself explic-
itly from the sheikh’s words.66 Part of the Gaza leadership at that point 
spoke up about the report of the visit by Youssef al-Qaradawi to Gaza: Imad 
Al-Alami supposedly tried to convince Ismaël Haniyeh of the urgent need to 
cancel this visit given what had been said some days earlier at Doha.67
Conclusion
Although it doubly differentiates itself from the “classic” international actor 
able to mobilize the resources of a state entity and defining itself in national 
rather than supra-national terms, Hamas pursues a foreign policy that resem-
bles those of most states in the international system. Any actor, be it a state or 
not, religious or secular, always favoring its interests, must take its values and 
norms into account when formulating foreign policy.
We have tried to demonstrate here that the latter most frequently 
are marshaled in defense of Hamas interests. In the early 1990s, with the 
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 movement marginalized on the national political scene, it invoked justifica-
tions of a religious nature in confronting Israel as a way of gaining popularity 
and credibility. On the other hand, its isolation on the regional scene involves 
a total break with using ideological references. Starting in the middle of 
the first 2000 decade, when it decided to stand for the legislative elections 
and take part in Palestine’s political life by integrating with the Authority’s 
institutions,68 the movement’s interests having evolved, the resort to ideology 
also went through a profound transformation: The policy toward Israel is 
most often presented in a pragmatic way, the religious references nevertheless 
serving to justify the reconciliation and to give credit to measures that may 
appear as deviant relative to the “Islamic norm.” This is the case, for example, 
with the hudna concluded in June 2008. With regard to other actors, the 
movement falls back on an ideology that is sometimes Islamic, at other times 
focused on the notion of a “resistance front,” to serve interests both exter-
nal and internal, such as ensuring the continuation of economic support, 
expanding its network of alliances, and delegitimizing its political rivals in 
Palestine. With the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the movement performs an 
ideological redefinition and actuates a new formula that lets it position itself 
in the heart of the revolutionary process under way.
Yet, the Hamas foreign policy remains different from that of a state in 
that its authorities in charge of foreign policy are geographically dispersed, 
an element that exacerbates the tensions and inconsistencies inherent in any 
decision-making structure. This splintering itself is fractured a second time 
in connection with the “daily” management of decisions relating to the inter-
national since it is the external leadership that wields a quasi-monopoly over 
these decisions. Starting from 2011, the exterior’s unilateralism is challenged 
and can express itself in normative terms to favor the interests of a group or a 
specific leader. Still, this plurality of actors with diverging interests does not 
preclude the existence of a base of shared interests within Hamas. Also, the 
capacity for transcending the split in the movement between the interior and 
exterior even if apparently structural proves the existence of shared interests.
It is too early to know the precise impact of the “Arab Spring” on Hamas 
foreign policy. Even though the divorce between Hamas and Syria appears 
to be final, the movement’s regional realignment has not taken place as yet. 
It remains dependent on Iran’s financial aid and the Syrian “revolution” is 
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far from an outcome that would cause a radical realignment in the regional 
configuration.69 On the Egypt side, Hamas, which appeared to be the prime 
target of a vast campaign waged by numerous Egyptian media against 
their president, had anticipated the risks of associating with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Mohamed Morsi’s overthrow on July 3, 2013 seems in fact 
to have prolonged the isolation of the Palestinian movement. Thus, more 
than ever, it appears that the policy of Hamas will still have to depend for 
some time yet on a regional context that is in uproar. The question remains, 
therefore: Just what contortions of an ideological order should we expect for 
justifying the movement’s evolving interests?
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Yassine.
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abduction and subsequent assassination of the Israeli sergeant major Nissim 
Toledano in December 1992 and then for a series of attacks on buses in Israel in 
1994 and during February and March 1996.
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17. With the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War and the PLO’s backing of Saddam 
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rated rapidly, until the holding of the Madrid conference on October 22, 1991, 
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the opening of a Hamas office in Teheran in February 1992. Iran then was the 
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op. cit.
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21. The United States had made contact with Hamas during January and February 
1993 through the American Embassy in Amman at a time when it had no 
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and Practice, op. cit.
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122 | the foreign policy of islamist political parties
brigades, Israel expelled 400 Palestinian Islamists to Marj-al-Zouhour in South 
Lebanon.
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Amman in addition is explained by the non-respect for this commitment, since 
a kind of mobilization existed in Jordan and it pointed to the Jordanian Section 
of the Brotherhood in this country.
25. This preeminence of the external leaders in the definition and elaboration of 
foreign policy is claimed by them as much as by the analysts. According to 
Usama Hamdan, whom the author met in Damascus on January 25, 2011, the 
Damascus section is in charge of the problems of “day-to-day management” in 
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New York and jailed in the United States until May 1997 when Israel dropped 
its request for extradition. In Damascus, he held the post of vice-president of the 
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one of the branches of the Muslim Brotherhood or, on the contrary, to advertise 
its independence. For a more precise description of the relationship between the 
Brothers and Hamas, see the analyses by Abd al Mu’min Mahmoud in al-Dustūr 
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and legitimacy imparted by being imprisoned would lend more weight to these 
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6
A Fighting Shiism Faces the World: 
The Foreign Policy of Hezbollah*
Aurélie Daher
S tudying the foreign policy of Lebanon’s Hezbollah is no easy task. From a methodological standpoint, it is an exercise that first of all entails untan-
gling a very tightly woven mix of internal and external strategies: More than 
any other Lebanese party, Hezbollah is a political apparatus whose reason for 
being, universe of meaning, and propensity for action are largely determined 
by a specific relationship with the external, in this case regional, world. Next, 
on the analytical level, the challenge consists of clearly grasping the multiple 
and multiform character of this foreign policy: Hezbollah’s leadership does 
not just have one but diverse foreign policies; depending on the context, it 
does not hesitate to change its relationship with the world in an explicitly 
pragmatic logic, but it also projects its relations with the outside through 
different organizational and institutional supports. The red lines defined a 
priori by its ideological paradigms are not perfectly inflexible, and its rela-
tions with the national political system—of which Hezbollah, like other of 
the country’s groups, is simultaneously a component and a competitor—lets 
it develop foreign policies from differing platforms that appear at times con-
tradictory but are functionally quite complementary.
Difficult to dissect it may be, but the subject keeps its hold on the 
interest. Close to thirty years after Hezbollah’s birth, the study of its foreign 
policy has in the main constituted a subordinate subject to the study of 
Western foreign policies, which has been content to view it as subcontracting 
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on behalf of more important regional actors. Hezbollah’s interaction with 
the world, thus limited to a series of anti-Western and anti-Israeli terrorist 
initiatives carried out on the orders of the Syrian and/or Iranian regimes, 
becomes a favored way for getting at the real nature of the organization, so 
that Hezbollah sees itself summed up as an essentially violent organization 
whose field of action is by nature extra-national. Indisputably, Hezbollah’s 
foreign policy reflects a series of elements that reveal the organization’s true 
identity; however, it is really nothing more than an evolving strategy hinging 
on other means of action, in the service of an order of priorities that are 
definitely Lebanese-centered: For Hezbollah, as for quite a few other political 
actors, its foreign policy is above all a domestic policy. In order to understand 
the latter’s relationship to the world and its strategic choices in that regard, 
it is necessary first of all to discard certain received ideas, and then to return 
to the reasons that brought the party into being and refocus on the principal 
goals it makes its own.
Hezbollah, Passive Instrument of Syro-Iranian Policy?
The ties that rule relations between Hezbollah and Teheran on the one hand 
and the party and Damascus on the other are not only of a dissimilar nature, 
but each of them of a substance that has been modulated multiple times in 
line with the contexts.
Revolutionary Iran is habitually regarded as Hezbollah’s matrix as much 
on the organizational as ideological plane. The argument essentially rests on 
the party’s declared allegiance to the principle of wilāyat al-Faqīh, or the 
“rule of the jurisprudent,” the hierarchizing doctrine of authorities within the 
politico-religious Shiite world, which, in practice, installs the Guide of the 
Iranian Revolution at the top of the pyramid. If this means that Hezbollah 
has to take into account the general strategic orientations laid down by 
the Guide, the connection between the party and the Iranian president still 
is not officially one of subordination.1 Moreover, and contrary to the widely 
held idea that the principle of wilāyat al-Faqīh acts as a constraining tie 
to the point of making Hezbollah a tractable satellite remotely controlled 
from Teheran, the modalities of this relationship are well-defined and only 
function in certain situations. The authority of the Faqīh in fact translates 
itself as (i) “good by consent,” by which the Guide a posteriori blesses certain 
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decisions made by the party’s leadership, and (ii) a power of arbitration that 
only intervenes if solicited by Hezbollah’s leadership. That leaves the latter 
all kinds of room for maneuver in the decision-making process, manage-
ment, and execution, since the two men who have held the office of waliy—
Khomeini, and then Khamenei—have been and remain relatively unintrusive 
mentors in the party’s day-to-day affairs.2
During the 1980s, abductions of a number of Western nationals and 
attacks directed against the Multinational Forces in Lebanon and the 
American Embassy were attributed to Hezbollah, which thus is supposed 
to have been responsible for delivering mission-messages addressed by the 
Iranian revolutionaries to its Western rivals.
Teheran, the prime beneficiary of the “affair of the hostages,” in having 
facilitated their liberation by interceding with the various abductors and 
simultaneously settling its differences with Paris over the Eurodif matter, 
denied having instigated the abductions.3 The party likewise always firmly 
denied its involvement; in point of fact, while some familial and friendship 
ties could be established between some kidnappers and party members, to 
this day there does not appear to exist any proof of a definite responsibility 
of its leadership.4 Whatever real links that may have attached Hezbollah 
and Iran to the abductors, the 1990s saw this bridle, which allegedly made 
the party subject to Teheran’s whim, relax significantly. During the terms 
in office of Rafsandjani (1989–97) and Khatami (1997–2005), Hezbollah 
lost the support of the presidential link, incarnated during Khomeini’s time 
by Khamenei. In fact, a just-elected Rafsandjani warned that the Lebanese 
protégé party must become “like any other party.” The first new translation 
of this distancing, a drastic reduction in the financial support the party 
had enjoyed previously, encouraged it to choose an intensive policy of self- 
financing. Khatami, intent on an opening to other Lebanese political tenden-
cies, set in motion an even sharper weakening of Hezbollah’s privileged 
status by insisting on making the Lebanese state Teheran’s premier partner 
in the Land of Cedars. Hezbollah would have to wait until the election of 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2005 to once again become the protégé organiza-
tion and principal interlocutor in Lebanon.
If the relationship between Hezbollah and Teheran however vertical still 
remained relatively supple, the relationship with the Syrian regime was less 
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so, horizontal as it may have been in this case. Damascus, during the years 
of its tutelage over Lebanon (1990–2005), regularly intervened, directly and 
in detail, it its neighbor’s political affairs. Desiring to maintain a certain 
equilibrium between the local forces, on occasion it imposed limiting edicts 
on Hezbollah as it did on other Lebanese groups. But the party, while con-
tinuing to depend on the good will of the Syrian regime to sustain resistance 
against the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon and weapons shipments 
from Iran, progressively became a key asset for the Syrian mentor in return. 
By virtue of its support for Hezbollah’s cause, the Assad dynasty managed to 
wrap itself for many years in the mantle of a “resisting Arab” regime,5 help-
ing it to sustain legitimacy in its own country at very little cost. There was 
only a more-or-less well-balanced bilateral contract between the party and 
the Syrian regime, whereas between Hezbollah and the Iranian Guide there 
existed an affinity and ideological engagement.
As it has in its relations with the Lebanese state, since the late 1980s 
Hezbollah has opted for prudence in its relations with Damascus, by advo-
cating non-confrontation in the hope of not compromising the interests of 
fighters engaged in South Lebanon. That said, whenever possible, the Syrian 
desiderata have been ignored when it benefited the party’s key interests. 
This was the case, for example, during the municipal elections in 1998 and 
in 2004, when Afwāj al-Muqāwamah al-Lubnāniyyah (the Brigades of the 
Lebanese Resistance) (AMAL), the second Lebanese Shiite grouping, insisted 
on putting up combined slates with the more popular Hezbollah in hopes 
of riding its coat-tails. The party leadership, sure of its victory, was opposed 
and even the pugnacious interventions by the Syrian authorities on AMAL’s 
behalf failed to change its mind. Likewise, in the spring of 2000, the Syrian 
regime was worried about Israel’s being resigned to making a unilateral with-
drawal from Lebanon, which, some weeks later, would indeed mark an end 
to twenty-two years of occupation of the Country of Cedars. Damascus 
tried hard to temper the aggressiveness of the Lebanese fighters in hopes of 
preventing the retreat, but Hezbollah, determined to achieve a quick, clear 
victory over Tel Aviv’s troops, disregarded the Syrian wishes by intensifying 
the pace of the attacks against the occupier to keep the Israeli general staff 
and government from backtracking on their decision to pull its military back 
unconditionally.
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If the grand outlines of Hezbollah’s policies, among them its foreign 
policy, are not completely determined by its regional godfathers, and if the 
party ventures to bypass the latter’s aspirations when it thinks its own inter-
ests demand it, what then are its own priorities?
Objectives, Institutions and Reinterpretation of Hezbollah’s 
Foreign Policy
Three Decades of Service to the Islamic Resistance
When Israel invaded Lebanon for the second time in June 1982, a resistance 
effort immediately welded together large parts of the country’s Shiite militant 
groups. In the Bekaa, the north-eastern Lebanese hinterland, a first network 
of clerics, who, for several years, had advocated anti-imperialist paradigms, 
simultaneously used their backing within the revolutionary world of Iran 
and their popularity with the local young people to set up a new paramilitary 
organization dedicated to repelling the occupier: al-Muqāwama al-islāmîyya 
fī Lubnān, the “Islamic Resistance in Lebanon” (IRL). Then its general staff 
joined to it a network of civil institutions responsible for mobilizing in its 
name and developing within the society and then among the political class 
a certain number of support levers. This network, soon to diversify and 
professionalize itself, took its permanent name in May 1984: Hezbollah, 
or Party of God. Relations between the IRL and Hezbollah are defined by 
a logic of complementarity: The former takes on the military combat role, 
harrying the occupation forces in the hope of convincing them to withdraw 
completely and permanently; the latter furnishes a discourse of justification 
and mobilization, social action of compensation and participation in the 
national political life with the objective of defusing any challenges arising in 
the population and any threat that may emerge from the leadership spheres of 
the Lebanese state. Hezbollah’s foreign policy (as distinct from IRL external, 
para-military action) does not evade this task distribution: Like the party’s 
other types of activities, the primary function of its foreign policy remains the 
defense of IRL’s interests.
With this postulate in mind, it becomes possible to discern the logic that 
underpins Hezbollah’s external preferences and to grasp how the context 
may suggest friendships or enmities. Logically, Israel remains irrevocably 
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enemy number one. On this level, Hezbollah makes sure to clearly dif-
ferentiate Zionism and Judaism, stating officially that it has no quarrel with 
the latter.6 Washington, Tel Aviv’s quasi-organic ally, cannot expect to be 
regarded better than its protégé. The other actors in this world are alternately 
elevated to the rank of respectable interlocutors, if not favored allies, or else 
condemned publicly for their policy or that of their governments. To cite 
France’s image as an example, it has clearly improved over the past three 
decades. A member of the Multinational Forces stationed in Beirut in the 
days following the 1982 invasion by Israel, Paris was criticized for the support 
it rendered at the time to the pro-Israeli Lebanese Christian militias despite 
its obligation to remain neutral.7 But, the end of the international armed 
presence in 1984 then allowed France to become a “reasonable Western 
partner.” The presidency of Jacques Chirac (1995–2007), in particular, is 
approved of for the most part, essentially for its multiple condemnations of 
the Israeli attacks on Lebanon during the second half of the 1990s. The vote 
for UN Security Resolution 1559 in September 2004, which provided for the 
disarmament of “all militias” in Lebanon—the IRL included—was a disap-
pointment. But France actually did not lose its status as favored interlocutor, 
even during the great crisis moments like the summer of 2006, during the 
33-Day War, when Paris would represent the sole Western firewall against 
Israel’s destructive capability.8
Internal Production Sources
From an internal, institutional perspective, the production of Hezbollah’s 
foreign policy is distributed on several levels. Contrary to what certain media 
have liked to assert, there is no “Foreign Affairs Ministry” in the party. It does 
indeed have a “Foreign Relations Unit” (Wahdat al-‘Ilāqāt al-khārijiyya), 
which, without being a decision-making organ, looks after a part of public 
relations and in particular provides advice and assistance to the authorities 
actually responsible for foreign-policy planning. Hence, the unit’s president 
takes care of general contacts with international organizations or foreign 
embassies, while his assistants comb through the foreign press and write 
memos that are sent to higher decision-making authorities. Depending on 
the nature of the delegations visiting Hezbollah, the meetings are organized 
in a fashion best suited to the visitors’ profile and they may be redirected to 
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other units: Emissaries from embassies or international organizations may be 
received by the president of the foreign relations unit in a framework of rou-
tine communications meetings, but foreign professors, journalists, and other 
professionals are most often received by party cadres belonging to specialized 
entities (the unit for student mobilization, information unit, and so forth).
The substance and methods of foreign policy are decided at higher levels. 
Hezbollah’s secretary general, supported by the Consultative Council, has the 
final say on what positions to adopt. The Political Council, one of five central 
councils supervised by the Consultative Council, is subdivided in turn into 
working groups responsible for individual “dossiers.” Among these are the 
external relations dossier, the dossier of relations with Arab countries, that 
of relations with the Palestinian factions, and one for relations with Islamic 
groups. More systematic contacts for mutual cooperation are established on 
this level. There are numerous exceptions when the exchanges are delegated 
to higher instances if the content is judged to be sensitive. The secretary 
general himself or his deputy handle strategic political cooperation as well as 
certain contacts that need to remain secret or are intended for passing along 
unofficial messages. Finally, military and security cooperations fall within the 
competence of the IRL general staff and the individuals who run the security 
apparatus.
Logically, this splitting of contact levels from those making the decision 
may augur a fragmented foreign policy for the party. However, for several 
years already, it appears to have been well-managed and with a remarkable 
coherence of the positions of the different levels, producing a uniform dis-
course of justification and action lastingly aligned with the stipulated choices. 
In this regard, solid internal discipline and a vertical organizational structure 
that effectively forestall differences definitely are of great help. The fit is that 
much more successful because it also incorporates Hezbollah’s external action 
via the state apparatus.
The State Platform
In practice, Hezbollah’s efforts in the foreign policy realm translate mainly 
into a permanent attempt to defuse through exchanges with foreign actors to 
the best of their ability any threats that may impede the Resistance continu-
ing in action. In particular, its foreign relations platform acts as an  extension 
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in communications terms of the battle field where the IRL and Israel habitu-
ally confront each other: Numerous indeed are the occasions when Hezbollah 
resorts to diplomatic channels to counter campaigns instigated by Israeli 
Foreign Affairs aiming to have Western governments punish the party and 
the IRL. But the main thrust of Hezbollah’s efforts in reality is foreign com-
munications by proxy, embodied in a policy of lobbying the Lebanese state 
authorities.
Research into Hezbollah’s recourse in foreign-policy matters to institu-
tions of the Lebanese state is relevant really only since the start of the 1990s, 
when the party decides for the first time to enter the national institutional 
arena. It was in fact in 1992 that the first post-war (1975–90) parliamentary 
elections took place and Hezbollah opted to take part. Its goal? īsāl sawt 
al-Muqāwama lal-Barlamén, or “Make the voice of the Resistance heard in 
Parliament.”9 In other words, it wanted to expand the array of levers already 
at its disposal for defending the IRL’s interests. Seeing that the Lebanese 
state, with the application of the Taëf accords that had just ended the civil 
war, was about to regain a certain authority, Hezbollah thought it prudent 
to acquire the means of countering the state’s potential nuisance power from 
the inside. Far from working to obtain subsidies for its institutions as is the 
wont generally of the region’s politico-religious groups and refraining from 
any debate on the opportunity for regime change in favor of an Islamic 
Government, Hezbollah’s parliamentary deputies remained faithful to their 
original mission. They did so by demanding that the IRL’s actions in South 
Lebanon be recognized officially and legitimized by the state, by calling for 
aid to the victims of the Israeli bombardments and for initiatives to free 
Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails; in addition, they tried to weigh in on 
Beirut’s foreign policy. This they did explicitly for every military crisis with 
Tel Aviv: for the Israeli army’s expanded offensives in July 1993 and April 
1996 and the various, more or less significant, skirmishes punctuating the 
relative calm that reigned on the border in the days immediately following 
the Liberation of 2000. The government, at Hezbollah’s urging, not only had 
to officially support the Resistance cause but also do its utmost to counter 
any international attempts to bring the resistance to heel. This expectation 
by the party was not simply one request among others: Its implementation 
was nothing less than a sine qua non for maintaining a good understanding 
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between Hezbollah and the government. From when it entered politics, the 
party, in fact, quite explicitly established the rules of the game: As long as the 
state did not challenge the IRL’s interests, it had no reason to fear a desta-
bilizing action by the party. Deferring its aspirations for an Islamization of 
government into a hypothetical future, Hezbollah therefore conceived of the 
state above all as an instrument of its policy for defusing any foreign threats.
As long as the Syrian regime remained the supreme arbiter of Lebanese 
politics (1990–2005), Hezbollah had no complaints about the service ren-
dered by the Beirut authorities: Prime Minister Rafic Hariri himself more 
than once went out of his way to defend the IRL’s cause against his Western 
allies. Hezbollah’s awareness of the state’s potential role in foreign influence 
continued after the Syrian troops pulled out in 2005 and the victory of the 
March 14 coalition, which was hostile toward Damascus, in the parliamen-
tary elections that same year. Despite marked ideological differences, rela-
tions between the party and the new Lebanese regime thus started off under 
acceptable auspices, thanks to a more or less explicit commitment by the new 
government not to damage the IRL.
The strategic importance to Hezbollah’s foreign policy of the state lever 
was illustrated with unprecedented clarity during the crisis in the summer 
of 2006, when Israel bombarded Lebanon non-stop for thirty-three days 
and thirty-three nights following the abduction of two Israeli soldiers at 
the border by the IRL in the early morning of July 12. For the first time in 
Hezbollah’s history, the government broke ranks with the IRL and part of 
the political class hostile to Hezbollah collaborated with the attacker. The 
political escalation led by Hezbollah after the war in large part originated 
with this disappearance of the state go-between, just as it explains its insist-
ence on getting a firmer grip on the reins of power. From 2006 on, more 
than ever, the president of the Republic, the prime minister, the head of the 
army, and the high officials of the forces of order and security would not 
be appointed without Hezbollah’s stamp of approval—on the first and last 
condition that the candidates were committed to defending the IRL. In this, 
the party’s task was aided by the fall of the Hariri Government in January 
2011 and the reversal of the trends in Parliament that followed. The March 
8 coalition gained the majority of seats in the Parliament and the privilege of 
forming a new government. However, the outbreak of the Syrian crisis at the 
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same time forced Hezbollah to revise its modus operandi in foreign-policy 
matters in spite of itself.
Anti-Assad Revolution: The Irl’s Exceptional Deterritorialization
In the spring of 2011, Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah, 
did not temporize. Faced with the rising political unrest in Syria, he publicly 
declared a preference for keeping the regime in power while calling for 
a dialogue between it and the opposition. This caused a serious setback 
to Hezbollah’s popularity among a large part of the Syrian public. It was 
logical for the relations between the party and the forces actively protesting 
to be tainted by animosity: disagreeable accusations erupted between the 
Syrian National Council (Snc) of Burhan Ghalioun and the party leadership: 
Ammar al-Wawi, spokesman for the Free Syrian Army, warned Nasrallah 
that he would be judged by “the Syrian revolutionary tribunals once the 
Revolution had achieved victory.”10 Tension arose especially around the 
presumed intervention by the IRL on the side of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. 
Report after report came from the Syrian opposition claiming that hundreds 
if not thousands of fighters were deployed on the side of Damascus, with 
several accounts asserting that dozens of IRL men had been killed in combat. 
Videos were posted on YouTube that showed armed militants purported to 
be IRL members in action in Syria. However, until the spring of 2013, it 
appeared upon checking that the Syrian accusations remained largely unsup-
ported, the IRL by all appearances not having rendered any manpower sup-
port to Assad’s army.
Nevertheless, this does not mean it had no presence on the ground. Its 
field of action is a well-defined part of the border, the Syrian region bordering 
on northeast Lebanon: Some IRL members living in the sector joined up 
with local militias that were defending several villages in the zone mainly 
inhabited by Lebanese Shiites and regularly targeted by the radical Sunni 
opposition groups.11 The Hezbollah leadership therefore justified the IRL’s 
action by claiming that these were not troops dispatched there from Lebanon 
but instead were Lebanese residents in Syrian territory acting in self-defense.
A participation by the IRL in combat between the regime and the oppo-
sition in Syria that proved to be true and was acknowledged by the party 
took place in late May 2013. Syrian rebels battled IRL fighters backed by 
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regular Syrian forces for three weeks at Qusayr, which the opposition had 
taken several months earlier. It was a ferocious face-off, with the two sides 
reporting casualties in the hundreds.12 The number of fighters who took 
part is difficult to establish: Media reports had from 3,000 and 6,000 rebels 
fighting the Syrian army, reinforced by an IRL contingent of 3,000 to 4,000 
men according to French authorities, of 1,500 men according to Hezbollah, 
of a few hundred according to other Lebanese sources.13,14
The Syrian army and IRL won a decisive victory in early June: The lat-
ter’s intervention especially is credited by observers of all persuasions as the 
decisive factor enabling the regime to prevail. The Syrian army previously 
had been mired for weeks in low-intensity fighting with the rebels without 
achieving a positive outcome.
The justification put forward by the Hezbollah leadership for this first 
intervention of its kind on Syrian territory alludes to a concern at the progress 
by radical jihadists in the border zone of a key region for Hezbollah—the 
region of Baalbeck al-Hermel in the North Bekaa—and the growing fre-
quency of their attacks on Shiites both on Lebanese and Syrian territory.15 
Fearing to see them advance deeply into the (Shiite) Lebanese zone, the IRL 
had no choice but to launch a blitz designed to push them back far enough to 
restore calm and security on both sides of this sensitive part of the border.16 
Thus, Hezbollah portrays the IRL intervention not as an offensive but as a 
defensive move. This argument seems to comport with the fact that if the 
IRL intervened in Qusayr and Homs, both very close to the Shiite Bekaa, it 
did not penetrate deeply to Aleppo, a city located far from the border.17 Fear 
of a massive presence of anti-Shiite radical fighters at the gates of northeast 
Lebanon justifying the need to make the Homs area a secure zone emerges 
genuinely enough from the accounts by IRL fighters to withstand scrutiny 
and offer a reasonable explanation for the choice made by the IRL’s leader-
ship to go into battle, for the first time in its history, on national territory 
other than its own. But evidently it is not the only explanation.
The most plausible interpretation of the IRL involvement in Syria there-
fore remains one of two converging interests. The Syrian regime, by retaking 
the Qusayr and Homs region, “unblocks” the two great transport and traffic 
routes linking Damascus to the country’s northwest, including the coast; at 
the same time, it renders access to the Sunni part of the Lebanese Bekaa more 
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difficult for the rebels that, since 2011, have established a rear area resupply 
and rearming base there. The IRL’s participation in the fighting in Syria 
appears above all to reflect its own interests; it is less about an attempt at 
saving the Syrian regime than anticipating the eventual adverse repercussion 
on these same interests from Bashar al-Assad’s fall. Let it be recalled that the 
modalities of the strategic alliance that govern Hezbollah’s relationship with 
Damascus since the early 1990s consist mainly of facilitating the logistics of 
transporting IRL weapons coming from Iran across Syrian territory. In all 
probability, these arrangements would not be sustained in case the Syrian 
regime falls, as the opposition groups, while unquestionably divided, are 
united in their aversion toward the Iran–Hezbollah tandem. Thus, the party 
cannot expect the fruitful cooperation with the Assad regime that it still 
benefits from today to continue forever. It is highly likely that the IRL and its 
Iranian mentor will have to resign themselves to getting their fingers burned 
in the rearrangement of relationships of Syria’s internal powers, but, a well-
thought-out finessing of the new order may allow them to preserve their main 
assets in spite of it. Thus, they will not have to be welcome on all of Syrian 
territory; a stable and secure sanctuary will suffice, provided that it pos-
sesses certain logistics facilities. Already the sectarian Syrian geography seems 
to present in the northwest—mainly Alawite and Christian, hence doubly 
favorable to Baath regional preferences—a natural prime territory where the 
IRL and Teheran can reestablish a presence and functioning organization: 
precisely the space that stretches between the Syrian coast and a line drawn 
through Damascus–(Qusayr)Homs–Aleppo. The IRL’s armed intervention 
in the region therefore seems to respond as much to a preventive self-defense 
reaction as a securing ahead of time of part of a zone where the IRL may be 
obliged, for a more or less long term, to confine its logistical maneuvers on 
Syrian territory.
In foreign policy terms, this engagement by the IRL on the ground does 
not prevent Hezbollah from supporting the Lebanese Government’s policy of 
dealing with the Syrian crisis by officially distancing itself from it. Split like 
this, the party’s foreign policy may seem contradictory, but the two positions 
are nonetheless complementary. On the one hand, the IRL tries to save a part 
of the regime of a strategic ally out of fear of a new power, secular or religious, 
that is equally intent on cutting off the support that Assad provided to the 
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IRL, perhaps even to entertain good relations with Israel. On the other hand, 
as it always has, Hezbollah tries to prevent domestically an explosion, both 
ideological and confessional, the party having always categorized the civil war 
as a framework conducive to weakening the IRL. To prevent this, keeping the 
government in a more or less neutral position appears necessary for maintain-
ing calm on the domestic scene—and so, by extension, not exposing the IRL 
even more than it already is.
Judging by the Syrian conflict, Hezbollah does not therefore appear to 
have rearranged its priorities, utilizing all the leverage available to it in defense 
of the IRL. After having resorted for years to a discourse of justification 
focused on the necessity of not detracting from its primordial and necessary 
role in protecting the national territory against all attacks from the south, 
Hezbollah in its argumentation on the Syrian crisis quite logically connected 
the fall of Assad and the Israeli threat. Rhetoric and real strategic option 
naturally are not to be confused, but one constant emerges: If the IRL for the 
first time in its history attacks a non-Israeli, extra-Lebanese enemy, and for 
the first time outside its national territory at that, Hezbollah, for its part, does 
not change. The IRL’s interests come before all else, and the dividends that it 
may collect by detaching itself and redefining itself as a mere political party, 
would seem small change compared with doing right by the original mission.
Notes
 * The publication of this article was made possible thanks to support by The 
Institute for the Transregional Study of the Contemporary Middle East, North 
Africa and Central Asia (TRI), Princeton University, USA.
 1. Practically speaking, Hezbollah’s dependence on the Iranian Government for 
weapons hardly lets the party be insensitive to “suggestions” addressed to it by 
the former.
 2. The first because of disinterest in a possible Lebanese option and the second 
because of what appears to be a definite confidence in the party leadership. For 
more detail, see Aurélie Daher, Hezbollah, Mobilisation et pouvoir [Hezbollah, 
Mobilization and Power], Paris, PUF, Proche-Orient, 2014, Chapter 3.
 3. For a more detailed report on the hostage affair, see Hala JABER, Hezbollah, 
Born with a Vengeance, New York, Columbia University Press, 1997.
 4. In the summer of 2013, the European Union decided to list Hezbollah’s “military 
wing” as a terrorist organization. Although France would already have decided 
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to do so following the participation by the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon (Irl) 
in the battle of Qusayr in Syria (see below), the official reason advanced for 
the condemnation is the terrorist attack perpetrated in Bulgaria in July 2012 
against an Israeli tourist bus. However, in the summer of 2013, the inquiry was 
not yet closed, and the trails seemed to lead nowhere. For more information on 
the international political stakes in the so-called “Bourgas” affair, see Aurélie 
DAHER, Le Hezbollah, mobilisation et pouvoir, op. cit., chapter 10.
 5. The Syrian army no longer wars against the Israeli army in Syria since the Yom 
Kippur war of 1973, even though Tel Aviv’s troops occupy the Golan since 
1967.
 6. Going as far as supporting the renovation of Jewish places of worship in the 
very center of Beirut and to receive with honors non-Zionist personalities, 
intellectuals, or Jewish clerics. Among them were Noam Chomsky, received 
by Hezbollah’s leadership with honors in 2006 and 2010, Norman Finkelstein 
in 2008, and several rabbis from the Neturei HaKarta movement in 2005 and 
2012.
 7. Elizabeth Picard, Liban, État de discorde [Lebanon, State of Discord], Paris, 
Flammarion, 1988, pp. 198–9.
 8. From the start of the fighting between Israel and the IRL in July and August 
2006, the French government tried to obtain a cease-fire. A contrario, the 
American, British, and German Governments for more than a month opposed 
a cessation of hostilities for fear it would cause the Israeli offensive to fail.
 9. To repeat the phrase used by a Hezbollah parliamentary deputy. (Interview, 
2007.)
10. “Nasrallah sera tenu responsable de ses actes ‘devant les tribunaux révolution-
naires’ syrien, avertit l’ASL,” L’Orient-Le Jour, February 1, 2012.
11. This region is an atypical case. The borders between Lebanon and Syrian never 
having been officially and accurately traced left some paradoxical pockets 
between the two, such as that of Qusayr with close to thirty villages (about 
30,000 people) that, despite being populated by Lebanese citizens, is situated in 
Syrian territory. In the absence of any sovereign protection, Lebanese as well as 
Syrian, the inhabitants organized self-defense militias to face attacks by certain 
Sunni opposition groups.
12. “Maʿrakat al-Qusayr: Nuqtat al-tahawwul,” Al-Akhbâr, May 20, 2013; Barluet, 
Alain, “Syrie: des cargaisons d’armes russes arrivent ‘tous les deux jours,’” Le 
Figaro, June 22, 2013; El-Hassan, Jana, “4,000 Hezbollah Fighters Reach Rebel-
Held Aleppo: FSA,” The Daily Star, June 4, 2013; Cohen, Gili, “Thousands 
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of Hezbollah Troops Fighting, Hundreds Killed in Syria, Study Confirms,” 
Haaretz, June 5, 2013.
13. Interview of Hezbollah cadres, May 2015.
14. “La situation est ‘désespérée’ à Qousseir,” L’Orient-Le Jour, June 3, 2013.
15. Since 2011, numerous incidents and attacks ascribed to the Syrian opposition 
Free Syrian Army or jihadist groups are regularly reported from the Lebanese 
Bekaa (Shiite) bordering the Syrian frontier.
16. Paradoxically, it would thus have favored the same strategy as the Israeli army 
in 1978 when it set up a buffer zone in South Lebanon that it “cleansed” of all 
armed Palestinian presence in the hope of stopping the launching of rockets on 
northern Galilee and preventing incursions into Israel by Palestinian fighters 
from Lebanese territory.
17. Reports from on the ground seem to show that the IRL fighters in the main were 
content in Aleppo to take on an advisory and training role for regime troops; 
only a few among them would have sporadically supported the regular forces.
142 | the foreign policy of islamist political parties
7
Identity of the State, National Interest, and 
Foreign Policy: Diplomatic Actions and 
Practices of Turkey’s AKP since 2002
Jean-Baptiste Le Moulec and Aude Signoles
The commonly held view of Turkish foreign-policy action in both European and American political and media circles is that it changed 
radically with the coming to power in 2002 of a government they label as 
“Islamist.” Specifically, it is the foreign policy of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP)1 Government that they depict as breaking with the ideological 
Atlanticism that successive (republican) governments had adopted since the 
end of the Second World War. The “break” would have proceeded equally 
from the fact that Turkish diplomatic actions would henceforth look to “the 
East,” including the Middle East,2 in being guided by an Islamic thread would 
present as a right-thinking “paternalism” a strategy of Empire that dare not 
say its name (the famous “neo-Ottomanism”3)—which to some meant that 
the Turkish foreign policy action was “Orientalizing,” even “Islamizing” at 
the same time that prospects for a rapid entry into the European Union were 
receding.
These Western representations can also be found in the academic lit-
erature that, in recent years, regularly made the study of AKP foreign policy 
toward the Arab world its subject.4 By themselves, such perceptions say 
more about the actors who contribute to spreading them than the action 
frameworks and contexts that play a role in crafting Ankara’s diplomatic 
positions. They seek to discredit the AKP Government’s external action by 
reading them through the sole prism of the religious and cultural variable. 
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What is more, they have the effect in Europe of producing a diffuse fear of 
Turkish activism abroad that reinforces the rejectionist positions on, and 
reactions to, this country’s candidacy for entry into the European Union. 
This highly politicized reading is also shared by the Turkish elites who were 
in place before R. T. Erdogan took power. The former, mostly belonging to 
the so-called “secular” current, accuse the AKP—and hence the “Islamo–
liberal–conservative” current5—of interring, in the name of a pan-Islamic 
Brotherhood and ties of a common legacy culture, the state’s modernity and 
secular identity that they are attached to.6 For their part, the AKP leaders 
present their foreign-policy actions as acting to “repair” connections with 
the regional, especially Arab, environment that ruptured when the Ottoman 
Empire crumbled.7 Therefore, they consider their directions as “innovative” 
and as “breaking” with what came before.
All these points of view on Turkish foreign-policy actions since 2002 
ultimately say little about the protagonists at work, the representations of the 
national interest that they bring to their self-perception, or about the aspira-
tions and strategic goals pursued. This article, therefore, aims to conduct an 
in-depth analysis of the foreign-policy agendas that Ankara brings to the 
international scene since the turn of the twenty-first century, particularly 
in the Arab world. The deliberate emphasis put on the relationships Turkey 
weaves with its Arab neighbors should not ignore the global vision advanced 
by the Turkish state in international precincts by multiple diplomatic means. 
Nor should it obscure the fact that it carries on an active policy of influencing 
the Turkish-speaking populations of Central Asia in the now independent 
former Soviet Republics (Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and so forth) as well as in 
the Balkans.
However, the focus of Turkish diplomacy on the “Arab” agenda is jus-
tified as simply a matter of circumstance in that it specifically translates 
the ambition of a state whose position as geographical pivot where Europe 
borders on Asia has lost its strategic relevance in the post-Cold War context. 
Approaching it in this way also permits examining the evolution of Turkey’s 
partnerships with the United States and the Atlantic Pact on the one hand 
and the European Union on the other. Starting from there will require stat-
ing how the government of R. T. Erdoğan has attempted to restore Turkey’s 
geopolitical role. What are the domestic and international policy stakes at the 
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heart of his “reformist” undertaking? On what theoretical foundations has 
it rested and in what respect can its major lines provoke acts of “rupture”? 
What actor-types are invested in it and in what manner, considering that tra-
ditionally the army and the executive power have monopolized this domain. 
Finally, how have Turkish foreign-policy actions been reshaped in light of the 
Arab revolutions and, especially, of the Syrian crisis? Conversely, how will the 
political uncertainties that weigh on the fate of the Arab regimes in transition 
lead the AKP Government to reconsider its role and eventual leadership in 
the region?
The theoretical approach opted for here is that of the constructivist 
current in international relations theory, which pushes the study of the con-
nections between a state’s identity (changing over time), national interest 
(multiple and variable according to the actors), and the foreign-policy orien-
tations (not fixed and sometimes competing). To accomplish this, we studied 
what is—or becomes—the object of security for the AKP leadership since 
their taking power, but also against what they must guard against as they see 
it. Next, we turned our attention to the actors of Turkey’s “Arab” policy, as 
well as the interdependencies woven between the areas of political, economic, 
and cultural power. One of the aspects that strikes us as the most determina-
tive is the relationship between the producers of knowledge about the Middle 
East (within the framework of a true institutionalized community of experts) 
and foreign-policy decisions. Lastly, we addressed the means of intervention 
and diplomatic tools deployed by the actors of the Turkish-Arab rapproche-
ment, by way of also describing specific cases of cooperation empirically. The 
methodological approach blends sociological interviews, direct observations, 
public discourses, and grey literature.
Understanding the “Arab” Agenda of the “New” Turkish Diplomacy. 
Between State Voluntarism, Strategic Contingencies, and 
Transformations of Relations with the Alterity
Putting Turco-Arab relations into a historical context shows that the atten-
tion paid by the Turkish state to its near abroad has been systematically 
nourished by public debates erupting over the question of the visibility of 
religion and the role of Islam in political life. Still, if a priori there are strong 
links between the orientation of successive governments and their diplomatic 
turkey’s  akp s ince 2002 | 145
priorities, an ideological reading does not suffice to explain the active engage-
ment by R. T. Erdoğan’s government with the Arab world. In point of fact, 
the international system in which the states operate places constraints on the 
autonomy of the actors. It is therefore necessary to resituate foreign-policy 
action measured against the international and regional balance of power exist-
ing at the moment the AKP took overy the government in 2002. Moreover, 
the structure of the international system also influences the identity of states, 
namely how they portray themselves and others. Yet, starting from 2003, 
the AKP Government has wished to distinguish itself from its predecessors 
by formulating its own foreign-polic doctrine whose specifics it forges on 
the discursive level while on the level of actions per se its initiatives reprise 
some that were conducted during the time of the Özal Government. For this 
reason, we also take into account the perceptions that contemporary Turkish 
society develops with regard to its neighbors—especially bordering ones.
“Restoring” Turco-Arab Relations: The Uses of History as Instrument of Foreign 
Policy
Since taking office in 2002, and once again with their second term beginning 
in 2007, the AKP leadership promotes links based on geographical solidarity 
in order to justify and legitimize the idea of a necessary rapprochement with 
the Arab neighbors. This utilization of history, which leads them to refer 
to a heritage in order to justify a foreign-policy position, is constantly very 
“present in the public discourses on foreign policy and the official discourse 
legitimizing them.”8 It is true that “any government upon installing itself 
inherits previous decisions which constrain its own action.”9 In Turkey, 
however, the Ottoman heritage is not invoked traditionally as a reference 
in justifying an international position. The imperial period for a long time 
even seemed to be treated more as a “foil”—particularly from the perspective 
of political and military forces that contributed to fashioning the national 
identity and establishing Turkey’s political legitimacy as a nation-state that 
is recognized and stable within its borders. The “new thing” here thus comes 
from choosing to reference a past that for a long time has been troubling 
in order to favor an—Islamic—identity that has been arbitrarily denied, 
distorted, even hidden and rejected.10 However, it is not the first time that 
a political force has seized on the Ottoman past to burnish it and employ 
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it as an instrument of international action in the “Arabo-Islamic” world, 
and certainly also not that Islam—as a system of religious referencing and 
civilizational space—has been brandished as a shared universe of meaning for 
orienting choices and diplomatic decisions on the ethical or ideological plane. 
In fact, Islam has already been given pride of place on four occasions since the 
founding of the Republic11 by governments concerned with basing a national 
identity on it capable of influencing the course of foreign relations.
The first steps toward a Turco-Arab rapprochement were taken from 
1950 to 1960 by the government of Adnan Menderes and his Democratic 
Party (DP).12 It was Menderes and his party who, in these first days of the 
Cold War when Turkey occupied a strategic position due to its kilometers 
of shared border with the USSR, chose Atlanticism and drew closer to the 
United States, and worked toward the country’s membership in the Atlantic 
Pact13 (achieved in1951), and then the Baghdad Pact14 (signed in 1955). 
The  military and strategic alliance woven between Turkey and Iraq thus 
allowed the Western bloc to check the territorial expansion of the Soviet 
“enemy” in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. This choice of alliance was 
informed by the tense diplomatic relations between Turkey and the USSR 
since Ankara had opted for neutrality during the Second World War.15 But it 
is also explained by a strong anti-Communist feeling within the Democratic 
Party. Indeed, while the Soviet regime prohibited and combated any reli-
gious practice, the DP, in contrast, contributed to the introduction of an 
Islam-focused religious rhetoric in official political discourse and focused 
on Islam, seeing to it that religious practice would be increasingly tolerated 
in the public sphere. It was one of the very reasons why the Turkish armed 
forces overthrew the Menderes Government in 1960. After the military 
coup d’état, Turco-Arab diplomatic relations “chilled” again as military 
regimes carried by “leftist” national forces affiliated with the USSR took over 
in Syria and Iraq.16
The détente of the 1970s, coinciding with a series of decisive events,17 
offered the coalitions led by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, composed of 
members from the National Salvation Party (MSP) of Necmettin Erbakan 
(a group that insisted on the Islamic referent and extolled “disalignment” 
with the West),18 the opportunity for a new rapprochement with the Arab 
countries. Détente between the two blocs let Turkey adopt a more concilia-
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tory attitude with the Arab countries that, in part, are supported by the USSR 
but are no less majority Muslim. Therefore, under the MSP’s leadership, 
the government openly threw its support behind Yasser Arafat’s Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) established in 196419 and reconnects with 
Egypt when Cairo adopts a more pro-American policy after Nasser’s death. 
The MSP membership and the government of B. Ecevit also multiply their 
demarches toward the Gulf states (including Saudi Arabia) starting with 
the 1973 “oil shock,” in order to secure the country’s hydrocarbon imports 
whose financing put an increasing strain on the national budget.
The 1980 military putsch led to the fall of the B. Ecevit government, 
accused by the military high command of creeping “reIslamization” of soci-
ety, then followed by the takeover of the government by the army’s general 
staff (MGK) headed by General Kenan Evren. It also led to the promulgation 
of a new constitution that is a milestone in Turkey’s political history by 
inspiring the promoters of the current called “Turco-Islamic synthesis,”20 that 
would have put the Turks in charge of sustaining the Islamic civilization after 
the Arabs. This new constitution confers a religious legitimacy to the military 
regime, as the latter tries to rally the people to its side. Prime Minister Turgut 
Özal, elected president (1983–9/1989–93), is the first to operate within this 
new constitutional framework with the aim of (re)initiating a policy of rap-
prochement with the Arab sphere. This policy translates into the conclusion 
of commercial trade pacts with hydrocarbon producers. In parallel, T. Özal 
pursues the strategic line of his Kemalist predecessors that makes anchoring 
Turkey in the West a matter of national security. It is also by virtue of this 
well-understood alliance of interests with the United States that he chooses to 
enlist Turkey in the international coalition that, from Washington, declares 
war on Sadam Hussein’s Iraq.
Finally, on the foreign-policy front, the years 1996 and 1997, during 
which N. Erbakan and his National Salvation Party (MSP) furtively reem-
bark on the path to power in coalitions with the Democratic Party (DP), led 
to a burgeoning of cultural projects carried out by private foundations often 
linked to the Fetullaci movement21 and targeting Muslim populations—
notably Turkish-speaking ones in Central Asia22 and, on the domestic side, 
for the adoption of measures seeking to “moralize” the public sphere. The 
“pro-Arab” bent of Turkish diplomatic actions, however, is abruptly stopped 
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by the leaders of the “post-modern” coup d’état of 1997,23 declaring openly 
“that the Turks don’t need to be Arabized.”
Studying these four historical experiences, during which the Turkish 
leaders gave impetus to diplomatic initiatives toward the Arab world, allows 
nuancing the AKP’s “break” discourse while underlining how difficult it is 
to “disconnect” Turkey’s “Arab” agenda from the domestic political issues—
particularly those involving identity. It would not be necessary, however, to 
put these diplomatic experiments of the years from 1960 to 1990 on a parallel 
with those conducted during the years 2000 under the leadership of the AKP 
Government. Indeed, the intensity of exchanges, the kind of actors involved, 
but also the modes of action promoted, contribute to this agenda appearing 
as potentially “foundational” for a regional order in  transformation—within 
which Turkey would have a major stabilizing role. We can therefore call 
it a difference of degree and of nature with the foreign policies initiated 
previously.
Turkish Diplomacy in a “World Turned Upside Down”24
The period inaugurated by the fall of the Berlin Wall is particularly propitious 
for the redefinition of national interests because the “bipolar” dimension of 
interstate relationships tended to lessen with the military and ideological 
“enemy” having vanished. The change in the international context in the late 
1990s initially confronted Turkey with a situation of strategic insecurity.25 
Indeed, Ankara wondered which geostrategic role to continue playing within 
NATO when the Soviet enemy had ceased to be and Washington pondered 
the future of the Atlantic Pact. While it was very quickly reassured of the 
interest that its position took on in the American view,26 rifts did open up 
between the two sides on how to read international relations and, more to the 
point, on the definition of “common threats.” In spite of a genuine American 
interest in relaunching a strategic partnership with Turkey,27 the post-9/11 
bilateral relations resembled a “dialogue of the deaf.” In fact, even while both 
the Turks and the Americans made “the fight against terrorism” a priority, 
differences arose in their strategic documents about the contours of the new 
“enemy.” For the United States, it had changed radically—the strategic and 
ideological enemy represented by the Soviet Union had been replaced by an 
enemy both multifaceted and labile that knew how to battle the values of 
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“Western civilization” (including freedom American-style) by metapolitical 
means. In contrast, on the Turkish side, the disappearance of the Soviet 
foreign enemy did not lessen the power of the “domestic enemy”—namely, 
the PKK,28 and all the Kurdish movements firmly established in South East 
Anatolia—not even that of their allies.
On the other hand, the end of the bipolar world led to a “displacement 
of the center of gravity in Turco-American relations from Eurasia to the 
Middle East”29—the attacks of September 11 only accelerated this process. 
The AKP assuming power took place in this context, which quite radically 
transformed the foreign policy of the United States in the Middle East. 
Indeed, while successive American governments until then had sought to 
maintain the territorial and political status quo to ensure that no single state 
in the region would emerge as a hegemonic power, G. W. Bush and his 
advisors henceforth made regime change one of the policy tools for fighting 
“Islamist terrorism.” Because it draws direct causal connections between Arab 
regime authoritarianism, the (suspected) presence of terrorists or weapons of 
mass destruction, and political instability,30 it buys into the idea that regional 
stability and international security can only be guaranteed by building a 
“greater democratic Middle East.” In this context, several states, so-called 
“rogue”, find themselves caught in the American administration’s sights—
with Iraq, Syria, and Iran, three countries bordering Turkey, at the head of 
the line. However, this new aggressive and “warmongering” American line 
puts the Turkey of R. T. Erdoğan in a bind. In fact, Turkey continues to have 
a vital stake in preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity—putting in question this 
state’s unity is perceived as risking (re) energizing Kurdish separatism strongly 
entrenched in the country’s north31 and resurgent since the mid-1990s.32 This 
is the reason why, in 2003, when the United States under G. W. Bush called 
for a “preemptive” military intervention against Iraq, the government played 
the card of alliance with Syria, Iraq, and Iran (countries with large Kurdish 
minorities whose nationalist aspirations they are also trying to “tame”) and 
tries to organize a regional consultation to prevent the Americans resorting 
to war—but in vain. The vote of the Turkish parliamentarians, who vote on 
March 1, 2003 against the deployment of American troops on the national 
territory must therefore be read as a sign of the autonomization of Turkish 
foreign policy vis-à-vis its American ally—even though the Turkish prime 
150 | the foreign policy of islamist political parties
minister had previously acquiesced in principle to the United States on this 
very point.
Thus, the change in the structure of the international system (with a 
bipolar world transformed by an aggressive American unilateralism) limits 
the Turkish Government in redefining its American partnership as well as 
relations with its “near abroad.” Even so, Turkey’s autonomization with 
respect to the United States should not be thought of as a break in the alli-
ance any more than an “Islamization” or a “(re)Orientalization,” so much 
do the foreign-policy stakes remain unchanged for Ankara in the post-Cold 
War period—namely, preserving the political and territorial stability of the 
Middle East.
Paralleling this, another regional political factor helps explain the 
autonomization of Turkish foreign-policy action relative to the “Western 
bloc”—and that is the European dossier. While Turkey is officially a can-
didate for joining the EU since the Helsinki European conference in 1999, 
with many reform “packages” adopted by the Turkish Parliament to har-
monize national legislation with European directives33 by 2004 and with 
negotiations for admission having started in 2005, perspectives for an end to 
the process deteriorated as Brussels’ reservations on integrating Turkey were 
asserted more and more openly and assumed to be such, notably on the part 
of the Franco-German “power” couple.34 The 2008 global economic crisis 
that severely impacted Turkey also contributed to Turkish entrepreneurs 
looking for development potential and investment perspectives outside the 
EU’s borders. This politico-economic context explains why, from 2010 to 
June 2013, neither the Europeans nor the Turks felt compelled to pursue the 
membership negotiations.35 However, negotiations did resume in October 
2013 with a focus on regional politics and this despite European criticism 
of the suppression of anti-government demonstrations that took place in 
Istanbul and many other Turkish metropoles starting in the spring of 2013.
All these factors led the Turkish AKP Government henceforth to follow 
a “multidimensional” policy aiming both for diversification of its strategic 
alliances on the regional level and for gaining influence and visibility on the 
international level.
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State Identity and Relationship to Alterity at Issue
Turkish diplomatic dynamism with regard to the Arab world in the first 
decade of the 2000s results from political voluntarism coupled with the 
necessity of (re)making sense of the country’s geostrategic position in a world 
in flux. It is accompanied by a multiform discourse intended to promote the 
image and action of Turkey on the regional scene and by fielding a cultural 
diplomacy.36 The “Turkish model” figure of speech contributed to modifying 
the state’s social identity in the eyes of the elites and political society that 
carry it, just as it did the Arab rulers and actors who adhere to it. In fact, the 
state’s identity is largely the result of a process of intersubjective construc-
tion.37 In this case, as the upholders of the constructivist current stress, this 
identity ranges across “corporate, type, role, and collective identities.”38
If the corporate identity relates to characteristics that make the state a 
full actor on the international scene (marking of borders, retaining a physical 
monopoly on legitimate violence, and so forth) and may thus antedate the 
interstate system, this is not the case with the other three kinds of identity 
that are constructed and are “negotiated” in the relationship to the Other.
In the Turkish case, the “type” identity—which relates to internal char-
acteristics of the state but also to the manner in which these help determine 
how states are “labeled” on the international scene—is subject to particularly 
rapid and structural transformations starting from the end of the Cold War 
and, once again, from the first decade of the 2000s on. These transformations 
are largely attributable to the waves of economic reform starting in the early 
1980s given impetus by the S. Demirel Government (with T. Özal working 
the levers), later deepened by the government of T. Erdoğan in the sense of 
liberalizing trade and opening the national markets to foreign investments.39 
These changes are equally linked to the adoption of new political measures 
that contribute to the development of state of laws and guarantee freedoms of 
expression in Turkey. But, beyond the content of the reforms, what matters is 
the way in which the surrounding Arab governments and populations portray 
as “positive” the capacity of Turkey to transform itself. Public statements that 
make Turkey into a “model” thus dwell on its seventeenth place in the world 
economic rankings or again its admission to the exclusive club of G20 mem-
bers. The 6 percent growth rate that the country resumes shortly after the 
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2008 international financial crisis also contributes to the social fabrication 
of the Turkish economic “miracle” in Middle Eastern perceptions. At the 
same time, the regime’s democratic character (testified to by holding regular 
elections and the progressive separation of the army from Turkish political 
power) coupled with successive electoral victories by the AKP cause a number 
of those living in the region not only to think of Islam and democracy as 
compatible but as equally virtuous. It must be said that the government of 
R. T. Erdoğan, which identifies itself as “conservative democrat” and rejects 
the “Islamist” label, is eager to appear as a party with respect for the rules 
of pluralism—and therefore as resolutely “modern” and “European”—in a 
context where, on the contrary, his opponents accuse him of “Islamizing” the 
state identity and taking the country (back) down the road of “archaism” and 
“tradition.” Finally, the depiction of Turkey as both Muslim and democratic 
imposes itself as constitutive of the state identity, as much with the national 
populations (although this is a debatable definition) as with Arab popular 
opinion.
As for the “role” identity of the Turkish state, which relates to the “pri-
orities that characterize a state in the perceptions of others and which causes 
the other states to expect it to behave in a certain way relative to them [and] 
that it takes on a certain role internationally”40 also experiences a notable 
reconstitution starting in the early 1990s and, yet again, with the AKP’s 
assumed power. Indeed, during the Cold War, the Arab states—including 
the “progressive” camp aligned with the Soviet Union—quickly classified 
Turkey as a regional ally of their American “enemy” (as they did the state of 
Israel).
What they have primarily remembered about Turkey, therefore, is the 
role if played as strategic “pivot” for the Western bloc and its hegemon, 
the United States. However, this image of a “NATO’s forward pawn in the 
region” is challenged starting in 2002 by a whole series of diplomatic posi-
tions advocated by the government of R. T. Erdoğan—which are seen from 
outside the country and especially the Arab world as “breaking” with the past.
In the academic sphere, but also in the affected “civilian societies,” the 
seminal “gesture” attaches to the refusal of the Turkish Parliament to involve 
the country in the military attack against Iraq that the Americans were pre-
paring in March 2003. During the second AKP term (2002–7), it is the posi-
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tions it takes favoring Palestine and being hostile toward the state of Israel that 
accentuate the idea that Turkey from now on is a country “no longer aligned 
with the West.” Appeals to political reconciliation and for exchanges with the 
partisan, economic, and cultural actors of the Arab countries advocated by 
the Turkish prime minister’s team, as well as diverse actions taken within this 
framework, give substance to the hypothesized change of diplomatic direc-
tion. They also substantiate the thesis of co-construction of a new identity “of 
type” around partnership and Turco-Arab mediation.
Finally, also developing from when the AKP takes power is the “collec-
tive” identity, “which relates to a state identifying with the interests of another 
to the point where it integrates them in the definition of its own national 
interest.”41 Indeed, the Middle East region experiences rapid adjustments in 
the existing equilibrium balance of power, starting with the September 11, 
2001 attacks and, once again, with the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
In this kind of environment, Turkey’s ambitions turn regional, to the extent 
that the country’s security is endangered by changes in the domestic order 
affecting the leaderships, regimes, and neighboring states—starting with 
S. Hussein’s Iraq. From then on, for the ruling elites in place, assuring the 
country’s security no longer means just seeing to the national defense; it also 
consists of reducing the risks to the surrounding, especially the bordering, 
states, from compromising the nation-state’s own fate. These twin concerns 
of security and stability, both economic and political, implies that the leader-
ship of the Turkish state takes “an interest [in] the reduction of conflicts with 
and within other states.”42 From this flowed new foreign-policy tools that 
turned Turkey into a power that portrays and imposes itself as a “mediator” 
of regional conflicts by the use of “preventive diplomacy.”
Does the AKP Promote a Strictly Islamic World View? State Identity, 
National Interests and Foreign-policy Goals
Posing questions about the Turkish state’s identity is not trivial if we pos-
tulate that “identities are at the root of interests.”43 Thus, what are the key 
values that the AKP leadership wants to promote?
The answer presents itself first in the form of a defense white paper 
[Strategic Depth. Turkey’s International Position].44 Declassified in 2001, 
this  programmatic text was authored by a university scholar, A. Davutoğlu, 
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a well-known theorist in the international relations field, close to two of 
the movement’s top leaders—Prime Minister R. T. Erdoğan and President 
(from 2007 on) A. Gül. Turned into a book and translated into many 
languages,45 this text quickly became a best-seller in Turkey as well as in the 
Arab world where its author is often found promoting it (meanwhile, R. T. 
Erdoğan has become president of the Republic, while A. Davutoğlu took the 
prime minister’s post in 2014). However, the intent here is not to reduce 
the AKP’s diplomatic action toward the Arab world to the sole doctrinal 
views of its “mentor,” as much as these are “molded” by the interpretation 
of actors who seize on it, diffuse it, and make it into a required reference. 
Thus, the government fleshes out its political voluntarism with leading actors 
who do not directly emerge from the diplomatic or military field to take 
an active part in its doctrinal corpus. In fact, a number of experts from the 
academic world, corporate chieftains, associated militants, or members of 
religious Brotherhoods participate in giving concrete form to the “new” 
Turkish foreign-policy action at the grass roots and, by so doing, make it 
simultaneously a unifying and catalyzing axis.
The Davutoğlu Doctrine of Foreign Policy or Expanding the Notion of 
National Security
The starting point for the book-opus by “Professor” A. Davutoğlu46 is the idea 
that contemporary Turkey has the potential to assert itself and be considered 
a major power on the international scene—including in the region—but that 
this is not yet the case.
Among the power factors invoked, he cites: geography (explicitly refer-
encing Turkey’s position astride different continents and at the crossroads 
of several cultural zones); history (invoking the Ottoman past, even holding 
it up as a “golden age” to serve as a benchmark for the current era); the 
economy (pointing to his country’s “takeoff” and repeat double-digit growth 
rates); political stability (a source of pride for the AKP after several decades 
marked by successive coups d’état); military strength (exemplified by an 
army with a solid reputation in the region as well as the external NATO 
“umbrella”); the collective identity (subject of multiform and competing 
definitions in the past that the AKP is trying to reconcile—with difficulty), 
as well as the political voluntarism and the capacity of elites to conceive 
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of, project, and impose a foreign-policy strategy and actions. Taking off 
from there, two orders of explanation are advanced to rationalize Turkey’s 
strategic weakness on the international scene of the 1990s: on the one hand, 
an underutilization of the country’s power capacities by previous govern-
ments and, on the other, a self-perception coupled with a representation of 
the Other—notably, its Arab neighbors—not highly thought of and even 
negative (what A. Davutoğlu calls the “psychological background”47).This 
way, the “professor” in essence attacks the strategies of deterrence and threat 
minimization, but also the conception of the national interest as the secularist 
parties conceived it before. In fact, beyond the ideological rivalry between 
them, the Islamo–liberal– conservative strain and the secular strain are dif-
ferentiated by their conception of the state identity and their definition of the 
national interest.48
Indeed, the secular current’s strategic doctrine (born of the War of 
Independence of 1919–22 and progressively imposed on the political elites 
and on society as a whole by the military “establishment”) perceives the 
national interest exclusively in security terms. The major aim is therefore the 
inviolability of borders, which is guaranteed by constituting (and maintain-
ing) a deterrent capacity. Concern over the territorial status quo therefore 
guides Turkey during the Cold War. It is translated by a façade of neutrality 
until 1952, and then by Turkey’s entry into NATO and leads to a kind of 
“isolationism,” or, at least, of distrust of the attitudes and geostrategic choices 
of the neighboring states. This “obsession with security” resulting from what 
Mümtaz Soysal calls the “Sèvres syndrome”49 is also translated by the imposi-
tion of an aggressive nationalist discourse that defines the contours of national 
identity in not very inclusive terms—especially when it comes to ethnic and 
religious minorities. It also harks back to manufacturing a menace described 
as capable potentially of emerging from the country’s “interior”—nourished 
by the existence of competing social and political movements, of which 
some have secessionist claims that organize the national chessboard and, in 
particular, the political life in certain regions of Southeast Anatolia starting 
in the late 1950s.50 Lastly, the Cold War alliance with the United States and 
Europe reflects the will to provide the populations a cultural model and—
Western—ideological references for them to follow. Beyond this observation, 
the mentor of the “new” foreign policy doctrine proposes a palliative solution 
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for the lack of heft and recognition for Turkey on the international scene. In 
concrete terms, A. Davutoğlu suggests that Turkey should gradually open to 
the external world, starting with the closest bordering neighbors, by weaving 
relations of mutual trust with them that would permit securing the Middle 
Eastern zone, assuring the state’s survival with respect to its territorial integ-
rity and helping to change its image for the better.51 Therefore, the time for 
isolationism or neutralism is over. Building on this, A. Davutoğlu defines 
three “contiguous basins” in which to expand Turkey’s influence and by so 
doing recapture the old imperial glory: the “contiguous land basin” (Balkans, 
”Middle East,” and Caucasus), a “contiguous maritime basin” (Black Sea, 
Adriatic Sea, Western Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Caspian Sea), and 
the “contiguous continental basin” (Europe, North Africa, South Asia, and 
West-Central Asia). This “rediscovery” of former Ottoman spheres of influ-
ence should also allow complementarities of an economic order to emerge 
for the benefit of the region’s national populations. Conceived in this way, 
national security is also enhanced by non-military aspects that put the accent 
on possessing the attributes of economic power (for example, trade volumes) 
or political power (for example, ability to influence regional geopolitics). In 
addition, even the term “national security” is progressively put aside and 
replaced by new official jargon, such as the famous expression “zero problems 
with the neighbors.”
Does this means that the army is sidelined when it comes to foreign-
policy decisions as the AKP consolidates its power at the head of the state? 
Certainly, the National Security Council led by high-ranking military men 
no longer has a monopoly on the decision-making process since 2002, so 
much do the presidency with A. Gül, the office of the prime minister with 
R. T. Erdoğan, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with A. Davutoğlu take 
a hand in directing diplomacy on questions linked to the Arab world, rely-
ing in the process on posted ambassadors, high functionaries, and select 
Parliamentary deputies.52 However, the observed process reflects expanded 
contours of national security with new, non-military stakes carried by “new” 
players.
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The Actors in the Turco-Arab Rapprochement of the 2000s
Compared to previous eras, the Turkish foreign policy under the AKP 
governments is devised and carried out by a multitude of players whose 
spheres of activity increasingly interlock. Economic entities, political parties, 
humanitarian organizations, research and teaching institutions, designated 
representatives of ethnic and confessional minorities, development NGOs, 
or also cultural actors all go international with projects requiring research, 
sojourns, communications, partnering, and networking of knowledge and 
competencies. Since 2002,53 this plurality of actors finds itself taking part 
in official delegations that accompany regular visits by R. T. Erdoğan and 
A. Davutoğlu to the Arab world.
If the media and academic literature often puts the accent on the role 
of economic actors in the matter, little attention is paid, by contrast, to the 
actions of “knowledge producers” regarding the Arab world. However, this 
action turns out to be crucial. In fact, when Stratejik Derinlik came out in 
2001, the Counselor for Foreign Affairs A. Davutoğlu had no inkling of its 
future success despite the fact that he already enjoyed some notoriety within 
the AKP and the academic milieu he came from.
In the beginning, he relies on academic colleagues to publicize his new 
diplomatic line and spread word of the new report to the world and to the 
alterity his book is about. The latter largely relay his thoughts by elevating 
his program-book to a “manual” of international relations.54 Some go fur-
ther by participating in the production through their research and teaching 
activity of “scholarly” knowledge about political societies in the Arab world. 
The public universities, beginning with Marmara University (in Istanbul) 
where A. Davutoğlu is tenured, but also Bosphorus University (Istanbul) or 
the Middle East Technical University (Ankara) beginning in the mid-2000s 
establish teaching and research tracks in the social sciences dealing with the 
Middle East.55 The same goes on at some private universities, such as Bilkent 
University in Ankara, or, in Istanbul, Fatih or Şehir universities (the latter 
founded in 2008 by the same A. Davutoğlu) that see in this niche a means 
of gaining a comparative advantage in a sector where there is a plethora of 
offerings.
Involvement by universities in the “fabric” of foreign policy is practically 
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unheard of in Turkey. In fact, it responds to a call by the minister who advo-
cates the creation of “research centers, academic institutes capable of pursu-
ing regional studies.”56 For A. Davutoğlu, the Turkish state owes it to itself 
to set up a panel of “autochthonous” knowledge of Middle Eastern political 
societies in order to better conduct his aimed-for policy of “restoring” Turco-
Arab ties. This is his reason for obtaining financing for the first Turkish 
research on the Middle East (also, more marginally, the Persian world) by 
public authorities as well as private actors.57 With this, the  scholars—and, 
more specifically, the professors of international relations—became fully 
engaged actors in the “pro-Arab” direction of the government by acting as 
“advisors to the Prince.” Taking an increasingly key role in elaborating the 
foreign policy,58 they develop an expertise for the purpose of informing, 
orienting, and stimulating foreign-policy choices, as well as those of other 
players engaged in developing ties with the Arab world. Turkey’s national 
interest thus no longer is to ignore the Other; rather, it consists of getting to 
know the latter by accumulating knowledge about it so as to better grasp its 
foreign-policy “habitus” and anticipate its behaviors with regard to Turkey 
and third-party states.59
Outside the university precincts, research on the Middle East also has 
grown for more than a decade in think tanks like TESEV, SETA, USAK, 
ORSAM or SDE.60 These private institutes, with the status of foundations 
or associations, devote the major part of their activities to publishing studies 
on the Middle East.61 In part, they operate by sub-contracting the analytical 
work to university faculty. Benefiting from public subsidies that sometimes 
amount to more than half of their respective budgets,62 these institutes also 
finance their activities with advisory assignments to private entrepreneurs 
prospecting and investing in Arab lands.
Private entrepreneurs are actually most visible in the “new” AKP policy 
for the Arab world where they see a means of securing and diversifying sources 
for national economic growth at a time when the European economies are in 
crisis. They therefore especially commission expert reports that let them eval-
uate the “country risks” but also the level of available resources in the various 
neighboring states. Two employers’ organizations in this regard appear to be 
the favored instruments for the Turkish policy of “conquering” the Middle 
Eastern markets: On the one hand, there is MÜSIAD63 formed in 1990 
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by a network of Anatolian businessmen close to the “Islamic conservative” 
current and, on the other side, there is TÜSKON64 founded in 2005 in the 
orbit of the Gülen movement.65 In this territory, they eclipse TÜSIAD,66 the 
other large employer association that started the network of close economic 
relationships woven with Europe by Turkish entrepreneurs identified with 
the secular current. Although involvement by these associations in the region 
is not new, since they were already on the ground during the Özal years 
(mainly in the Gulf countries and Northern Iraq), they nevertheless possess a 
novel character. In reality, the economic activities they engage in are directly 
“connected” with the government’s “pro-Arab” diplomatic agenda and have 
simultaneous political aims as much as economic ones. Thus, depending on 
individual cases and negotiated partnership agreements, promoting freedom 
of trade and movement by the Turkish import–export companies must con-
tribute to regional economic development, the fight against poverty, political 
stabilization, or the promotion of human rights and democracy. As a result, 
MÜSIAD and TÜSKON participate in numerous consultative meetings 
on the future of the Middle East that bring together business people and 
politicians close to the AKP. These two employers’ associations are also very 
active in international economic associations, such as the Mediterranean 
Association of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry or the Islamic 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, but also DEIK, the (national) Platform 
of Foreign Economic Relations that stand for the idea that strengthening the 
private sector and liberalizing trade contribute to regional political stability. 
For these associations, therefore, as for the government, promoting regional 
commerce is an important key to political peacemaking in the Middle East.
Thus, since the first decade of the twenty-first century, political and 
economic actors close to the AKP rally around the “Davutoğlu doctrine” 
to redefine the contours of the state’s identity and the national interest and 
to make the Arab world the priority target for a “pluridimensional” foreign 
policy.67 Beyond that, they agree on the tools likely to promote their world-
view and regional ambitions and, in this regard, innovate by advocating the 
use of so-called levers of public diplomacy.68
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Regional Ambition and New Action Instruments: Peace through Trade 
and Mediation
Since the AKP took power, the Turkish state has sought to project itself as 
a key state in the Middle East—meaning that it is able to exert influence on 
the regional environment—rather than as a pivotal state playing the part 
of forward outpost of the United States in the area. In the Arab people’s 
perspective, the 2003 Iraq war, as we have seen, marked an evolution in 
Turkey’s strategic positioning. The Turkish Government at the time under 
the leadership of the Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Davutoğlu actually put 
forward geographic and historical characteristics (which he called “strategic 
depth”) to justify its new ambitions. “Ankara [then] ‘distances itself’ from the 
classic realist concepts of international relations such as ‘power,’ ‘balance of 
power,’ or ‘zero-sum game’ [and] tries to … evolve its approach … [by seek-
ing to] move beyond the historical conflicts that for a long-time handicapped 
[its] relations with the Arab world.”69 The Turco-Syrian rapprochement as 
the twentieth turned to the twenty-first century is a good example of the 
AKP’s new diplomatic line, designed to bring stability and security to the 
region through improved ties with the Arab countries, especially the border 
states. Beyond that, the quest for “zero problems with the neighbors” leads 
the leaders in office to work on transforming conflicts by establishing a 
relationship of interdependence with the close-by and the more remote envi-
ronments. The conclusion of bilateral economic pacts and, in a wider sense, 
the development of sectoral partnerships, work toward this. The Turkish 
state’s recurring involvements in conflict prevention abroad also testifies to 
a new—growing—ambition: aiming to appear as a builder of bridges and 
thereby a key actor for regional political stability.
Peace with the Neighbors: The Turco-Syrian Rapprochement of the First 2000 
Decade
The Turkish commitment to the foreign policy of “zero problems with the 
neighbors” is illustrated almost emblematically by the Syrian case. The dip-
lomatic rapprochement between the two countries, engineered during the 
late 1990s before the AKP came to power, revved up during the 2000s, 
legitimized by the Turkish elite largely by references to the past and shared 
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culture. The recourse to Ottoman history, that the Turkish and international 
media made much of as an indicator of the “Islamization” of Turkey’s foreign 
policy, must nevertheless not obliterate what is essential—namely, the use of 
tools of technical and economic cooperation for settling political differences. 
Ankara and Damascus drawing closer illustrated the new Turkish strategy of 
economic peace promoted by the AKP Government—at least until the “Arab 
revolutions” of 2011.
Until the end of the 1990s, many factors made for conflict between Syria 
and Turkey and were sources of a permanent state of tension. Historically, 
they stemmed from diverging readings of the Ottoman past (in the early 
twentieth century, with the emergence of Syrian and Turkish nationalism); 
from territorial disputes revolving around the province of Alexandrette (called 
Hatay in Turkish); from ideological differences linked to Cold War logics 
(Baathist Syria siding with the USSR and Turkey siding with the United 
States); from conflict over sharing the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates 
(which was heightened during the 1980s); or, finally, from misunderstand-
ings about Turkey’s policy toward Israel (especially after the signature of a 
bilateral military-related accord in 1996).70 But it was especially the Kurdish 
question that cast a shadow over diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. In fact, “until the late 1990s, Turco-Syrian relationships were at 
their lowest … [on account of] the support rendered by the Syrians to the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party … a Kurdish nationalist organization in a state of 
rebellion against the Turkish state since the early 1980s.”71 Here, the Kurdish 
problem is more precisely correlated with the division of the Euphrates river’s 
water that flows from Turkey into Syria. Starting in the mid-1970s, Turkey 
launched a huge development plan for Southeast Anatolia—an economically 
marginalized region largely peopled by Kurds—that entailed the building of 
numerous dams. However, a direct consequence of this project, designated 
by the acronym GAP (Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi), was that it dimin-
ished Syria’s usable water resources downstream. The Damascus regime then 
decided to sanction Turkey by financing and sheltering the PKK on its terri-
tory—including its top leader, Abdullah Ocalan.72 Throughout the 1990s, the 
Kurdish rebellion, with its rear bases in Syria, regularly took on the Turkish 
armed forces stationed along the border as well as in Southeast Anatolia. The 
number of dead and wounded soldiers but also civilians aroused widespread 
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indignation in Turkey. Several attempts to resolve the conflict were made 
from 1987 to 1996 and several treaty protocols were signed providing for an 
end to Syrian support for the PKK in return for Turkish guarantees of water 
flow, but none of this had any concrete effect on the ground.
This context of “suspended crisis” explains why, on the Turkish side,73 
Syria would progressively be perceived as a major security threat. It is also 
behind the break in diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1996 
and it led Ankara to threaten the military option in 1998. Damascus rapidly 
gave ground before the deployment of Turkish troops on the border. This 
showdown ended with the signing of the Adana protocol, in which Syria 
committed to no longer support the PKK and to stop sheltering A. Ocalan.74 
From then on, and even more so with the AKP taking power, relations 
between the two countries were on the upswing.75
The thaw between the two countries in the 2000s is in large part imput-
able to regional considerations and, particularly, to the Kurdish problem in 
Iraq. It so happened that the latter country’s Kurdish population enjoyed 
growing political autonomy in the wake of the occupation by the American 
military in 2003 and the fall of the regime of S. Hussein.76 However, these 
populations are primarily settled in the north in the border region with Syria 
and Turkey. Their autonomist demands (and, in particular, their advocacy 
for a decentralization law) revive fears in Ankara and Damascus of once again 
seeing demands arise for constituting an independent Kurdish state. The two 
states, quite to the contrary, plead for maintaining the territorial integrity of 
Iraq and share a common opposition to the integration of the city of Kirkuk 
in the territory of Iraq’s northern region—while the latter, for its part, calls 
for an Iraqi regional Kurdistan Government.77 The Kurdish problem, which 
had been the source of violent conflicts between the two countries in the past, 
thus was the origin of the post-2003 Turco-Syrian rapprochement. It took on 
the traits of a veritable partnership at a time when the stakes in post-Saddam 
Iraq’s political reconstruction saw the views of the two former rivals converge. 
Bashar al-Assad’s diplomatic visit to Turkey in January 2004, followed by 
the Turkish prime minister coming to Syria in December that same year, 
inaugurated a new era. First, the Syrian president accepted the idea that the 
Hatay region was an integral part of Turkish territory—which the state that 
he represented had refused to do since 1939. The two parties also agreed that 
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the question of the water sharing had to be addressed in common and should 
not obstruct their diplomatic relations. To accomplish this, they opted to 
set up a tripartite technical committee (including Iraq, equally concerned as 
a downstream country) whose task would be preparing and implementing 
projects to help meet the three countries’ immediate needs. The problem 
of one or another party’s sovereign rights respecting the waters of the Tigris 
and Euphrates78 thus is left unresolved, not even squarely faced; rather, it is 
sidestepped in the hopes that rectification would “dissociate” itself from the 
political questions to which it is linked until then, namely those of Hatay and 
the Kurds. Treating the contentious dossiers piecemeal rather than globally 
and emphasizing their technical rather than their political dimensions consti-
tutes a new way for the two parties of handling conflict—one especially pro-
moted by the AKP leadership. This strategy allows them to bypass the “heavy” 
conflicts and the resort to the balance of political power (or “hard power”), 
betting instead on the establishment of common and sectoral authorities for 
managing problems. Cooperation in economic matters has the same aim. 
In this domain, Syrians and Turks signed a free-trade agreement in 2004 
(taking effect in 2007) with the goal of boosting bilateral exchanges by lifting 
visa requirements, followed by creation of a (joint) Strategic Partnership 
Council79 (in 2009). The accelerating take-off of commercial and industrial 
exchanges between the two countries benefited Turkey in particular, making 
it “the number one [foreign] investor in Syria and an essential business 
partner for Damascus” in the years from 1998 to 2009.80
For Ankara, at stake in the rapprochement with Damascus is a better 
ability to “penetrate” the entire Arab Orient for selling its products (nota-
bly in Iraq) while shrinking its commercial dependence on the European 
Union. It is also specially designed “to boost its influence in the region, 
more particularly on dossiers relating to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict or 
the Lebanese issues.”81 For its part, Syria sees in the rapprochement with 
Ankara a way out from being “blacklisted” by the United States which, in 
the post 9/11 context, views the Bashar al-Assad regime as offering potential 
support to jihadist groups. However, the American threats of excluding it 
from the international sphere became more intense82 after the assassination of 
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, which the Syrian regime was 
accused of instigating. Thanks to Turkey’s intervention, Damascus appears 
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to be an approachable and reliable regime. The diplomatic rapprochement 
of the two parties is, on balance, therefore more vital for Syria than for 
Turkey—explaining, no doubt, that the agreements arrived at (on Hatay and 
water, especially) on the whole answer more to Ankara’s security concerns 
and demands.
This power disequilibrium in Turkey’s favor on both political and eco-
nomic levels is far from being a constant in the “new” relationships that 
Ankara knits with its Arab neighbors. On the contrary, quite frequently, the 
exchanges are to Turkey’s detriment. This is particularly so in the case of 
the business partnerships that it negotiates with the large petro producers in 
the region. This touches on a key element in the AKP’s policy of “economic 
peace.”
The Energy Challenge at the Heart of the AKP’s “Good Neighbor” Policy
Since the 1970s, geo-economics is a driving element of Turkish foreign 
policy toward the Middle East.83 Indeed, the oil shock of 1973, manifested 
by a rapid increase in hydrocarbon prices, led the Turkish Government on a 
search for business partners in the region. In exchange for purchasing gas and 
oil, Turkey there and then negotiated special access to jobs in construction 
and public works as well as food processing. Iran and Iraq but also Saudi 
Arabia are its key targets. This exchange of processed goods allowed Turkey 
to reduce the bill for its hydrocarbon purchases, even if its overall trade 
balance remained deeply in deficit. During the 1980s, the modernization of 
the Turkish economy, linked to the opening of domestic markets to foreign 
investment and an industrialization policy linked to the production sector 
brought with it a significant increase in energy requirements. This situation 
pushed the Özal Government (1983–93) to upgrade the economic partner-
ships initiated earlier. Ankara’s neutrality in the Iran–Iraq War (1980–8) 
let the leaders at the time supply themselves from both sides. If the political 
challenge is always to ensure that the hydrocarbon bill does not burden 
the national budget excessively, it is also—in a context of externalizing the 
national economy—to offer outlets to its own entrepreneurs, in particular 
those from cities in central Turkey (Kayseri, Konya), called the “Anatolian 
Tigers” that carried the “Islamic-Conservative” current to power.84
The AKP’s economic policy after 2002 accentuates this direction for 
turkey’s  akp s ince 2002 | 165
Turkish economic exchanges. The free trade agreement with Syria in 2004, 
the forging of economic ties with the regional Kurdistan Government in 
Northern Iraq starting from 2008–9,85 the dynamics of investment in Libya 
beginning in 2003, or yet again the organization of the first Turkish-Arab 
world economic forum in Ankara in 2005 testify to the growing will of 
Turkish entrepreneurs as well as of the political leadership that negotiates the 
association agreements and “entry” conditions for business people in foreign 
countries to offer themselves new export perspectives in a context of growing 
globalization and structural fragility of the domestic economy because of 
its strong energy86 dependence and the then still lasting effects of the 2008 
European economic crisis.87
Three major oil producers profit to the hilt from this new Turkish activ-
ism in the Middle East: Libya, Iraq, and Iran. The economic exchanges 
with Tripoli consist mainly of oil imports against the opening of the Libyan 
building and public works sector (BTP). Until Khadafi fell in 2011, Turkish 
entrepreneurs constituted the second overseas market for building and public 
works in Libya. For its part, the abolishment of visas is why there are approxi-
mately 25,000 Turks in Libya in 2010 (of which a good part were “exfil-
trated” during the NATO intervention against the Khadafi regime).88 In Iraq, 
Turkey’s economic position asserted itself in growing fashion since 2003 
and the end of the oil embargo in sectors such as public construction, the oil 
and steel industries, or yet again in the food-processing industry, especially 
in the country’s north. Today, Turkey is the primary trade partner of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the leading investor in the area. 
A total of 740 companies and approximately 20,000 Turkish expatriates are 
settled throughout the country. Energy takes center stage: Turkey ranks fifth 
among importers of Iraqi oil, after Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and France, 
buying 25 percent of total national production.89 Finally, as concerns Iran, 
the economic exchanges are very asymmetric, since Teheran remains rather 
closed to foreign investors while Ankara buys some Iranian gas that covers 30 
percent of its annual energy requirements.90
Turkey’s “entry” into the Middle East must therefore be related to secu-
rity needs covering oil supplies rather than a calling into question of ties 
woven earlier with the West. It addresses evident energy worries that the 
discourse of “Islamic solidarity between Brother people” does nothing to 
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dispel. Two Turkish diplomatic strategies overlap from now on in the Arab 
world:91 on the one hand, research into the economic interdependencies, 
which lets Ankara affirm peace by trade and to reduce its oil import bill 
by procuring new trade outlets for its entrepreneurs and, on the other, the 
deployment of a multilateral diplomacy, with ambitions of aiding the preven-
tion, the transformation, or settling of regional conflicts. In both cases, the 
new strategies testify to an expansion of the security concept that, for the 
Turkish Government, no longer confines itself to just the national defense. 
Mediation notably implies the idea that it is necessary to assist in “settling 
foreign conflicts before they turn into destabilizing factors or military risk.”92
“Good offices” Turkish diplomacy or laying claim to regional leadership
Does the interventionism of the R. T. Erdoğan Government in the political 
conflicts rending the Middle East states aim to protect Turkey’s interests or 
buttress its seeming role as an indispensable player in stabilizing the region? 
Since 2002, Ankara strives to be promoted (and recognized) as a mediator in 
different conflictive regional dossiers, a tendency that was accentuated from 
2007 on during the current prime minister’s second term. There is no ques-
tion that the American military invasion of Iraq in 2003 had destabilizing 
effects on the entire Middle East. In an environment of renewed political 
violence, numerous Turkish mediations aimed simultaneously to build trust 
between adversaries to get them to the negotiating table, facilitate the passing 
on of messages, or again create perspectives for emerging from crisis. They are 
especially conspicuous in four hot spots:: Lebanon (and its Syrian “patron”), 
Palestine (and Israel), Iran (and the nuclear problem), and Iraq (and its 
sectarian tensions).
Bilateral relations between Turkey and Lebanon for a long time have 
depended on Turco-Syrian relationships, because of the political and military 
clout wielded by Damascus in the Country of Cedars, including during the 
post-civil war 1990s. These relations, however, were separated from the Syrian 
tutelage starting in 2004, with the beginning of official visits to Ankara by 
the Lebanese foreign affairs minister (Jean Obeid) and prime minister (Rafik 
Hariri), followed by the Beirut visit of Abdullah Gül, then Turkey’s minister 
of foreign affairs. It is true that the AKP Government played a decisive role in 
the Syrian decision to withdraw from Lebanon (accomplished in April 2005). 
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The assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (in February 2005), nev-
ertheless opens a period of uncertainty that keeps the Turkish Government 
from openly siding with its new Syrian ally. Indeed, the Bashar al-Assad 
regime is suspected of having instigated the attack, which causes the United 
States and European Union to launch an embargo and an international com-
mission of inquiry. The visit of Turkish president Sezer to Damascus, which 
he made despite criticism leveled by the American ambassador seconded to 
Ankara at the time, was thus made with the aim of clarifying the assassina-
tion’s circumstances but, especially, to assure the Syrian authorities of Turkish 
support. This involvement, however, is not totally criticized by Brussels and 
Washington, because it lets the Western powers hope for a deradicalization 
of the Syrian regime (even for its “reform” in the sense of democratizing its 
institutions) as well as distancing itself from its Iranian ally. On the Syrian 
side, this support, which keeps the regime from being “expelled” from the 
international scene, is taken advantage of to open negotiations with the Israeli 
Government led by Ehud Olmert.93 Turkey’s mediation, started in 2007; it 
nevertheless stalls two years later (while the negotiations were progressing 
fairly well) as a consequence of the large-scale Israeli military attack against 
Hamas in the Gaza Strip.94 R. T. Erdoğan was, in fact, rueful at having been 
left in the dark by Tel Aviv about its plans involving one of his regional allies, 
Hamas, affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood for which certain currents 
within AKP had an affinity. However, in 2006, Turkey was already involved 
in Lebanon as intermediary with Tel Aviv following the war started by Israel 
against the politico-military Hezbollah faction.95 The government of R. T. 
Erdoğan appeared to be both an agent for “pacification” (since it had sent 
an armed unit to reinforce UNIFIL, the United Nations peacekeeping force 
in place) and a favored go-between of the parties to the conflict (on the one 
hand, dissuading Syria from intervening in the conflict and, on the other, 
severely criticizing the Israeli bombardment).96
As for the Palestine dossier, R. T. Erdoğan’s Turkey first threw itself into 
mediation between the Palestinian and Israeli sides. It did so by facilitating 
contacts, passing on messages, and getting secure meeting places when the 
United States to some extent pulled back, focused as they were on the Iraq 
War. Then, starting in 2007–8, the government tried to lend a hand in rec-
onciling the two rival Palestinian factions of Fatah and Hamas.97 At the time 
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it had the ear of the Palestinian President M. Abbas and of Ismaïl Haniyeh, 
leader of the Islamists at a time when the latter resisted any mediation with 
provenance, either in the United States or the European Union, which were 
boycotting the government running the Gaza Strip. However, starting with 
the Israeli military operation “Plomb durci” (Hard Lead) of December 
2008–January 2009, R. T. Erdoğan ended the policy of neutrality and his 
government’s involvement in the Israeli–Palestinian negotiations (also the 
Israeli–Syrian ones mentioned earlier). He even regularly took overtly anti-
Israel positions publicly that made him a hero in the eyes of the region’s 
Arab populations. Such was the case, especially, at the Davos International 
Economic Forum in 2009, during which Erdoğan took Shimon Peres, the 
Israeli president at the time, thoroughly to task, exclaiming “just a minute” 
for not having been given a chance to excoriate the military occupation of the 
West Bank.
Following the Israeli assault on the Mavi Marmara (a ship under Turkish 
flag taking part in a humanitarian mission known as the “Gaza Flotilla”),98 
an operation that resulted in nine dead on the Turkish side—he called cease-
lessly for Tel Aviv’s apologies, sprinkling his appeals with clearly anti-Israel 
digressions.99 In so doing, R. T. Erdoğan looked less and less neutral to the 
Fatah political faction and its chief, Mahmoud Abbas. Thus, Turkey’s posi-
tion as mediator that it had occupied until then in the Palestinian national 
reconciliation process was weakened by the support rendered to its Hamas 
ally by the R. T. Erdoğan Government.100
In parallel, the Turkish Government plays an intermediary’s role in the 
nuclear affairs between Iran on the one side and the American and European 
chiefs of state on the other. It was called on to play a key mediating role in 
this matter because it maintains communications with all involved parties. 
Thus, in opposition to the official Washington and Brussels positions, it 
campaigned against the imposition of new economic sanctions that would 
further impoverish and radicalize Iran, all the while still seeking to slow 
the Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear potential. Playing off his privileged 
contacts with Teheran, the Turkish prime minister received the Iranian 
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2008 and went to Iran himself in 
2009.101 His efforts led to talks between Iran and the G5 in September 
2009 in Switzerland (which, however, do not meet with success). They do 
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demonstrate the Turkish Government’s capacity, in this dossier as in others, 
to establish its autonomy with regard to the immediate policy interests of the 
United States without irritating its transatlantic ally or, above all, without 
rupturing the alliance. It is therefore on the occasion of a UN Security 
Council vote in June 2010 that Turkey opposes Washington’s demand for 
tightening financial sanctions against Teheran.102
Finally, turning to Iraq, here Turkey is trying to pose as promoter of an 
even-handed policy toward the country’s different politico-sectarian factions. 
The R. T. Erdoğan Government for starters involved itself in negotiations 
on forming a national government following the parliamentary elections 
of March 2010. Two electoral slates finished “neck and neck” that held 
diametrically opposed visions for the Iraqi state: that of Nouri Al-Maliki, 
heading up and backed by voters of the majority Shiites and advocating the 
political marginalization of the Sunnis, and that of Iyad Allaoui, coming in 
second and with more Sunni support, calling instead for their reintegration. 
As it were, this was also Ankara’s position and so it successfully put pressure 
on Prime Minister Al-Maliki to integrate members of the opposition slate in 
his government. To the R. T. Erdoğan Government what matters is having 
the camp pushing for the idea of a unitary Iraqi state represented in the gov-
ernment and to raise its voice against the prime minister’s party that favored 
installing a federal state.
This “obsession” of the Turks with the preservation of the political and 
territorial unity of the Iraqi state (to counter the autonomization of northern 
Iraq and control of the revenues from oil fields located there) also led the 
government of R. T. Erdoğan to support the party of Moqtada al-Sadr, 
despite its anti-Sunni rhetoric, so long as it also advocated maintaining the 
territorial integrity of Iraq.103 By doing so, Turkey projects itself as a power 
capable of communicating with all the actors on Iraq’s political scene, unlike 
Saudi Arabia, which is viewed as pursuing a “Sunni agenda” and from Iran, 
accused of having a “Shiite agenda.”104
Conclusion
Given these elements, focusing on the blocking of Turkey’s accession to the 
European Union as decreeing the redefinition of the Turkish national interest 
due to an “Islamist” agenda appears to be wrong. It no doubt does constitute 
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a short-term setback for the government of R. T. Erdoğan, but it partakes of a 
complex causality arising from sociopolitical processes, internal debates, and 
economic realities in both parties so that reducing it to the “Islamist agenda” 
of the AKP is to render it unfairly.
What is more, confronted with the Arab “revolutions,” the tone in Turkey 
is progressively one of concern and disappointment. Originally attempting 
to diffuse, not without ambiguity,105 a discourse promoting dialogue and 
democratization, the R. T. Erdoğan Government progressively lets go of 
the lucrative friendship with Libya (in July 2011), and then “betrays” the 
preferential cooperation it maintained with the Syrian regime of B. al-Assad 
(from June 2011 on). Somewhat later, however, the victory of the Islamist 
an-Nahda party in Tunisia’s constituent assembly elections in October 2011, 
that of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood with the accession of one of their 
key personalities, Mohamed Morsi, to president of the Republic in June 
2012, (re)animated rhetoric of the “Turkish model.” In fact, the United 
States under Barack Obama, but also certain Arab “leftist” leaders, made 
AKPist Turkey into the political ideal to be followed, as the only one able to 
offer a government of the “moderate Islam” type capable of staving off the 
risks of radicalization by Islamist forces henceforth competing in societies 
roiled by “revolution.”106 This context contributes to the government of R. T. 
Erdoğan assuming a kind of regional leadership that is increasingly viewed by 
the Iranian political leadership and the Shiite leaders in the Arab Near East 
as a mode of defending the Sunni world. But the prolongation of the Syrian 
conflict, the violent repression of its people, the number of civilian victims 
but also of refugees thronging makeshift camps on the Syro-Turkish border 
prompted the Turkish leaders—and especially A. Davutoğlu—to support the 
rebellion openly, to call for a regime change in Syria as well as to urge military 
intervention by the international community in the conflict. This “exit” from 
neutrality is read as a sign and admission of the failure of the AKP’s vaunted 
“zero problems with neighbors” policy by the major Turkish opposition 
leaders (including the secular camp), the military High Command (even if it 
is divided on the question), and a growing fraction of public opinion.
The AKP’s foreign policy thus is confronted by a fairly radical challenge, 
seeing that the Arab countries with which relations have developed the most 
since 2003 are also the ones whose regimes were overturned or are violently 
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conflicted. At the same time, the “Gezi Park” protests that took place in the 
center of Istanbul in May 2013 that violently opposed diverse former opposi-
tion or ad hoc movements against AKP partisans (and the police) weakened 
the ruling government’s legitimacy and that of the state.107 The (multiform) 
protests all tended to question the model of the state being formed that, as 
we have seen, underwent profound changes in ten years and not without 
provoking major sociopolitical fractures. Thus, while throughout the Turkish 
Republic’s history, interest in the Arab world went hand in hand with 
attempts at redefining the national identity as violently opposing Islamist 
and secularist currents, the Arab revolutions and Syrian crisis brought with 
it a change of internal fault lines. In fact, the Turks who rejected the AKP 
also rejected all aspects of its foreign policy and even though what happened 
at Gezi in June 2013 caused them to focus their critiques on the “failings” of 
democratization, many of these opponents seemed to view what they called 
“setbacks” in the Middle East as that much more proof of the futility of the 
Davutoğlu and Erdoğan policy.
What is more, the fact that the AKP Government should have developed 
intensive relations with now deposed regimes tells some opposition com-
mentators108 that this should enlighten the Turkish public on the real nature 
of the AKP’s democratic ambitions. Moreover, even within this party, those 
favoring its non-involvement in the Arab world would be numerous starting 
in late 2012 and would today wish for A. Davutoğlu’s departure if not that of 
R. T. Erdoğan. The close think tanks themselves seem to have recommended 
caution, but have not been heeded on this point.109 On the contrary, we are 
witnessing an ebb in the cooperative links established ten years earlier—a 
retrograde surge orchestrated by the political power itself—or even an insti-
tutionalization of de facto highly conflicted situations. In other words, the 
secularist camp going forward opposes the AKP Government’s intervention-
ism in the Arab world, all the more openly as it is no longer either friendly or 
cooperative like it was from 2003 to 2011.
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Question], Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 1997. See also A. Mango, Turkey 
and the War on Terror. For Forty Years We Fought Alone, London/New York, 
Routledge, 2005.
 29. Ö. Taşpinar, “La relation turco-américaine à l’épreuve du Moyen-Orient” 
[Turkish–American Relations Put to the Test in the Middle East], in D. 
Schmid (sub. ed.), op. cit., p. 152.
 30. Philippe Droz-Vincent, Vertiges de la puissance. Le moment américain au 
Moyen-Orient [Giddy with Power. The American Moment in the Middle East] 
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[The American Moment in the Middle East], Esprit, 2005, no. 5, 150–63.
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 32. With the Cold War over and following the Gulf War (1990–1), the rigidity 
of the Turkish authorities in refusing to recognize the cultural identity and 
administrative autonomy of the country’s approximately 20 million Kurds 
incited many young people to join the PKK and relaunch the guerilla conflict.
 33. Other than abolishing the death penalty, the AKP quickly moved to reduce 
the army’s role in political life. This party also sought to reform the judicial 
institution by, for example, suppressing special jurisdictions, and launching a 
reform of the criminal code.
 34. Two major elements contributed to sustain a deteriorated climate between 
Turkey and the EU: Cyprus and the Kurdish question. On the one hand, the 
recurring tensions between the Cypriot, but also Turkish and Greek govern-
ments, reached a climax during the Cypriot presidency of the European Union 
(in the second trimester of 2012). On the other hand, the AKP Government’s 
policy toward the Kurds, called the “outstretched hand” initiated in 2006, 
aimed to open negotiations with the PKK and to envisage a political resolution 
to the armed conflict. This approach fizzled and hostilities resumed from 2011 
to 2013 before opening new talks, “the Imrali process,” named after the prison 
where Abdullah Öcalan was being held. The whole initiative was nevertheless 
aborted in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis. Ankora’s regional policy seems to 
be majorly determined by its will to annihilate the PKK and avoid the consoli-
dation of a unfied Kurdish territory on its borders with Syria and Turkey.
 35. One of thirty-five chapters was concluded and eight were blocked, by reason 
notably of the Turkish refusal to sign a free trade agreement with the Twenty-
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 36. Until the AKP came to power, cultural diplomacy was more or less the privi-
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 38. According to A. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 1999, p. 233, 
quoted in D. Battistella, op. cit., p. 155.
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economic policy—which the army’s high command approves. See J.F. Pérouse, 
La Turquie en marche, les grandes mutations depuis 1980 [Turkey on the March, 
the Great Changes since 1980], Paris, La Martinière, 2004.
 40. D. Battistella, op. cit., p. 155.
 41. Ibid., p. 157.
 42. I. W. Zartman, “La politique étrangère et le règlement des conflits” [Foreign 
Policy and Conflict Resolution], in F. Charillon (ss. ed.), Politique étrangère. 
Nouveaux regards, op. cit. [Foreign Policy. New Looks], p. 275; emphasis 
added.
 43. After A. Wendt, quoted in D. Battistella, op. cit., pp. 152–3.
 44. See A. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth], 1st edition, Istanbul: 
Küre Yayınları, 2001.
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 46. Ahmet Davutoğlu was the Turkish minister of foreign affairs from 2009 to 
2014. Before that, he was special advisor to Prime Minister R. T. Erdoğan, from 
2000 to 2003. A former professor of international relations at the University of 
Marmara (Istanbul), he is also one of the founding members of the University 
of Şehir (Istanbul) and Science and Culture Foundation (a kind of after-hours 
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J. B. Le Moulec, “Le Professeur qui a voulu révolutionner la politique étrangère 
turque” [The Professor who Wanted to Revolutionize Turkish Foreign Policy], 
April 4, 2013, http://ovipot.hypotheses.org/8642 and also G. Zengin, Hoca: 
Türk Dış Politikasında “Davutoğlu Etkisi” [Professor: The “Davutoğlu Effect” 
on Turkish Foreign Policy], Istanbul, İnkilâp, 2012.
 47. In Turkish: Psikolojik arkaplan.
 48. C. Karakas, Turkey: Islam and Laïcism between the Interests of State, Politics and 
Society, Frankfurt, PRIF (Peace Research Institute Frankfurt), 2007.
 49. Leonore Martin in Lenore G. Martin and Dimitris Keridis, The Future of 
Turkish Foreign Policy, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 2004, p. 41.
 50. This especially concerns the Alevi. For the Kurds, the collective demands for 
political autonomy, even self-determination, are organized later, at about the 
start of the 1960s in Iraq and after 1978 and the creation of the PKK relative 
to Turkey.
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given to Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu in 2004, also is a symbolic event in this regard.
 52. S. Magued, La politique arabe de la Turquie depuis 2002 comme une dimension 
de sa gestion régionale au Moyen-Orient [Turkey’s Arab Policy since 2002 as a 
Dimension of its Managing the Middle East], PhD thesis in political science 
(spv. dir. G. Groc), Sciences Po Aix-en-Provence, 2012.
 53. Interview with S. E. Özdem Sanberk, Istanbul, April 2013.
 54. This is the case in certain academic enclaves: G. Zengin, Hoca: Türk Dış 
Politikasında “Davutoğlu Etkisi” [Mentor: The “Davutoğlu Effect” in Turkish 
Foreign Policy], Istanbul, Inkilâp, 2012, p. 81.
 55. By doing this, they defy the prohibition on Arab language courses that the 
military high command issues at the start of the “postmodern coup d’état” 
of February 1997. See A. Sencer, “Changes in the Domestic Politics and the 
Foreign Policy Orientation of the AK Party,” in M. Lenore and D. Keridis, op. 
cit., pp. 243–75.
 56. A. Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik [Strategic Depth], 1st edition, Istanbul, Küre 
Yayınları, 2001, p. 453.
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 58. Interview with Nuray Mert, Istanbul, November 2012, Burcu Gültekin 
Puntsmann, Ankara, January 2013.
 59. However, there can be no talk, in our opinion, of a “new Orientalism” regard-
ing the Turkish knowledge-production enterprise for the Middle East and the 
Ottoman past, so much so are the attempts at a mental re-appropriation of the 
Middle East region and of the Ottoman past by means of an effective policy of 
presence, which are two dimensions of the same policy that the AKP did not 
manage to reconcile. Certainly, there is an editorial mode effect, by virtue of 
which scientific and literary publications, as well as televised productions on 
the subject of the Ottoman empire, “pollute.” In addition, the AKP elites often 
use geographic terms used during the Ottoman empire to name geographic 
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taking into account that they glorify the Ottoman past during official trips that 
they make to their immediate neighbors. But rewriting Ottoman history for 
public opinion is debatable—and not just inside the university community—
and it is suddenly far from appearing to be consensual.
 60. TESEV (Turkish Foundation for Political and Economic Studies), SETA 
(Foundation for Research in Politics, Economy, and Society), USAK 
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journalists, and/or pundits publish works on the Middle East, ranging from 
career narratives (for example, Cengiz Çandar, a reporter for Radikal, consid-
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governments dating back to T. Özal; see C. Candar, Mezopotamya Ekxpresi, 
Bir Tarih Yolculuğu [Mesopotamia Express: A Voyage into History], Istanbul, 
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Middle East] Istanbul, Destek Yayınları, 2012. The author comes from Syria. 
From the start of the Syrian conflict, he pronounced himself in favor of the B. 
Al-Assad regime, convinced that the rebellion would lead to civil war and not 
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 62. Such is the case with the more dynamic organizations like SETA and USAK, 
mostly financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Presidency of the 
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(close to theAKP). This employer’s association has not yet set up a permanent 
representation in the Arab world, it appears, although it has branched out to 
Europe and the United States for several years now.
 64. TÜSKON: Confederation of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (emerged 
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 65. See especially H. R. Ebaugh, The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a 
Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam, New York, Springer, 2010.
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1971 (close to the secular current).
 67. It is what A. Davutoğlu calls the “geocultural” dimension. A. Davutoğlu, 
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pp. 327–32 and pp. 452–3. The multidimensional aspect also implies the 
development of links between civil societies and pushing a policy of cultural 
influence via the media.
 68. Understood by this term, which is close to that of “soft power,” is the spread 
of a state’s national culture to a foreign society by means of cultural acts and 
institutions (including the media) and people-to-people exchanges.
 69. A. Sever, “Turquie/Syrie: de rapprochements en désillusions” [Turkey/Syria: 
From Rapprochement to Disillusion], in D. Schmid, op. cit., pp. 174–5.
 70. L. Mallet, “Les ambiguïtés des relations turco-israéliennes” [The Ambiguities 
of Turco-Israeli Relations], Sécurité mondiale [Global security], 40, ISI, 
Université de Laval, http://www.psi.ulaval.ca/fileadmin/psi/documents/
Documents/Securite_ mondiale/relations_ turco-israeliennes_ no_ 40.pdf
 71. A. Sever, “Turquie/Syrie: de rapprochements en désillusions” [Turkey/Syria: 
From Rapprochement to Disillusion], op. cit., p. 171.
 72. The Gulf Cooperation Council condemned Turkey and instead lent its sup-
port to Syria at the time of the GAP project. For Syria, the idea is for the PKK 
to destabilize Turkey, which would lead this state to make concessions on 
resolving the problem of the water as well as Hatay.
 73. It involved President Süleyman Demirel and his prime minister, Mesut Yilmaz.
 74. Shortly thereafter, the Kurdish leader was expelled from Syrian territory and 
arrested when he fled to Kenya.
 75. Attendance by the Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer at the funeral for 
President Hafez al-Assad in 2000 augured a change of course in bilateral 
Turco-Syrian relations.
 76. In 2005, the newly adopted Iraqi constitution made it a federal state and 
instituted the Regional Government of Kurdistan in northern Iraq.
 77. The Kirkuk region is hydrocarbon-rich (containing 13 percent of Iraq’s petro-
leum reserves). Taking control of it would let the Iraqi Kurds have the financial 
means for the independence that some among them wish for.
 78. The difference on this point stemmed from the fact that Turkey considers 
the waters of the Tigris, Euphrates, and Orontes (in Hatay) as cross-border 
waters over which it exercises total sovereignty, but that it must share slightly 
with its neighbors downstream; Syria and Iraq, in contrast, consider them to 
be international waters, that is, over which they also are also able to exercise 
sovereignty.
 79. This council brings together the ministers of trade and economy of both coun-
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rail line and a joint bank (two projects practically still-born) or yet, more 
modestly, setting up Syrian consulates in Turkey—including at Gaziantep, in 
the Hatay region (until then rather marginalized) to develop commercial ties 
with the Aleppo region (especially in textiles).
 80. A. Sever, “Turkey/Syria: From Rapprochement to Disillusion,” op. cit., 
pp. 179–80. The volume of trade between Turkey and Syria rose from in the 
region of 773 million dollars in 2002 to approximately 797 million dollars in 
2006, and then to about 1.2 billion dollars in 2007, and approximately 1.8 
billion in 2009. Turkey imports a small amount of energy, agricultural pro-
duce, and textiles, and it exports more technology, metals, chemical products, 
minerals, electronics, and vehicles.
 81. A. Sever, “Turkey/Syria: From Rapprochement to Disillusion,” op. cit., p. 177.
 82. The US Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty 
Restoration Act in 2003, which called for the Syrian regime to withdraw 
from Lebanon and to cease its political, financial, and military support to the 
Lebanese Hezbollah faction.
 83. O. Baskın, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşindan Bugüne [Turkish Foreign 
Policy: The War of Independence Today] op. cit., pp. 793–4.
 84. D. Yankaya, La nouvelle bourgeoisie islamique [The New Islamic Bourgeoisie], 
op. cit.
 85. After the Turkish refusal to aid the American military invasion of Iraq when it 
opened a second front in 2003, Turco-American relations were imprinted by 
distrust concerning the Iraqi dossier until 2007. The Turks accused the United 
States of letting the PKK operate widely in the north of Iraq in parallel with 
the political autonomy that they granted to the Kurds settled in this part of 
the country. Starting in 2007, the Turks revisited their attitude regarding the 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) set up in 2005, thinking that the Iraqi 
Kurds constituted an unavoidable political force in the post-Saddam context 
(by the fact that they won 26 percent of the vote in the 2005 legislative elec-
tions). They therefore played the political-economic rapprochement card with 
the Kurds in Iraq, expecting that this would let them negotiate a political 
“opening” with the Kurds in Turkey. In 2008, several official visits took place 
on both sides, which amounted to a recognition of the KRG by the Turkish 
Government. A Turkish consulate was opened in Erbil, the KRG capital, in 
2010. J. Cécillon, “L’Irak, nouvel espace de déploiement de la puissance turque” 
[Iraq, New Space for Deployment of Turkish Power], in Schmid, op. cit.
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Saharan African countries was in response to the same need for diversifying 
export terrains and markets for national goods in return for access to natural 
resources and raw materials. The first Turco-African summit thus was organized 
in 2012 in Istanbul, with the aim of stimulating economic exchanges and to 
accompany the opening of F. Gülen schools just about everywhere in Africa. The 
creation of direct air connections between Istanbul and numerous African capi-
tals by the national air carrier Turkish Airlines during the second half of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century as well as of many Turkish embassies in Africa 
and African ones in Turkey witnessed to the AKP’s political voluntarism in this 
regard. See the doctoral thesis by Francis Boulou on the Turkish actors in for-
eign policy in Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa (spv. M. Tozy and A. Signoles), 
University of Galatasaray–Sciences Po Aix-en-Provence (in preparation).
 87. The AKP economic policy resulted in a ripple effect that brought a relatively 
strong decline in trade during the second half of the 2000 decade, despite 
the EU remaining Ankara’s number one economic partner. See the statistics 
by MOCI (Moniteur du Commerce International) (International Commerce 
Monitor), a French magazine that collects and puts out a weekly summary 
of all import–export related information). (http://www.lemoci.com/0122-412 
-EXCLUSIF-Les-statistiques-completes-du-commerce-exterieur-turc.html)
 88. R. Bourgeot, “Une réorientation de l’économie turque vers le Moyen-Orient?” 
[A Reorientation of the Turkish Economy toward the Middle East], in D. 
Schmid, La Turquie au Moyen-Orient [Turkey in the Middle East) op. cit.
 89. Ibid. and S. Magued, La politique arabe de la Turquie depuis 2002 [Turkey’s 
Arab Policy since 2002], op. cit.
 90. Ibid.
 91. For C. Sitzenstuhl, La diplomatie turque au Moyen-Orient. Héritages et ambi-
tions du gouvernement de l’AKP 2002–2010 [Turkish Middle East Diplomacy. 
Legacies and Ambitions of the AKP 2002–2010], Paris, L’Harmattan, 2011, 
these two strategies allow distinctions to be drawn between relations woven 
by Turkey with bordering states for one, and, for another, with those that tie 
it to non-bordering states. While this distinction has the virtue of clarity, it is 
not entirely relevant for the case of Iraq, to the extent that this frontier state 
is the object of a dual Turkish strategy since 2003 that is both political and 
economic.
 92. I. W. Zartman, op. cit., p. 275, in F. Charillon, Politique étrangère. Nouveaux 
regards [Foreign Policy. New Looks], op. cit.
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 93. International Crisis Group, Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and 
Constraints, April 7, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org, last accessed March 16, 
2013.
 94. A. Signoles, “Lendemains de guerre dans les Territoires palestiniens” [Aftermaths 
of War in the Palestinian Territories], in F. Charillon and A. Dieckhoff (eds), 
Afrique du Nord-Moyen-Orient, Paris, La Documentation française, 2010–11, 
pp. 49–63.
 95. B. Rougier, “La guerre d’Israël contre le Hezbollah et la défaite de l’État 
libanais” [Israel’s War against Hezbollah and the Defeat of the Lebanese State], 
in F. Charillon and A. Dieckhoff (eds), Afrique du Nord/Moyen-Orient, Paris, 
La Documentation Française, 2006–7, pp. 67–94.
 96. O. Baskın, Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşindan Bugüne, op. cit. [Turkish 
Foreign Policy: Independence Wars Today], pp. 781–96.
 97. From 2007 on, two rival governments existed side by side in Palestine: Hamas, 
which controlled all of the Gaza Strip, and Fatah, its power base in the West 
Bank. See A. Signoles, “Territoires palestiniens: la lutte Fatah-Hamas” [The 
Palestinian Territories: The Fatah–Hamas Conflict], in F. Charillon and A. 
Dieckhoff (eds), Afrique du Nord/Moyen-Orient, Paris, La Documentation 
Française, 2007–8, pp. 57–70.
 98. The “Gaza flotilla” was a humanitarian action carried out by international 
militant networks to transport by sea construction materials and food supplies 
to the Gaza Strip population as a way of breaking the economic blockade 
imposed on this territory since 2006. On the Turkish side, the humanitarian 
operation of the Mavi Marmara is supported by a humanitarian NGO, IHH 
(Insan Hak ve Hüriyetleri Insanı Yardım Vakfı) (Human Rights, Freedoms and 
Humanitarian Relief Foundation) that came out of the Islamic-conservative 
current. The Israeli attack, which took place in international waters, is widely 
condemned by the international community. It led to Turkish reprisals: The 
Israeli ambassador to Ankara was expelled and the military cooperation accords 
signed between the two countries in 1996 were suspended.
 99. Israeli prime minister B. Netanyahu publicly apologized to Turkey three years 
later, in March 2003.
 100. International Crisis Group, Turkey and the Middle East, op. cit.
 101. O. Baskın (ed.), Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşindan Bugüne [Turkish 
Foreign Policy: Independence Wars Today], op. cit., pp. 781–96.
 102. The G5 is made up of five permanent UN Security Council members, some-
times with the addition of Germany, in which case, it becomes the G5 + 1.
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holds are situated around Baghdad and that this region is poor in hydrocarbons.
 104. On Turkey’s involvement in Iraqi politics, see J. Cécillon, “L’Irak, nouvel 
espace de déploiement de la puissance turque” [Iraq, New Space for Deploying 
Turkish Power], in Schmid, op. cit., pp. 185–204.
 105. The “zero problem” policy with the neighbors openly flouted the dictatorial 
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 106. M. B. Altunisik, in D. Schmid, La Turquie au Moyen-Orient [Turkey in the 
Middle East]. op. cit., pp. 130–1.
 107. B. Montabone, “Droit à la ville et contestation de l’ordre moral urbain en 
Turquie” [Law in the City and Challenges to the Urban Moral Order in 
Turkey],” EchoGéo, October 10, 2013, http://www.echogeo.revues.org/13567, 
last accessed April 11, 2015; J. F. Pérouse, “Le parc Gezi: dessous d’une trans-
formation très politique” [Gezi Park: Under a Very Political Transformation], 
Métropolitiques, June 24, 2013, http://www.metropolitiques.eu/Le-parc-Gezi-
dessous-d-une.html, last accessed April 9, 2015; S. Weber, “Looking from 
the Side Lines: retours sur la Turquie de Angry nation et de Another Empire” 
[Returns to the Turkey of the Angry Nation and of Another Empire], EchoGéo, 
Vol. 25, October 10, 2013, http://echogeo.revues.org/13575, last accessed 
March 17, 2015.
 108. Additions: Kadri Gürsel (the author is also a commentator in the anti-gov-
ernment centrist daily Milliyet), “Turkey, Lonely Man of the Middle East,” 
Al-Monitor.com, July 15, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com, last accessed 
October 2, 2012. Akın Kenan, “İktidarın iflas eden Orta Doğu politikası! (La 
politique moyen-orientale du gouvernement en faillite)” [The Government’s 
Failing Middle East Policy], Yeniçağ (a daily coming out of the Kemalist 
Ataturkist movement), September 2, 2013, http://www.yg.yenicaggazetesi.
com.tr, accessed September 5, 2013. Ekrem, Mahmut, “AKP politikalarının 
iflası, İsrail’in ekmeğine yağ sürüyor! (La faillite de la politique étrangère de 
l’AKP, du miel pour Israël)” [The Failure of the AKP Foreign Policy is Honey 
for Israel], posted on the blog “Muhalefet demokrasiye geliştirir” (L’opposition 
renforce la démocratie) [The Opposition Strengthens Democracy], August 
16, 2013, http://blog.milliyet.com.tr/profilimaspx, accessed September 5, 
2013. Halkarin Demokratik Kongesi (a political association with socialist and 
pro-Kurd leanings), in a communique dated October 5, 2013, association 
undertook to note in article 2 of its declaration of “the failure of the AKP gov-
ernment’s Middle East policy,” including its “inability to promote democratic 
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 109. Interview with T. Özhan, president of SETA (Foundation for Political, 
Economic, and Social Research, Ankara), January 2013. Interview with 
T. Küçükçan, director of foreign policy studies at SETA, December 2012, 
Istanbul.
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